

# **Occupied Palestinian Territories**

## **Mid-Term Evaluation**

**Thematic window: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment**

**Programme Title: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

**Author: Joel Beasca, Consultant**

## **Prologue**

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent “snapshot” of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the “Delivering as One” initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.

**Mid-Term Evaluation of the MDG-F Joint Programme entitled  
*Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*  
[MDGF-1702-B-PAL]**

**Revised Evaluation Report**

Prepared By:

Joel Beasca  
Independent Consultant

January 2011

**The MDG-F Secretariat  
One UN Plaza  
New York City**

I am now ready to submit this revised version of the evaluation report on the MDG-F Joint Programme entitled *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [MDGF-1702-B-PAL]*. This version has been revised based on the comments sent by the MDG-F Secretariat and the Evaluation Reference Group on the draft report.

In my opinion, the findings herein fairly represent the activities and results from the programme since it officially started in February 2009. These findings were derived from my review of the programme documents, and the interviews and discussions with various informants from the UN Agencies, the participating ministries and non-state institutions in the OPT, the local Spanish Cooperation Office and the MDG-F Secretariat in New York, the programme staff, and beneficiaries.

The facts that are stated in this report are based on the documents and verbal information that were obtained during the course of the evaluation. I have assumed that these facts, likewise indicated in the draft version, have been reviewed by the stakeholder groups. Still, the opinions and conclusions that follow are mine, and these may not necessarily represent the views of the persons and organizations consulted during the evaluation.

The key persons from the Executing UN Agencies and UNSCO provided all the necessary information and support to complete this report. Their counterparts from the PNA Ministries also ably assisted in giving and clarifying the information which were used in the evaluation. The Programme Secretariat delivered valuable service in convening the interviews and discussions, and freely extended other needs which were requested by the evaluation. The Technical Lead Agency and the Administrative Agent further granted additional assistance during the mission. In general, the stakeholder groups were cooperative to the exercise and receptive to the ideas that came out during the evaluation process.

It was a privilege to have been part of this exercise and the larger effort to successfully achieve the MDGs in Palestine.

**Joel Beasca  
Independent Consultant  
New York City**

27 January 2011

## List of Acronyms

ABC	- Activity-Based Costing
AECID	- Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
CAP	- Consolidated Appeals Process
CEDAW	- Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSO	- Civil Society Organization
ERG	- Evaluation Reference Group
FPCCIA	- Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
GBV	- Gender-Based Violence
GET	- Gender and Entrepreneurship Together
HSTF	- Human Security Trust Fund
ILO	- International Labor Organization
M & E	- Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	- Millennium Development Goals
MDG-F	- MDG Achievement Fund
MDTF	- Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOEHE	- Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MOL	- Ministry of Labor
MOPAD	- Ministry of Planning and Development
MOSA	- Ministry of Social Affairs
MOU	- Memorandum of Understanding
MOWA	- Ministry of Women's Affairs
MTRP	- Medium-Term Response Plan
NEX	- National Execution
NGO	- Non-Government Organization
NSC	- National Steering Committee
NWEC	- National Women's Employment Committee
OECD/DAC	- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
OPT	- Occupied Palestinian Territory
PCBS	- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PGFTU	- Palestinian General Federation of Trade Union
PLC	- Palestinian Legislative Council
PM	- Programme Manager
PMC	- Programme Management Committee
PMT	- Programme Management Team
PNA	- Palestinian National Authority
PS	- Programme Secretariat
RBM	- Results-Based Management
SMART	- Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant or Representative, Timely
TOR	- Terms of Reference
TOT	- Training of Trainers
TVET	- Technical Vocational Education Training
UN	- United Nations
UNDAF	- United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	- United Nations Development Group
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	- United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	- United Nations Population Fund
UNIFEM	- United Nations Fund for Women
UNRC	- United Nations Resident Coordinator
UNRWA	- United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCO	- United Nations Special Coordination Office
VAW	- Violence Against Women

## Table of Contents

	Page
<i>Executive Summary</i>	<i>i</i>
<b>I. Introduction</b>	
A. Background and Details on the Evaluation .....	1
B. Context of the Programme Area .....	3
<b>II. Findings and Analyses</b>	
A. Programme Design .....	7
B. Relevance of the Programme .....	12
C. Effectiveness of the Programme .....	14
D. Efficiency of the Programme .....	21
E. Prospects for Sustainability .....	26
<b>III. Conclusions</b> .....	27
<b>IV. Recommendations</b> .....	30
Annexes	
A. Itinerary of the Field Mission .....	33
B. Questionnaires Used for the Evaluation .....	34
C. List of Persons Consulted .....	37
D. List of Reference Materials .....	38
E. Comments on the Results Framework (Revised Version) .....	39
F. Assessment Criteria and Guide Questions .....	44

## ***Executive Summary***

There were changes in the political and security context of the programme area after the finalization of the programme document. Armed conflict occurred in Gaza which resulted in the closure of the area from the West Bank. Internal fighting between Palestinian groups also led to the inactivity of the PLC and difficulty of the PNA to operate in Gaza.

Preparations for the conduct of a mid-term evaluation of the joint programme entitled *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the OPT* started in May 2010, until an arrangement was reached to hold the field mission in early November 2010. The evaluation sought to discover the programme's design quality, understand how it operates and assess its efficiency, and identify the programme's degree of effectiveness. Aside from the conduct of the field mission, the evaluation was designed along MDG-F and UNEG standards which involved a review of documents, preparation of an inception report, and consultations with various informants.

The programme being evaluated generally aims to promote Palestinian women's social, economic and political empowerment through the following outcomes: reducing gender-based violence and all forms of violence against women and the girl child; increasing the representation of women and women's issues in decision-making bodies; and enhancing the opportunities for women to participate in the economy.

Most of targeted institutions were able to participate in the consultations organized during the mission. However, the planned visit to Gaza did not push through because of security constraints and a video conference with the Gaza Team was held instead. There are also limitations in the financial data used in this report because the reports were unaudited and not all the UN Agencies were able to submit updated data.

The changes in the larger context surrounding the programme are both challenging and favorable to the programme. Developments in the political and security situation have made the programme more difficult to implement in Gaza. Outcome 2 of the programme has also been placed at risk because of the inactivity of the PLC. At the same time, the PNA has remained optimistic to the achievement of the MDGs, particularly Goal 3, which is good for the programme.

The programme also had to pass through a process of re-design because considerable time had lapsed between the design phase and implementation phase. There was a need to review and re-design the programme because of changes that had already occurred within the intervening period. Nevertheless, the programme has remained highly relevant to the current situation in the OPT.

It was further found that the programme had been highly effective in terms of the quality of its work, its adherence to the joint programming standards and the development of national ownership over the programme, and on its synergistic, innovative and immediate effects. However, these successes are being pulled down primarily by problems in the achievement of results, and also by the limited outreach in Gaza.

There is a significant delay in the completion of programme activities, and this delay is putting the achievement of results at risk. The causes of the delay are: (a) a Lengthy Start-Up Period, covering both the need for a re-design and the late staffing of programme personnel; (b) the Newness of the Undertaking; (c) Extensive Procedures in place among the UN Agencies; (d) the Combined Commitment Rate System adopted for the MDG-F programmes; (e) Political and Security Constraints in the programme area; (f) Internal Agency Constraints in some UN Agencies; and (g) a Need to Harmonize Schedules in the local setting. Nevertheless, the programme has already accomplished several key output indicators and milestones.

Because it is the first time that a joint programme is being implemented in the OPT, there have been some management inefficiencies that the evaluation has noted. There are also some issues raised in the report that are related to management accountability and administration. At the same time, there are

noticeable strengths on programme management, specifically the minimal staff turnover and the adoption of innovative approaches. Performance on financial efficiency has also shown mixed results: cost efficiency is high, but budget efficiency could stand serious improvement.

There is also no sustainability strategy yet which has been formally adopted for the programme, although there are indications that the programme has potential to become sustainable.

There are notable features in the programme which are cited in the report. These include: (a) a conscious effort to deliver high-quality activities and outputs; (b) the collaboration with a broad spectrum of organizations from the PNA, NGOs, business groups, and the academe; (c) an openness to adapt to local demands; (d) the potential pioneering efforts in gender equality and women's empowerment in the area and in the region; and (e) a willingness to make further experiments on the joint programme concept.

The evaluation identified the following lessons from the programme experience thus far:

- There are significant participation costs incurred when the gap between the programme design phase and its actual implementation phase is too wide, especially for a joint programme in which the element of national ownership is highly valued.
- Further guidance from the MDG-F Secretariat on programme inception and revision of the Results Framework would have been helpful to the programme implementers. Technical assistance on programme planning and RBM would have also been productive.
- Timely release of financial inputs does not necessarily lead to timely implementation of activities. UN Agency procedures and practices are among the factors that create a lag in the results chain. Hence, for a future similar programme, these procedures and practices should adapt to the assumptions underlying the results chain.
- In programme planning, it is important to distinguish the start-up activities from the core activities within the implementation phase. It is also important to allot a period for the exit of the programme.
- The management of a joint programme is more complicated than it is for a regular programme or project, because of a wider span of participation from various stakeholders. While there are costs associated with this arrangement, there are also synergies that can make up for these costs.
- The commitment rate system is a weak method for fund releases if there is a large difference between it and the actual disbursement rate. Applying this system given such a difference will result in budget inefficiency.

The evaluation recommended the following:

1. The programme implementers should apply for an extension period until the maximum time allowed, and the MDG-F Secretariat should consider its approval.
2. The programme implementers should review and finalize the Results Framework.
3. The MDG-F Secretariat should consider the application for programme extension.
4. The new work plan and budget should include disaggregated interventions and inputs specific to Gaza and the West Bank, and the activities under the exit phase.
5. The activities and budget to be developed should include the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation capacities at the level of the UN Agencies and the partner-organizations, as part of the overall sustainability strategy.
6. A Monitoring Plan should be adopted for the programme.

7. The TOR for the various management structures, as well as for the special function units (i.e. Technical Lead Agency, Coordination Office, Administrative Agent, and Programme Manager) should be revisited and improved, and an organizational structure should be defined based on these TOR.
8. Based on these TOR, the programme should also develop its communication plan.
9. The risk factors affecting the programme should be reviewed, and clear measures should be taken on some elements which are doable.
10. The actual synergies being created may now start to be defined and elaborated by the programme.
11. The programme should document its experiences on joint programming because it has several interesting experiences in joint programme planning and management that can be useful in the future.

## I. Introduction

### A. Background and Details on the Evaluation

#### 1. Origins of the Evaluation

In May 2010, preliminary discussions were held between the Consultant and the MDG-F Secretariat in New York on the mid-term evaluation of the MDG-F Joint Programmes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). Consultations have also been going on between the MDG-F Secretariat and the programme implementers in the OPT. It was agreed at that time that the field missions be carried out after the Ramadhan Period in September 2010.

Near the end of Ramadhan in September 2010, the MDG-F Secretariat renewed the earlier effort to undertake the mid-term evaluations. A critical point in the preparations was the scheduling of the field mission for the two joint programmes in the OPT. Finally, an arrangement was reached for the field mission to be held during the first two weeks of November 2010.<sup>1</sup>

#### 2. Evaluation Objectives

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for this evaluation set the following objectives:

- a. To discover the programme's design quality and internal coherence (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the Millennium Development Goals, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action;
- b. To understand how the joint programme operates and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework; and
- c. To identify the programme's degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Gender and Women Empowerment thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

#### 3. Approach and Methodology

This evaluation was designed following the basic standards set by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG). There was stakeholder participation in the planning of the exercise, various stakeholder groups were consulted during the field mission, and their inputs were considered in revising the draft version of this report. At the same time, the independence of the undertaking was consciously asserted and its integrity was protected.

This evaluation gives emphasis on the achievement of results expected from the joint programme (i.e. the outputs and outcomes committed in the Results Framework), which is being analyzed from the purview of Results-Based Management (RBM). While the evaluation identified certain weaknesses or gaps on this aspect, the intention was to clearly identify such weaknesses or gaps in order to come up with possible solutions which could still be done within the remaining half of the joint programme. This is also an effort to contribute to the lessons being learned on joint programming and the achievement of the MDGs.

---

<sup>1</sup> Aside from this *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the OPT* Programme, there is also a second joint programme entitled *Culture and Development in the OPT* Programme which is being supported by the MDG-F.

Given this approach, the evaluation first held briefings with the MDG-F Secretariat on September 2010. Documents which were provided by the MDG-F Secretariat were also reviewed and an Inception Report was prepared. This inception report was thereafter forwarded to an Evaluation Reference Group (ERG)<sup>2</sup> which provided comments on the initial findings and suggestions on the proposed methodology.<sup>2</sup>

A field mission to the OPT was carried out from October 31 until November 11, 2010. Group and individual meetings with the participating UN Agencies, Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Institutions, Beneficiaries, the UN Special Coordination Office (UNSCO), the Programme Secretariat (PS), Programme Management Team (PMT), Programme Management Committee (PMC), and other organizations were held during the mission. A preliminary meeting and a final debriefing were also held with the ERG [Annex A].

Prior to the field mission, a standard questionnaire was sent via e-mail to key informants [Annex B]. The responses to the questionnaires were used as bases in elaborating the structured, while open-ended, group and individual discussions with the persons consulted during the mission [Annex C].

More documents were provided during the mission by the informants who were consulted during the process. Other documents were also sent by the Programme Secretariat prior to the mission. These and other references were reviewed for the evaluation [Annex D].

A draft version of this report was forwarded by the MDG-F Secretariat to the ERG for factual corrections and comments. Factual errors were corrected by the Consultant on this revised version, and comments were considered. The MDG-F Secretariat will send this revised version back to the ERG, together with a template for an Improvement Plan which should be based on the recommendations later raised in the evaluation report.

#### 4. Assessment Criteria

The programme was evaluated on the bases of its Design, Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Prospects for Sustainability. The guide questions that were used in exploring these criteria are shown in Annex F.

#### 5. Disclosure of Limitations

##### a. Extent of Institutional Participation

The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOEHE) was included in the agenda for the field mission. However, the scheduled meeting with MOEHE on November 1, 2010 did not push through and there was no opportunity to arrange for another meeting. Hence, the opinion and information from the MOEHE is not included in this report. Nevertheless, the rest of the institutions which were included in the agenda were able to participate in the mission activities [Table 1].

---

<sup>2</sup> Based on the guidelines set for the evaluation, an Evaluation Reference Group was formed especially for the exercise. This group was composed by members of the PMC, the lead ministries in the OPT, and the PS.

**Table 1. Summary of Target and Actual Institutional Participation**

	Target Number	Actual Number	% of Participation
NSC Members	3	3	100%
PMC Members	8	8	100%
PMT Members	6	6	100%
PNA Institutions	5	4	80%

b. Quality of Financial Data

Not all the UN Agencies were able to submit their latest available financial data. As such, the evaluation's use of such data is bounded by time gaps. The data submitted for this evaluation are also unaudited.<sup>3</sup>

c. Programme Sites Visited

The original agenda for the field mission also included a site visit to Gaza, aside from the visits to the West Bank (i.e. Ramallah). Due to security constraints however, the visit to Gaza did not push through. In lieu of the site visit, a video conference with the Gaza Team was held on November 10.

d. Time Limitation

In conformity with the generic TOR for all mid-term evaluations under the MDG-F, the exercise was intended to be rapid and abbreviated. Missions were generally expected to be held only for 5 – 7 days. For this evaluation, the duration of the mission was 8 days, excluding the time of arrival and departure [Annex A].<sup>4</sup>

**B. Context of the Programme Area**

**1. Changes in the Political and Security Context**

After the finalization of the Programme Document in October 2007, there was a resurgence of armed fighting in Gaza between Palestinians and Israeli forces in the last few days of 2008 until early 2009. Around 1,000 people died and 5,000 were injured from both sides during the attacks. A large number of roads, establishments, and social service infrastructure were damaged. It was also estimated that the number of persons displaced by the fighting could have reached some 25,000 per day.

While the violence eventually ended through the declaration of temporary ceasefires by both sides, there were continuing armed incidents in Gaza, although these have been of a lesser scale. The sanctions that were imposed after the fighting are however still in place, and these are leading to greater hardships. The closure of the perimeter borders is preventing the free movement of persons and goods from and towards the area. As a result, it believed that more than 3,000 businesses closed down and 75,000 workers lost their jobs. Around 30% of the residents in Gaza did not have a regular supply of water because of the sanctions.

<sup>3</sup> 3 out of the 6 UN Agencies were not able to submit updated [October 2010] financial data.

<sup>4</sup> This clarification is in response to a comment on the draft version about more time needed to conduct the evaluation.

In the West Bank, the situation is more peaceful and the economy is functional. Still, there are trends towards the disruption of peace brought about by the gradual physical constriction of Palestinian communities. The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is on-going; in 2009, it was reported that there were over 130 of these settlements in the area. There have been incidents of fighting among civilians because of these events. The physical wall that separates Israeli and Palestinian areas within the West Bank has extended to roughly 400 kilometers. Roadblocks and checkpoints plus the identification card system further restrict the movement of persons and raise the cost of transporting goods.

Internal fighting between Palestinian groups is also contributing to political instability, the breakdown of peace and order, and the ineffectiveness of public governance. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) remains dysfunctional since the dissolution of the national government in 2007. As such, critical policy measures could not be passed. Some Fatah-affiliated state institutions could not perform their duties in the Hamas-controlled Gaza area.

## 2. UN Strategy and Joint Programmes in the OPT

In view of the special situation in the programme area, the UN is combining humanitarian assistance in Gaza with development efforts in the West Bank. On-going development work by UN Agencies in the West Bank is guided by a Medium-Term Response Plan (MTRP) which is substitute for a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The MTRP is a two-year plan which was adopted in mid-2009.<sup>5</sup>

Based on the discussion with UNSCO, the programme being evaluated is the first joint programme to be implemented in the OPT. It is one of three joint programmes that are on-going in the area, two of which are being funded through the MDG-F. There is also a third joint programme supported by the Human Security Trust Fund (HSTF) which has started last July 2010 [Table 2].<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Parallel humanitarian work in Gaza is on the other hand guided by a separate document entitled “Consolidated Appeals Process” or CAP.

<sup>6</sup> It was clarified during the discussion that a previous programme under the Global Fund to Fight HIV, AIDS and Malaria implemented by UN Agencies in the OPT could not really be considered as a joint programme, with reference to the standards set by the UN Development Group (UNDG).

**Table 2. Summary Data on Joint Programmes in the OPT**

<b>Programme Title</b>	<b>Implementation Period</b>	<b>No. of Participating UN Agencies</b>	<b>Budget/Fund Source</b>
Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the OPT	February 2009 – January 2010	6	US\$9.0 million/MDG-F
Culture and Development in the OPT	March 2009 – February 2010	4	US\$3.0 million/MDG-F
Livelihood Protection and Sustainable Empowerment of Vulnerable, Rural and Refugee Communities in the Jordan Valley	July 2010 – June 2013	4	US\$4.6 million/HSTF

Sources: UNSCO and UNESCO

### 3. Overall Progress in the MDGs

Despite the constraints, the PNA is continuing its commitment to work towards the attainment of the MDGs. Due to the continuing political uncertainty, the PNA is nonetheless considering two scenarios in achieving the MDGs within the time frame of 2015. The latest [August 2010] MDG Progress Report prepared by the PNA shows a high level of national confidence in attaining goals 2, 3, and 6, given both scenarios. The confidence level for goal 7 is, on the other end, low. The PNA seems to be confident in achieving the primary goal (1) under a condition of state sovereignty, together with goals 4 and 8 [Table 3].

**Table 3. MDG Data, as of August 2010**

Goals, Targets, and Indicators	Probability of Achievement	
	Scenario 1: Occupation	Scenario 2: Sovereignty
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Unlikely	Likely
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	Likely	Likely
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	Likely	Likely
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Unlikely	Likely
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Potentially	Likely
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Likely	Likely
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Unlikely	Unlikely
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development	Unlikely	Likely

Source: MDG Progress Report

## II. Findings and Analyses

### A. Programme Design

#### 1. Programme Formulation and Start

The timeline of events show that after the submission of a Concept Note, a draft version of the Programme Document was completed by October 2007, after which a formal approval by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office was sent in April 2008. The approval letter nevertheless suggested further revisions on the management and reporting of the programme; these were applied to the final version of the Programme Document which was signed on November 2008.

However, the programme officially started on February 2009 when the first transfer of funds to the participating UN Agencies was completed. From this reckoning date, around 16 months have lapsed since the onset of the programme design phase. Further, the programme management staff came on board by July 2009, only after which the operating activities were reported to have started.<sup>7</sup>

Considering all these, it turns out that there was a significant time interval of 16 - 22 months between the programme's design phase and its implementation phase, which in turn, affected (i.e. extended) the start-up process. There is a common belief by programme management, the PNA Ministries, and at least one original proponent of the programme that this large intervening period led to the allotment of more time to undertake another round of consultations and other preliminary activities, instead of directly implementing the core activities. One variable that came in during the intervening period were the turnovers among the focal persons who were involved in the programme planning phase: by the time that the programme was about to be implemented, the informed focal persons were gone and their replacements had to be re-oriented about the programme.

Another factor was the updating of the basic assumptions underlying the programme: informants from the PNA Ministries believed that new needs and realities have emerged since the original planning period, and that there was a need to review these factors once again and arrive at a common understanding about the programme before it is actually implemented. One example that can be cited to elaborate this point is the PNA's development plan. When the programme document was being drafted, reference was made to the *2005-2007 Medium-Term Development Plan* by the PNA. At the time of implementation however, a new *2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan* was already in place. Because the element of national ownership is a key feature of this joint programme, the programme implementers have been pro-active in ensuring that the programme activities would be in line with the national plan.

#### 2. Programme Inception

After the hiring of the programme management staff in July 2009, an Inception Workshop was immediately held within the same month. Based on the minutes of this workshop, the activity was attended by the 6 participating UN Agencies, the MOPAD and the MOWA on the side of the PNA, and the programme management staff. The agenda covered a review of the plan of each agency for the next 6 months, the formation of technical committees, and the next steps that will be taken after the workshop.

The minutes of the workshop, as well as the discussions about this activity held during the mission, nonetheless indicate that the inception of the programme was not finalized during the workshop. Changes were still made by some UN Agencies on the activities, budgets and methodology afterwards. Because the key persons from some UN Agencies also came on board within this period, the basic consultations and needs assessments were also re-done. Key persons from one UN Agency reported that they were hired only in January 2010, after which they made changes in some

---

<sup>7</sup> Programme management believes that the starting date should be reckoned from their date of hiring, and not from the fund transfer date.

activities. The Results Framework for the programme was itself revised (the plan to revise the framework was discussed during the inception workshop) through a process that lasted until November 2009. These changes were however done with the knowledge of the PMC. Some informants who were present during the workshop noted that the activity served more as a presentation of agency plans and the identification of overlaps, rather than a real inception of the programme. Based on the data gathered by the evaluation, inception activities could have extended until November 2009 (when the revised Results Framework was completed) or even January 2010 (as reported by one UN Agency).<sup>8</sup>

### 3. Results Framework

As earlier stated, the Results Framework for the programme was revised, as agreed upon during the Inception Workshop. This was done through a process of consultations that were held from August until November 2009. Revisions on the said framework emanated from the overall review of the programme by new focal persons from the PNA Ministries and the other participating organizations. These revisions were limited to the indicators and some activities, and not on the outcomes and outputs. This was a good effort to enhance the results framework, based on fresh views and realizations by the programme implementers. Nevertheless, the framework as summarized in Table 4 and specified in Annex E may still be revisited and it may stand further improvement on the following aspects:

- *The number of indicators for each result* - The number of indicators for each output and outcome varies from 1 to 5. Having only 1 indicator weakens the integrity of the result. A rational allocation of the number of indicators could be based on the results structure of the joint programme (i.e. based on the number of agencies that are working on each output);

---

<sup>8</sup> Based on the comments on the draft report, there appears to be a need to clarify on what is meant by programme 'inception'. From the evaluation's perspective, there are 3 phases in a development intervention: the start-up phase, the implementation phase, and the exit phase. The inception activity is part of the start-up phase, and is the last planning step taken before moving on into the implementation phase. The inception of an intervention is a process taken after the formulation of the approved project or programme document. It now aims to elaborate on how the intervention is understood by the implementers at that particular point in time (i.e. what will be done), and how the intervention will be implemented based on such an understanding (i.e. how it will be done). Between the time when the project or programme document was approved and the time of inception, the design and methodology for the intervention can be still be changed (or updated) in view of changes in the overall context or based on a sound assessment of the project/programme design. This means that the results, activities, budget allocation, and implementation methodology can still be changed at this intervening period. It also means that the Results Framework, plan of activities, and implementation strategy should have been reviewed during this time, and finalized during the inception activity.

In RBM, the basic concept being followed is the concept of a Results Chain. This means, among others, that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between activities and outputs (i.e. the first-level result). In other words, it means that once the activities have been completed, then the outputs associated with those activities will be achieved. This is why it is not easy to change the activities: changing the activities will affect the achievement of the outputs! This is also why the activities (and also the inputs and results) have to be finalized during the inception stage.

The inception of an intervention becomes more logically important in view of the new concepts in RBM. From this view, project/programme inception is very much different from a project/programme orientation.

It follows that the actual implementation of an intervention is done after the inception activity. Note that we are now referring to the "implementation of activities" in this phase: the activities which are supposed to lead towards the achievement of the outputs (i.e. no longer the start-up activities). From a purely technical standpoint, changes in the inputs, activities, and results should no longer be allowed in this phase. However, in real life, projects and programmes do allow changes even within this phase. The real question is how much change is allowable during the implementation phase which will not compromise the concept of a Results Chain (e.g. in some agencies, changes in activities and outputs are allowed, as long as the proper protocols are followed and the results framework remains logical).

- *The formulation of indicators* - A clear criteria for formulating the indicators may have to be set. For example, if the SMART criteria are applied, some indicators may not qualify because these appear to be vague and do not represent the result. According to the M & E Officer, there could also be a difficulty in the collection of information pertaining to some indicators which do not have a baseline and which require the conduct of special surveys to generate the information (i.e. there will be a problem in the timeliness of these indicators);<sup>9</sup> and
- *The formulation of targets* - Some targets in the revised framework are “activity” targets (e.g. number of trainings) which may not measure the change to be created by the programme (i.e. the “result” as distinct from the “activity”: what happened after the training?). Some targets also do not seem to match the indicator.

Conceptually, there may also be a need to review and agree on what an “outcome” means. Based on the discussions with the M & E Officer, it appears that the programme understands an “outcome” as a higher-level result which is being shared by the programme with other interventions. Hence, Outcome 1 has been formulated as such, although its indicators do not exactly conform to the result statement. One reference which could be useful in coming up with a common understanding of this term (and all other terms being used in the results framework) are the OECD/DAC definitions [2007 Proposed Harmonized Version]. Based on these definitions, the programme could actually be referring to an impact-level change, which is not covered by the framework. There may therefore be a need to revise the formulation of Outcome 1 at the least, or modify its indicators.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Some interventions apply the SMART criteria as guide in selecting the indicators: **S**pecific - The indicator cannot be interpreted in another way; **M**easurable - The indicator has a clear size, amount or degree; **A**ttainable - The indicator can be possibly achieved; **R**elevant or **R**epresentative - The indicator is a logical representative of the result; and **T**imely - The indicator can be collected in time.

<sup>10</sup> Based on the OECD/DAC definition, an *outcome* refers to the “intended or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners”. This is distinct from an *impact*, which could be the “positive and negative long-term effects on identifiable population groups produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended”.

**Table 4. Comparative Features of Original and Revised Results Framework**

Results	No. of Indicators		Comments on the Revised Version
	Original	Revised	
<p><b>Outcome 1: Gender based violence and all forms of violence against women and the girl child reduced</b></p> <p><u>Output 1.1:</u> Knowledge and baseline on VAW and GBV established to monitor gender equity goals and inform program development</p> <p><u>Output 1.2:</u> Capacity of gender advocates to influence policy decision-making and practice in relation to discriminatory legislation increased</p> <p><u>Output 1.3:</u> Capacity to provide refuge, security, basic services and access to justice strengthened</p> <p><u>Output 1.4:</u> Awareness raised, behaviour and attitudes changed amongst men and women on gender relations, women's entitlements and rights</p>	1	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The indicators do not represent the result</li> <li>- Some targets do not match the indicator</li> <li>- Some targets are "activity" targets</li> <li>- Only 1 indicator has been set for this output</li> <li>- This has the same indicator as the outcome</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcome 2: Representation of women and women's issues in decision-making bodies increased</b></p> <p><u>Output 2.1:</u> Knowledge and baseline on women's political representation used to monitor equity goals and inform programme development</p> <p><u>Output 2.2:</u> Increased capacity of local government and authorities and grassroots organizations to identify, plan and deliver gender-sensitive services and on MDGs</p>	12	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some indicators do not represent the result</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcome 3: Enhanced opportunities for women to participate economically, equally</b></p> <p><u>Output 3.1:</u> Influence of gender advocates, workers and employers organizations in decision-making and planning is increased particularly in relation to reforming discriminatory labour laws and planning for gender-sensitive employment opportunities</p> <p><u>Output 3.2:</u> Capacity of MoL (including its institutions), workers' and employers' organizations developed to implement specific measures that promote women's employment and protect them in the workplace</p> <p><u>Output 3.3:</u> Employment opportunities for low-income women and female graduates including in refugee camps are increased</p>	5	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The targets do not match the indicator</li> <li>- There could be 2 indicators put together as 1</li> <li>- Some indicators do not represent the result</li> <li>- 1 target does not match the indicator</li> <li>- The same indicators are used</li> <li>- Some targets do not match the indicator</li> </ul>

Sources: Original and Revised Results Framework

The apparent need to arrive at a common understanding on some basic definitions and make further improvements in the Results Framework makes it difficult for the evaluation to establish whether or not the programme has been ambitiously designed. Still, it would be highly logical to assert that programme intentions to change social behavior, perhaps indicated by reduced cases of GBV and VAW, would be very difficult to achieve given the limited time frame.

Operationally, the protocols in revising the results framework were apparently also not made clear. There had been no clear communication or definite approval on the revisions, and programme management assumed that the MDG-F Secretariat had approved the revisions because this is the one which is being used in the monitoring reports.

#### 4. Support to Programme Design

Records show that the MGD-F Secretariat and the Spanish Cooperation Office in the OPT have actively participated in formulating the programme document and in improving the programme design. Comments and suggestions were forwarded to the programme proponents on the management system to be adopted for the programme, as well as its priorities. Management guidelines were also developed later to help in joint programme management. These included the roles of an NSC, PMC, and programme management staff. Reporting templates were also provided by the MDG-F Secretariat.

During the implementation stage, the MDG-F Secretariat had also organized a field mission on December 2009 to monitor the progress of the programme, identify some issues and challenges, and suggest improvements. A video conference was also held earlier, in April 2009, as a preliminary step towards the field mission. The comments and suggestions by the MDG-F Secretariat for the improvement of the programme were documented and sent back to the programme implementers in the OPT.

In hindsight however, further support to the design of the programme could have been rendered on the following aspects:

- *Technical support in checking the coherence and feasibility of the Programme Document and Results Framework given the final budget allocation and the revisions done on later versions* - It turned out that the original programme concept was designed at a cost of US\$11.1 million. This was eventually scaled down to US\$10.8 million, and then US\$9 million. It could not be ascertained if the later versions of the programme document and results framework were still proportionate to the level of resources which were finally made available;<sup>11</sup>
- *Guidelines on how to conduct the inception workshop for the programme* - There did not appear to be clear guidelines from the MDG-F Secretariat on what the expectations are from an inception exercise and how it is supposed to be conducted; and
- *General support in RBM* - Aside from the reporting templates that were provided by the MDG-F Secretariat and its initiative to hold this formative evaluation, basic support could also have been provided in arriving at a common understanding about the results-based management of the programme, specifically on the concept of a results chain and the relevance of the disbursement rate in this concept, as well as the definitions of the key terms being used in the programme (i.e. results, activities, outputs, and outcomes). The benchmarking of targets based on comparable MDG-F programmes in other countries would also have been helpful.

---

<sup>11</sup> One example is the budget for the baseline study: according to programme management, it was found out later that the programme had no budget to conduct the baseline study for some indicators which were included in the results framework.

## B. Relevance of the Programme

### 1. Foundations of the Programme

Prior to the implementation of the programme in 2009, the PNA had already taken significant steps that lead towards gender equality and women's empowerment in the OPT. The Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) was created in 2003 to integrate women's concerns in the mainstream of government plans and policies. In 2004 and 2005, a quota system was adopted in the OPT which allocated women-representatives in the local and national legislative councils. The 2005-2007 Medium-Term Development Plan which was adopted by the PNA for the OPT recognized the role of women in the development process and granted preference to projects and programmes that are "gender-sensitive and contribute to female empowerment". In 2008, the Palestinian Cabinet endorsed the formation of a National Committee to Combat Violence Against Women and created gender units in the various PNA Ministries.

The programme had been anchored on these initial efforts, while aiming to further raise the PNA's gender equality outlook and agenda to specific issues and needs, and to transform policy decisions into concrete forms of action. The problem of domestic violence, for instance, had only been initially addressed by the PNA in the prior period, although statistical data which were available at that time [2005] already showed its prevalence in Palestinian society. "Honor killings" also became controversial in the implementation period when there was an attempt to downgrade such acts for lesser punishment. The economic participation of women had also been an unexplored dimension at the baseline period, which the programme eventually sought to magnify. While there was already a Cabinet decision to create gender units in the ministries, this policy had not yet been fully enforced.

In general, the programme came at a time when there was a need to broaden the theme of gender equality and women's empowerment in the Palestinian setting beyond the level of sensitivity, political participation, and development planning, towards the other dimensions of women's access to justice and economic opportunities. It also came at a time when there was a need to follow-up the favorable policies and initiatives that were launched in the prior period.

### 2. Relevance of the Programme to the Current National Context

Current data suggest that the programme is responding to continuing gender-based problems and issues in the OPT. In 2009, it was reported that there were more than 1,000 VAW cases which were registered at the police. This was an increase from the 774 registered cases in 2008. There is still no law against domestic violence in the OPT. Because of the greater incidence of "honor killings" starting in 2009, the Palestinian Cabinet in early 2010 took an initiative that aimed to elevate these acts as major crimes. While there have been improvements in women's economic participation and decision-making in the OPT, it is believed that these have not yet reached significant levels. The programme interventions are hence fit to these continuing problems and issues.

The programme also remains relevant to the current plans in the OPT.

- In March 2009, the Palestinian President signed the *CEDAW* and adopted *UN Resolution No. 1325* which committed the PNA to protect women's rights in accordance with internationally-accepted standards. However, there are difficulties in the actual implementation of these provisions because of different laws prevailing in the OPT and limitations in the enforcement of these laws by the PNA. The programme is nonetheless working on certain deliverables (e.g. National Strategy to Combat VAW) relevant to the CEDAW that are still achievable given these constraints.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> For instance, the nationality law of Jordan is being followed in the West Bank while the nationality law of Egypt is the one being applied in Gaza. Unlike men, both laws do not grant women the right to pass on their nationality to their spouses or children. Also, it was pointed out that the Palestinian President endorsed the CEDAW despite the fact that the PNA is not a member-state of the UN (i.e. the PNA is attending UN functions in observer status).

- A *Palestinian Reform and Development Plan* for 2008 until 2010 was adopted by the PNA which envisions a future Palestinian State that “promotes equality between men and women”. A women’s economic empowerment program led by MOWA is included in this plan. This program aims to provide women with entrepreneurship skills and to remove gender discrimination in the laws and policies of the OPT.
- A new *Palestinian National Plan* for 2011-2013 is also currently being prepared. The programme has been pro-active in mainstreaming gender issues in this plan through the interface of a National Strategy to Combat VAW which was developed through MOWA.

Informants from MOWA validated the relevance of the programme to the policies and priorities of the PNA. They particularly cited the relevance of key programme activities and outputs, such as the National Strategy to Combat VAW, the gender training of government personnel, the women’s vocational trainings, and the establishment of a shelter.<sup>13</sup>

On the part of the UN System in the OPT, the joint programme objectives and activities have been integrated into the current (2009-2010) *Medium-Term Response Plan* which recognizes gender and diversity as a cross-cutting theme. There are also at least 2 outputs under the Results Framework of the MTRP which are directly linked to the programme.<sup>14</sup>

### 3. Contribution of the Programme to the National MDGs and the Global MDG-F Theme

Aside from its direct link to the achievement of Goal 3 in the OPT (Promotion of Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women), the programme is also contributing to the national effort to reach Goal 1 (Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Hunger). Outcomes 2 and 3 of the programme are related to two targets and four indicators under these goals [Table 5].

While Outcome 1 of the programme is not linked to the national-level MDGs because of the absence of targets and indicators pertaining to GBV/VAW in Goal 3 of the MDGs worldwide, Outcome 1 is highly associated with the thematic priorities on gender equality and women’s empowerment of the MDG-F, as it will definitely lead to the reduction of the vulnerability of Palestinian women to violence. Outcomes 2 and 3 are also part of the global MDG-F priorities because these are enhancing the capacities of the women in Palestine and their access to resources and other opportunities.

---

<sup>13</sup> From the five-point Lickert Scale applied in the questionnaire [Annex B], MOWA assessed the programme to be “Highly Relevant” to the policies and priorities of the PNA.

<sup>14</sup> These are: Output 3.2 - Government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have improved capacities to empower women in community building; and Output 3.3 - National capacities to provide refuge, security and reintegration essential services for survivors of gender based violence are strengthened. These are under Outcome 3 of the MTRP which is focused on social protection.

**Table 5. Selected MDG Targets in the OPT and Related Programme Outcomes**

Selected MDG Targets	Related Programme Outcomes
<p>Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employment-to-population ratio</li> <li>• Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;">Outcome 3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Outcome 3</p>
<p>Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector</li> <li>• Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;">Outcome 3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Outcome 2</p>

C. Effectiveness of the Programme

1. Achievement of Results<sup>15</sup>

a. Delivery of Financial Inputs

After receiving the signed copy of the Programme Document, the MDG-F Secretariat immediately transferred the full amount of US\$9.0 million to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office by December 2008. The MDTF then advanced the Year 1 budget of US\$3.54 million to the participating UN Agencies, through their respective headquarters, in January-February 2009. Because the first fund transfer was completed by February 2009, programme start had been officially reckoned from this date [Table 6].

<sup>15</sup> The analytical framework used in this section is based on the concept of a “Results Chain”, which relates Inputs to Activities, and Activities to Results: (i.e. Inputs ► Activities ► Outputs ► Outcomes ► Impact). This concept implies the following cause-and-effect relationships: (a) financial and other inputs are needed to conduct the activities; (b) planned activities should be completed in order to achieve the outputs, (c) the attainment of outputs should lead towards the achievement of outcomes; and (c) the achievement of outcomes will lead to the realization of long-term impact. Hence, the framework is premised on the following premises: (a) a delay in the delivery of the inputs will also delay the conduct of activities, and ultimately, the results; (b) because the input requirements should match the planned activities, a lesser amount of inputs would also reduce the level of activities, and this will therefore affect the achievement of results; and (c) because the outputs are supposed to lead towards the outcomes, non-achievement of any output will place the attainment of outcomes (and the impact) at risk.

**Table 6. Schedule of Fund Releases from MDTF Office to Executing Agency Headquarters**

Date	Amount (US\$)
January/February 2009	3.54 million
October 2010	3.05 million
	6.59 million

Source: MDTF Website

b. Completion of Activities

However, the planned activities indicated in the programme document obviously did not start as scheduled. Except for one case, the Programme Secretariat and the other key persons from the other UN Agencies (i.e. the Programme Coordinators and Associates) were hired and were only able to begin their work in disparate periods starting from June 2009 until even March 2010 [Table 7]. These imply that the core activities could have been delayed at the onset by at least five months. Based on the discussions, it appears that the following factors affected the lengthy period of staffing: (i) a normally lengthy recruitment process prevailing at the UN Agencies, especially considering the centralized systems in some agencies; (ii) a failure in the first job posting, which required a second round of recruitment; (iii) a turnover occurred in one agency, which necessitated another staff to take over the post; and (iv) according to existing policies, it was not possible for the agencies to commence the recruitment process before the first fund transfer had actually been consummated.

**Table 7. Schedule of Current Personnel Hiring**


	Hiring Date	Time from Programme Start
<u>Programme Secretariat</u>		
Programme Manager	July 2009	+5 months
M & E Officer	July 2009	+5 months
<u>UN Agency Focal Persons</u>		
UNIFEM	July 2009	+5 months
UNDP	October 2009	+8 months
ILO	June/July 2009	+4/+5 months
UNFPA	August 2009	+6 months
UNRWA	January/March 2010	+11/+13 months
UNESCO	April 2009	+2 months

Sources: Focus Group Discussions and Interviews

As earlier noted, the start-up of the programme had also been extended because the counterpart key persons from the PNA Ministries had also changed over the course of time since the programme was designed until it was actually implemented. There was also a felt need to review the programme design anew and make adjustments based on perceived current realities in the OPT. The programme proponents had also been keen in establishing the element of national ownership over the intervention, and were willing to allot more time for consultations, building consensus, and aligning the programme activities with the pace and plans of the Palestinian ministries.

There is general acknowledgment among the implementers that the programme is delayed. The extent of the delay has not yet been quantified by programme management. The evaluation nonetheless estimates the extent of delay to be significant: on the whole, only around 47% of the Year 1 activities (programme start + 12 months) have been completed as of the mid-term period (programme start + 18 months). This means that the programme could be behind schedule (within a three-year time frame) by roughly 12 months. Activities under Outcome 2 and Outcome 3 have comparatively lagged behind the activities under Outcome 1 [Chart 1].

**Chart 1. Estimated Level of Completion of Activities, until July 2010**



Source: Consultant's estimates based on financial data in the Year 1 Work Plan and July 2010 Monitoring Report

The discussion with the PMC identified the following factors that contributed to the overall delay in programme implementation:

- *Lengthy Start-Up Period* - As earlier reported, there was a need at the start to make changes in the programme design in order to align the programme with new developments in the OPT. There were also turnovers among the key persons in the partner-institutions, which required another round of consultation and orientation about the programme, as well as agreements about the budgets. The PMC also noted that there was a need to overcome an initial resistance from some Palestinian institutions because their new focal persons have not been involved in the original planning process;<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> One example on how the turnovers in the PNA side have affected the programme is the case of the PCBS, in which the key person changed 3 times. It was also found during the course of the negotiation that the budgeted amount to conduct a survey was no longer adequate.

- *It is a New Undertaking* - This programme is the first real joint programme to be implemented in the OPT: the participating UN Agencies, UNSCO, the PNA Ministries, and even the Spanish Cooperation Office are all still learning from this initial experience. There is a high premium being placed on the participation and ownership in the programme, which has taken some time to develop. The discussion for instance noted that there have been instances of miscommunication or misinterpretation of communication within some agencies, which needed time to collectively resolve;
- *Extensive UN Agency Procedures* - It was recognized that some UN Agencies had time-consuming recruitment and financial procedures that also caused the delay. The centralized system being followed by some agencies, and an inability to adapt to programme needs, also came out as a factor in the other discussions;<sup>17</sup>
- *Fund Release System* - The combined nature of the commitment rate system which was applied for the second release of funds was cited by one agency as a reason for their delay. Apparently, the agency had already fully disbursed its first year budget but was unable to access the next set of funds because the other agencies had difficulty in submitting their commitment documents; and
- *Political and Security Constraints* - The political and security developments in the OPT since the start of the programme have curtailed the movement and communication of personnel, especially in Gaza.

In addition to these, it turned out that *Internal Agency Constraints* and a *Need to Harmonize Schedules* are contributing to the delay. For the second time since the start of the programme, the workers' union in one participating UN Agency has gone on strike. This agency also has separate management systems (e.g. fund accounting) between the West Bank and Gaza, which doubles the level of effort on programme supervision. Another agency explained that they had to adjust to the schedule of the school system in the OPT since they have to work with the schools. Ministry personnel are also busy with their own tasks, and it had not been easy to find a common schedule for the training activities which involved the participation of personnel from various ministries.

While some agencies are confident that they will still be able to achieve the (agency-level) results despite the delay, the ability of the programme as a whole to achieve the (original or revised) results could not yet be established. This is because the programme is working on an annual and per agency work planning system, and it is still uncertain until the time of the mission whether the programme will have an option for an extension.

#### c. Key Accomplishments

Nevertheless, the programme has already achieved the following key output indicator and milestones:

- *A National Strategy to Combat VAW* was completed in June 2010 - This is a key accomplishment under Outcome 1 of the programme because it is expected to be adopted later on as a national policy in the OPT. It is also being used as input to the finalization of the 2011-2013 Palestinian National Plan. A related *Study on Policies and Draft Laws on VAW and GBV* was also completed in October 2010;

---

<sup>17</sup> It was reported that it took 80-100 days for one UN Agency to conclude a contract with a service provider.

- A series of *Gender Audit Training of Trainers* was finished by October 2009, and a *National Gender Audit Team* has been formed - Through this training course, gender gaps in the participating PNA Ministries were identified and gender audit teams were formed. Corrective measures are likely to be adopted by the ministries after the identification of gender gaps;<sup>18</sup>
- A *Special PCBS Survey* was finished on May 2010 - The conduct of this survey is critical because the survey results will serve as the baseline data for Outcome 2. It is also related to Outcome 1, specifically on the training activity for PLC Members;
- A *National Women's Employment Committee* was created on February 2010 - The creation of this committee is expected to lead to the formulation and adoption of policies related to the outcome on the economic empowerment of women (i.e. Outcome 3);<sup>19</sup>
- A *Study on Women's Co-operatives* entitled "Mainstreaming Gender Equality Concerns in Palestinian Cooperatives" was concluded on March 2010 - After the completion of this study, policy and capacity-building proposals for the strengthening of women's co-operatives in the OPT are expected to be formulated and advocated for adoption in the PNA. As a result of the study, a "Training of Trainers for the Palestinian Women Cooperative Leaders" was also concluded and action plans for women cooperatives were developed;
- A *Media and Advocacy Strategy Plan* was developed - This plan was based on a needs assessment; and
- A *Technical Vocational Education Training (TVET) Assessment* and a *Training on Gender and Entrepreneurship Together (GET Ahead)* were concluded on March and May 2010 - Based on the TVET Assessment, an MOU was prepared among the main stakeholders in the TVET sector. Action plans were also developed after the GET Ahead Training as part of the provision of grants.

## 2. Quality of Activities and Outputs

In general, the beneficiaries reported the programme outputs and activities to be of "high" quality. The training courses were generally noted to be of "high" quality, "new", and "useful", even among those who were themselves trainers and who have previously attended gender trainings. The methodology applied for these trainings (e.g. the use of video) was also cited to be "different". During the mission visit to the on-going training courses being done simultaneously by 3 agencies, it was noted that the programme is working with well-known facilitators from universities and NGOs in Ramallah. The technical assistance provided by experts were also positively appreciated, and their approaches (i.e. participatory and bottom-up) were highly regarded.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> As a complementary process to the training, two Participatory Gender Audits (PGA), using ILO methodology, were accomplished at MoL in March 2010 and at the PGFTU in June 2010 to identify gender gaps within the two institutions. As a result of the two audits, a set of findings and recommendations were presented to both the Palestinian Minister of Labour and the General Secretary of the PGFTU, and were followed by the development of new actions plans to be implemented by both institutions with the support of ILO under the MDG-F effort. During the reporting period, the PGA was implemented at FPCCIA. Corrective measures are likely to be adopted by the Ministry, PGFTU, and FPCCIA after the action plan.

<sup>19</sup> This is part of the ILO Global agenda to bring together representatives of governments, employers and workers to jointly shape policies and programmes and its commitment towards promoting gender equality in the world of work.

<sup>20</sup> There was only one informant who, on the other hand, believed that the training course she attended was "not comprehensive".

### 3. Extent of Programme Outreach

The reports and the information gathered during the mission indicate that the programme has been successful in attaining its target reach. The relevant PNA Ministries (i.e. MOWA, MOL, MOSA) and statistical office (i.e. PCBS) are involved in the programme activities, and their institutional capacities are being strengthened through such participation and also by the formal training of their personnel and the posting of technical experts who provide professional assistance. The mission also found that NGOs, employers, and workers representative organizations are also being covered by the programme, in addition to the academe (i.e. Birzeit University). It also appeared that grassroots women and girls from the West Bank are being reached as targeted.

There has however been a difficulty in establishing a similar outreach of the programme in the Gaza Strip because of the complexity in governance in the area: the PNA institutions that the programme is working with in the West Bank could not effectively function in Gaza because of a problem in state control. Programme activities in Gaza could not also go on as smoothly as in the West Bank because of security constraints being encountered by the programme staff. Nevertheless, it appeared that the programme has been trying its best to adapt to the special situation in the area so that programme activities could still be implemented and the target outreach could still be covered. The programme has for instance, been working with local NGOs in Gaza, instead of the state institutions as originally planned.

### 4. Adherence to Expected Norms

#### a. Application of the Joint Programme Concept

The programme is working within the joint programme standards set by the UNDG: a common work plan and budget is in place among the participating UN Agencies; a joint programme document which states the roles of the UN Agencies and counterpart ministries has been formulated; and shared results have been identified in the said joint programme document.

By practice however, the application of the joint programme concept in this particular programme has been more complex than the standard arrangements. There are 6 UN Agencies which are involved in this programme (i.e. UNIFEM, UNDP, ILO, UNFPA, UNRWA, and UNESCO), which is one more than the MDG-F global average. Aside from these, there are 6 counterpart national institutions that the programme is working with (i.e. MOWA, MOL, MOSA, MOEHE, PCBS, plus MOPAD). This configuration makes the joint programme concept more difficult to apply in this particular programme, primarily because of its wider span of institutional participation. One immediate lesson that can be drawn from this experience is that joint programming is not limited to the participating UN Agencies: the national ministries would also have to be factored in, otherwise the programme would lose out on the element of national ownership. Therefore, the joint programme concept as applied in this context would normally entail higher participation costs than otherwise expected in the UNDG Standards.<sup>21</sup>

This is also the first time that the joint programme concept is being applied in the OPT. This means that the programme did not have the benefit of learning from possible previous joint programme experiences in the area.

#### b. Development of National Ownership

The programme has also generally conformed to the MDG-F guidelines on national ownership. There is a strong sensitivity towards national ownership in this programme: while only one UN Agency is operating via NEX mode because of the special situation in the OPT, the programme has placed extra effort in aligning its activities with the pace and demands set by the counterpart PNA Ministries. As earlier reported, the programme has made considerable adjustments at the onset to integrate the

---

<sup>21</sup> Based on the latest [September 2010] report of the MDG-F Secretariat to the Steering Committee, the 128 Joint Programmes that are currently being funded by the MDG-F have an average of 5 participating UN Agencies each.

programme within the plans and activities of the Palestinian ministries. The programme had also demonstrated its openness to adapt to local demands that are normally difficult for international specialized agencies to apply: for example, national experts have been mobilized to deliver services in lieu of the international and regional staff as planned for in the programme document. PNA presence is also clear in the governance and management of the programme, through the MOPAD's involvement in the NSC and MOWA's role in the PMC.

Non-state institutions are also involved in the programme, but to a lesser extent. During the mission, the evaluation met some NGO, trade union, academic institutions and business groups which are participating in the programme either as service providers or beneficiaries. However, these non-state institutions are not present in the NSC and PMC, and are therefore not part of the decision-making process in the programme. There is also a difference in the way that the participation of non-state institutions is being perceived in the West Bank and Gaza areas. The meaningful participation of non-state institutions in the programme is an element which can be further improved in the next half of implementation.<sup>22</sup>

## 5. Other Effects

### a. Synergistic Effects

While the actual synergies being created by the programme are still to be clearly documented, it appears that there are potential synergies from the collective experiences in gender equality and women's empowerment across different sectors (i.e. women vis-à-vis the youth and their parents, women in the private sector vis-à-vis women in co-operatives and the trade unions, and women in the refugee camps vis-à-vis women outside the refugee camps). There could also be potential synergy between the policy interventions (e.g. the policies arising from the study on women co-operatives being inputted into the 2011 Palestinian National Plan), and from the combined effects of the rights promotion interventions with the economic empowerment models being piloted by the programme. Synergy from cost savings would also be possible from the conduct of shared activities by the various agencies, such as common mass media campaigns.

### b. Pioneering Effects

The mission also found that the programme could be implementing innovative approaches and activities on gender equality and women's empowerment in the OPT and in the Arab Region. According to the informant from the Birzeit University Institute of Law, the programme effort to train both the civil courts and family courts on gender equality is a pioneering activity in the region, as previous interventions were believed to have focused only on the civil courts. The Gaza Team also reported that the training on perpetrators was the "first of its kind" in Gaza. If these are true, the programme could produce pioneering effects that could be emulated elsewhere in the territory and in the region.

### c. Effects of Training and Awareness Activities

Several beneficiaries of the training and awareness activities reported immediate positive effects from their participation in these activities. A representative from the business sector said that "brought attention to the issue" (of gender equality). A trade union delegate noted that the learnings she acquired from the workshop "caused a debate" within their ranks and "created a change in behavior" among her colleagues who previously assigned only women to attend the gender workshops. Those

---

<sup>22</sup> The joint programme document limited participation in the NSC and PMC to only the UN Agencies, PNA Ministries, and the Spanish Cooperation Office. The document also stated that NGOs may attend as observers in the PMC, depending on the agenda. A review of the minutes of the PMC Meetings however shows that this has not yet happened. Also, the NGO, trade union, academic institution and business groups consulted in the West Bank did not raise their participation in the programme as an issue. But in Gaza, the UN Agencies themselves reported that "civil society organizations are questioning the ownership of the programme" in the area.

who took the trainers' training activities shared that information that they have been able to do the training themselves, while one ministry personnel stated that she was able to "sensitize the institution" on gender issues because of her training.

#### D. Efficiency of the Programme

##### 1. Efficiency of the Management System

###### a. Personnel Staffing and Turnover

As earlier reported, staffing took a considerable period of time: the Programme Secretariat (PS) and the most of the programme personnel hired by the UN Agencies came on board around 4-13 months after the official start of the programme [Table 7]. While it may be true that personnel recruitment normally takes 4-5 months in the UN System, such time lost for staffing alone is significant enough for a 36-month programme in the context of RBM. For a future programme, some adjustments in programme staffing will therefore have to be made based on this perspective.

Personnel turnover however appears to have been minimal, and this is one of the strengths of the programme. The posts of Programme Manager (PM) and M & E Officer have been stable, which is contributing to an accelerated pace of programme delivery. Based on the discussions, there have also been turnovers among the agency-level programme staff, although these were not highlighted as a cause for the delay. Nonetheless, it was noted that there is a risk in turnover in some agencies that employ their staff for only one-year contracts.<sup>23</sup>

###### b. Structures and Functions

The management structures for the joint programme that have been set in the MDG-F Guidelines are in place and functional: a National Steering Committee (NSC) composed by MOPAD, UNSCO, and AECID is operating; a Programme Management Committee (PMC) made up primarily by the Heads of the UN Agencies and their key personnel is working; and a Programme Secretariat (PS) has been positioned. Records and information show that the NSC has met three times since the official start of the programme: one meeting was held in 2009 and two meetings were held this year, one of which was a special meeting. The PMC had also convened at least quarterly for five times since the staffing of the PS in July 2009. The NSC Meetings were held for 2 hours, during which both the gender and culture joint programmes were discussed, while the PMC Meetings were done in 1.5 to 3 hours [Table 8].

---

<sup>23</sup> In the case of one UN Agency, it was explained that the hiring policy is based on the availability of funds for the position. For the MDG-F Programme, the programme staff were hired for one year because this was the equivalent of the first transfer of funds (i.e. for Year 1).

**Table 8. Details of NSC and PMC Meetings**

Dates of Meeting	Duration
<u>NSC</u> April 2, 2009 March 15, 2010 November 3, 2010	2 hours 2 hours 2 hours
<u>PMC</u> September 7, 2009 November 18, 2009 March 3, 2010 May 5, 2010 October 20, 2010	2 hours 3 hours 2.5 hours 1.5 hours 2 hours

Sources: Minutes of Meetings

It is clear from the minutes of these meetings that the NSC and PMC are serving the purposes of coordinating the programme activities from among the UN Agencies and the PNA Ministries as well, in line with the joint programme planning approach. The major issues and problems being faced by the programme (e.g. the programme delay) are also being discussed in these meetings, and efforts are being done to solve these. However, it turns out from the experience that the problem-solving function in a joint programme may not be as straightforward as it is for a regular programme or project: in most cases, there has been extra sensitivity not to overstep each agency's autonomies and personal authorities. Hence, while a problem may be identified and actually discussed in an NSC or PMC meeting, its solution may not be immediately forthcoming.<sup>24</sup>

The Spanish Cooperation Office and some agencies also noted some difficulties in the management of the NSC and PMC, especially at the onset. These difficulties have to do with the definition of roles which are discussed later on in this section.<sup>25</sup>

One innovation that the programme has been experimenting with is the involvement of the Heads of UN Agencies in the PMC. This was presumably done to facilitate the problem-solving and decision-making process across the agencies. While there is an issue being raised on the effectiveness of this approach, it nevertheless shows the programme's ability to experiment with the joint programme concept further and its willingness to go beyond what have been set in the MDG-F and UNDG Guidelines. The other distinct features in the management of this programme are: (i) the formation of a Programme Management Team (PMT) composed by the key programme staff from the different UN Agencies who have direct links to the PS; (ii) the creation of Thematic (Sub-) Groups (i.e. Media, Access to Justice, Income Generating Activities) with the aim of coordinating inter-agency activities within the same line of activity (and also possible create synergy); (iii) the adoption of pooled system for the programme vehicles which can be used by the programme staff from among the UN Agencies;

<sup>24</sup> An example on this point was the effort taken by the UNRC to hold bilateral meetings with the Heads of UN Agencies which were having low disbursement rates, after a meeting in which this problem was reported by programme management.

<sup>25</sup> The Spanish Cooperation Office, for example, felt that its role in the NSC was not clear among the other institutions.

(iv) the organization of a Gaza (Management) Team among the programme personnel working in the area, which serves as the local coordinating body; and (v) the assignment of an overall Technical Lead Agency for the programme, as well as lead agencies for each of the programme outputs.

The mission likewise noted some management issues that came up during the consultations, which could be further clarified, debated, or improved by the programme implementers. One of these are the roles of the Technical Lead Agency, the Administrative Agent, and the Coordination Office. It seems that while the designated agencies are performing these roles, there are different perceptions about these roles which are in turn, creating varied expectations and impressions of functional overlaps. It appeared that this gap in the definition of roles has to do with the mostly administrative concerns raised during the mission (e.g. which agency should take down the minutes of meetings, which agency should call for the meetings, which agency should facilitate the meetings, etc.).

A second related issue is the accountability of the Programme Manager (PM) in a joint programme context. Typically, programme managers for a regular programme are made accountable to a single contracting agency. However, the joint programme concept is more complex as it involves multiple stakeholders: as an example, the programme document itself intimated the PM post to be accountable to the PMC. Yet, the PMC is itself a multi-agency body. The TOR for the PM position for instance indicates that the PM shall work “under the guidance of a Programme Management Committee and a UNDP Programme Analyst” (*underscoring supplied*). Operationally, the vagueness of this TOR has raised the level of difficulty in the PM post.

There was also an issue raised about the lodging of the Programme Associate of UNDP together with the PS, which is housed within the premises of MOWA. It is believed that the PM has specific involvement in the activities of UNDP because of this arrangement, which should not be the case because the PM is supposed to be generally working with all the UN Agencies.<sup>26</sup>

A fourth issue is the programme coordination and communication with the Gaza Team and with one UN Agency working in the refugee camps. During the videoconference with the Gaza Team, some gaps related to these aspects were reported.<sup>27</sup> While it is evident that programme management is trying its best to overcome the difficulties in a remote setting, demonstrable adjustments will have to be shown in the Improvement Plan. The agency working in the refugee camps also perceived that their information and involvement on the programme has been limited.

A fifth issue is the role and expectations of the Spanish Cooperation Office. In a situation where the UN Agencies themselves are careful not to overstep into each other’s institutional boundaries, there are those who believe that the donor country office should also be sensitive towards the distinct roles of each institution. On the other end, donor interest on this programme is high and should be respected. There seems to be a gap in communicating the information needed by the Spanish Cooperation Office that would be useful in raising the donor county’s level of confidence on this programme. Programme management should therefore also exert extra effort to fulfill these needs.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> It was clarified that this was for the Programme Associate to provide administrative support to the PS. Guidelines from the MDG-F were also cited as basis for this arrangement.

<sup>27</sup> It was mentioned that the Gaza Team “was not involved” in the programme. This point was then clarified by the PM, who agreed that this was during the design phase (i.e. the input from Gaza was “minimal”). In the implementation phase however, this weakness was already believed to have been corrected. There was also information from the team that they “rarely meet” and that the “mechanism for coordination is not present”.

<sup>28</sup> As an example, the Spanish Cooperation Office reported that they do not have a copy of the Monitoring Reports and that there is usually not enough time given to review the documents prior to an NSC Meeting.

### c. Monitoring and Evaluation

The presence of a full-time M & E Officer is another positive feature of this programme. It is obvious that a lot of effort has been made in improving the results framework for the programme, and in collecting and reporting the information that have been included in the monitoring reports.

Still, some improvements could still be made on setting-up the M & E System for the programme, including: (i) The formulation and adoption of a Monitoring Plan, which should primarily identify the results to be monitored by the programme and the persons/agencies responsible for the collection of information; (ii) The allocation of a clear budget for the monitoring (and evaluation) activities to be incurred under the Monitoring Plan; (iii) Defining the participation of the PNA, NGOs, and other stakeholders in the monitoring activities; and (iv) The conduct of capacity-building activities (e.g. training) on joint programme monitoring among the programme implementers in order to arrive at a common understanding and ability to plan and implement results-oriented monitoring.

It was clarified that the programme strategy is to empower MOWA in M & E, so that the ministry can itself perform the M & E function even after the programme has ended. The programme planners are conscious of the need for M & E to be a going concern, in view of the MDG time line until 2015. The specific activities and approaches for empowering MOWA in M & E will nonetheless have to be set by the programme, aside from involving the MOWA Focal Person in the affairs of the PS.

The interface of M & E with programme planning and decision-making could also stand review and improvement. During the mission's meeting with the PMC, it was sad to know that only a few PMC members have actually read the latest [July 2010] Monitoring Report.

There is a plan by UNSCO to further the capabilities of UN Agencies in the OPT on M & E, and the programme should coordinate its effort in establishing its M & E System with this initiative.

## 2. Financial Efficiency of the Programme

### a. Cost Efficiency

The UN Agencies apply standard agency procedures in their procurement of goods and services for this programme. This practice ensures that procurement decisions are based on good quality and least cost considerations. The PNA Ministries are also apparently consulted on the procurement of services: in this way, an added oversight mechanism is in place to ensure that cost efficiency principles are being followed.

However, as mentioned earlier in this report, agency procurement of services has taken more time than expected for this joint programme. The service providers who took part in the consultations also raised some issues on the delay of their contracts. Hence, it appears that while direct cost efficiencies are being gained by the programme through quality and cost control measures, some indirect costs are likewise being incurred through the delayed procurements and the effects of these delays to the achievement of results.

### b. Budget Efficiency

This report earlier on pointed out that the original budget applied for this programme was US\$11.1 million, which was eventually adjusted to US\$10.8 million, until a final allocation of US\$9.0 million was approved in November 2008. Due to the absence of supporting documents on the originally-proposed budgets, the evaluation could not ascertain if the final allocation of US\$9.0 million is a rational budget vis-à-vis the activities and results expected from the programme. The only information that was gathered by the evaluation on this point was that the activities were prioritized (i.e. reduced) based on

the budget cuts, according to one of the original programme proponents. The PS also confirmed that the programme budget was not thoroughly reviewed during the inception exercise.<sup>29</sup>

The actual yearly allocation of the budget which planned for the most spending during the first year of implementation (i.e. 39% of the total three-year budget, compared to 34% for the second year and 27% for the last year) nonetheless suggests that the budget allocations could be wrong. It would have been more logical, especially for a first-ever joint programme, to allocate most of its financial inputs (and therefore, activities) in the second or third years of implementation in consideration of the learning curve that will have to be passed through by the programme implementers for this type of intervention. Hence, this could be one reason why the overall disbursement rates (i.e. the usage of the funds) on the first year budget alone have been quite low [Table 9].

**Table 9. Selected Financial Data**

	Amount Transferred (US\$)	Amount Disbursed (US\$)		Disbursement Rate	
		As of July 2010	As of October 2010	As of July 2010	As of October 2010
UNDP	769,225	134,971	204,791	18%	27%
UNIFEM	734,459	289,279	289,279	39%	39%
ILO	731,816	344,072	344,072	47%	47%
UNRWA	630,444	200,387	445,741*	32%	71%*
UNFPA	407,510	427,339	427,339	105%	105%
UNESCO	272,463	140,126	218,342	51%	80%
<i>Total</i>	<i>3,545,917</i>	<i>1,536,174</i>	<i>1,929,564</i>	<i>43%</i>	<i>54%</i>

Sources: MDTF Website, Agency Reports and Consultant's Estimates

\* including additional financial data received from UNRWA in Gaza on November 2010

While one UN Agency has apparently overspent its allocation by July 2010 (i.e. Programme Start + 18 months), this was already six months past the allocation period (i.e. Programme Start + 12 months). This was also the only agency that was operating via NEX mode for the programme, which could have been a facilitating factor for the disbursements.

A second fund transfer in the amount of US\$3.05 million (i.e. 34% of the three-year budget) was nevertheless further approved by the MDG-F Secretariat on October 2010 [Table 6], after the agencies have complied with the 70% combined commitment rate requirement (on the first fund transfer). Crossing the data in Table 6 with those in Table 9 however shows that only 54% of the first fund transfer has actually been used as of the same period. This means that it is highly likely that a large portion of the transferred funds will remain unused by the programme in the immediate period.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> The approved programme budget of US\$9.0 million is actually much higher than the global average of US\$5.0 million allocated per programme.

<sup>30</sup> It can be inferred from the financial data that mid-way into the programme, only half of the activities scheduled for Year 1 have actually been implemented. This means that this half will still be implemented prior to the Year 2 activities. Therefore, the evaluation believes that most of the funds will remain undisbursed (i.e. unutilized) at least in the next 6 months.

## E. Prospects for Sustainability

The programme is designed to capacitate the participating PNA Ministries and non-state institutions in the OPT, so that these local institutions can themselves perform the programme activities or make use of the programme outputs even after the programme period. The programme is building up these capacities by providing technical expertise within the ministries, aligning programme activities with ministry plans, and training ministry personnel on relevant gender courses. The programme has apparently allocated a large portion of its budget for training activities, and a Training of Trainers (ToT) approach has been adopted.

There are initial signs that the training courses and the ToT approach have been effective in building local capacities for self-sustainability. As earlier reported, the graduates of the gender awareness courses said that they have been able to practice their learnings in their respective fields of work, particularly in applying gender audit to their ministries, NGOs, and trade unions. Some trainers who participated in the ToTs noted that they have actually been able to deliver the workshops themselves. At the same time, it appears that greater demand is being created through these interventions: for example, gender audit workshops are being requested by other PNA Ministries which are not part of the original targets. There is hence a need to work out a way by which the initial successes of the programme are continued, either through an extended period of implementation and/or through the adoption of a good sustainability plan.

Local sustainable mechanisms, such as the National Gender Audit Team and the NWECC, are also being created through the programme activities. Whether intended or not, these mechanisms have potential to carry on with the programme activities even after the programme has ended.

While there are emerging and potential sustainability measures such as those that have been stated above, the programme has not yet been keen on formalizing its sustainability strategy and plan, including the limitations in sustainability given the situation in the OPT and also the limited budget of the programme. Obviously, much of the effort at the present moment has been focused on the implementation phase. The eventual exit of the programme is still to be discussed by the PMC. The evaluation also noted that an exit phase is missing from the programme design. It follows that additional time may be needed to cover this exit phase in order to ensure a proper turn-over of the programme outputs and tools so that these can be sustained beyond the programme period.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> One of these limitations could be the capability of the PNA to financially sustain the programme activities, given its current revenue collection and fiscal constraints.

### III. Conclusions

1. Developments in the larger context have been both challenging and favorable to the programme. Changes in the political and security aspects have made the supervision and operation of the programme in Gaza more difficult. Outcome 2 of the programme, which aims to increase the political participation of women, has also been negatively affected because of the inactivity of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). At the same time, the PNA holds an optimistic outlook on the achievement of about half of the MDGs, including Goal 3, which goes well for the programme. This is a factor which is raising the chances of programme success and sustainability.
2. The programme had to pass through a re-design process because a significant period of time (i.e. at least 16 months) had lapsed between its design phase and implementation phase. Within this large intervening period, changes have occurred among the key persons who were involved in the initial preparations for the programme, as well as with the plans of the PNA. Several indicators and activities in the Results Framework adopted for the programme were also revised. The re-design process has resulted in higher participation costs. Support was provided by the MDG-F Secretariat and the Spanish Cooperation Office on the design of the programme, although technical assistance on programme planning, inception, and RBM could also have been useful.
3. Despite a large interval between the design of the programme and its actual implementation, the programme continued to be highly relevant to the current situation in the OPT. The programme interventions follow up the basic initiatives on gender equality and women's empowerment launched by the PNA. The programme is also responding to contemporary problems in the area, particularly the increasing cases of GBV and the continuing economic and political marginalization of women. Further, the programme is clearly linked to the latest plans and priorities of the PNA and contributes to the national achievement of MDG 1 and MDG 3.
4. The programme has been highly effective in terms of the quality of its work, its adherence to the joint programming standards and the development of national ownership over the programme, and on its synergistic, innovative and immediate effects. Still, there are challenges to the programme's ability to achieve results and its outreach in Gaza [Table 10]. The programme can also stand improvement on making the participation of non-state institutions more meaningful.

**Table 10. Summary of Effectiveness Measures**

Parameters	Assessed Level of Effectiveness
Achievement of Results	Low
Quality of Activities and Outputs	High
Extent of Programme Outreach	Medium
Adherence to Expected Norms	High
Other Effects	High

The programme is significantly delayed, and it is likely that the achievement of results (within the original time frame) is at risk. The factors that led to the delay are: (a) a Lengthy Start-Up Period, covering both the need for a re-design and the late staffing of programme personnel; (b) the Newness of the Undertaking; (c) Extensive Procedures in place among the UN Agencies; (d) the Combined

Commitment Rate System adopted for the MDG-F programmes; (e) Political and Security Constraints in the programme area; (f) Internal Agency Constraints in some UN Agencies; and (g) a Need to Harmonize Schedules in the local setting.

Nevertheless, the programme has already achieved some key accomplishments such as the National Strategy to Combat VAW, the Gender Audit Training and Teams, the PCBS Survey, the NWEAC, and the Study on Women's Co-operatives.

5. Being a new endeavor, there have been inefficiencies in the management of the joint programme, which are rooted on different perceptions about institutional roles and a sensitivity towards the autonomy of organizations. There are on-going issues related to these, as well as on management accountability and administration, which are part of the lessons being learned in joint programming. On the other end, there have been managerial strengths in terms of minimal staff turnover and the adoption of innovative approaches.

The performance of the programme on the matter of financial efficiency has also drawn mixed results. Direct cost efficiency appeared to be high, due to compliance with standard UN rules and additional oversight provided by the PNA. However, opportunity costs could have offset the benefits from these. The budgets have also been largely unspent, owing to a flaw in the budgeting method, as well as the fund release system adopted for the programme.

6. At the time of this mid-term evaluation, the programme has not yet finalized its sustainability strategy and plan. By practice nonetheless, the programme is already laying the foundations for the sustainability of its interventions through the conduct of capacity-building activities and the creation of local mechanisms that have potential to carry on with the programme activities.
7. Several notable features have been cited in this report which add value to the programme. These include: (a) a conscious effort to deliver high-quality activities and outputs; (b) the collaboration with a broad spectrum of organizations from the PNA, NGOs, business groups, and the academe; (c) an openness to adapt to local demands; (d) the potential pioneering efforts in gender equality and women's empowerment in the area and in the region; and (e) a willingness to make further experiments on the joint programme concept.
8. There are interesting lessons that have been learned thus far in the implementation of this joint programme. These are the following:
  - 8.1 There are significant participation costs incurred when the gap between the programme design phase and its actual implementation phase is too wide, especially for a joint programme in which the element of national ownership is highly valued.
  - 8.2 Further guidance from the MDG-F Secretariat on programme inception and revision of the Results Framework would have been helpful to the programme implementers. Technical assistance on programme planning and RBM would have also been productive.
  - 8.3 In a joint programme such as this one, timely release of financial inputs does not necessarily lead to timely implementation of activities. UN Agency procedures and practices are among the factors that create a lag in the results chain. Hence, for a future similar programme, these procedures and practices should adapt to the assumptions underlying the results chain. For example, staff hiring may start prior to the actual receipt of programme funds (i.e. a notice of vacancy can be posted on condition that such vacancy is subject to the availability of funds).
  - 8.4 In programme planning, it is important to distinguish the start-up activities (e.g. staff hiring) from the core activities (e.g. training) within the implementation phase. From this experience, the start-up sub-phase was included on the work plan which had taken away a large portion of the time allotted for the core activities. It is also important to allot a period for the exit of the programme (i.e. the exit phase).

- 8.5 The management of a joint programme is more complicated than it is for a regular programme or project, because of a wider span of participation from various stakeholders. While there are costs associated with this arrangement, there are also synergies that can make up for these costs.
- 8.6 The commitment rate system is a weak method for fund releases if there is a large difference between it and the actual disbursement rate. Applying this system given such a difference will result in budget inefficiency.

#### IV. Recommendations

1. It will be necessary for the programme implementers and the MDG-F Secretariat to realize that the programme is actually working on a limited time frame within which to achieve the results that have been set in the revised Results Framework. In reality, the programme implementation period could only be between 20 to 28 months, if the start-up and exit phases are factored in. However, the MDG-F has recently opened the possibility, subject to its approval, of an extension period for eligible programmes for up to one year until June 2013. This means that it is possible for the programme to operate within an extended period, until the maximum time allowed by the guidelines. The programme should apply for this extension period, and the MDG-F Secretariat should consider its approval.
2. The next step would be for the programme implementers to review and finalize the programme's Results Framework. The final framework should now be based on the extended time frame, less an exit phase of 3 months. The key questions to ask in revising the framework would be: (a) What results can be achieved within the new time frame? (b) What activities need to be implemented in order to achieve these results? (c) What would be the cost of such activities and is the budget enough (or too much) to cover these costs? The costs of joint programme coordination should also be considered in the budget.

The evaluation highly suggests the use of SMART criteria for selecting indicators. If necessary, the programme may hire the services of an external RBM expert to help in finalizing the Results Framework and budget, aside from assisting in a preliminary leveling-off on the concept and definitions being applied in the framework, especially among the key persons from the various UN Agencies and PNA Institutions.

The MDG-F Secretariat and the Technical Lead Agency should contribute to the setting of acceptable benchmarks on the framework, based on comparable benchmarks being used in other countries (e.g. how much income increases do women-beneficiaries usually obtain from similar interventions in other gender programmes).

3. The MDG-F Secretariat should then consider the application for extension, subject to the submission of this final Results Framework and the other documents required in its guidelines.
4. It is suggested that the new work plan and budget should include as an Annex, disaggregated interventions and inputs specific to Gaza and the West Bank, so that the spatial distribution of efforts for both areas can be clearly established. The work plan until the end of the programme period should include an exit phase.
5. The activities and budget to be developed should consider those that are related to the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation capacities at the level of the UN Agencies and the partner-organizations, as part of the overall sustainability strategy. These activities should run in parallel with the efforts of UNSCO to improve M & E capacities in the OPT.
6. A Monitoring Plan, which indicates the roles of each participating institution in the monitoring activities and the process to be followed in sharing and validating the collected information, should be adopted for the programme.
7. The TOR for the various management structures (i.e. NSC, PMC, PMT, PS, Gaza Team, and Thematic Sub-Groups), as well as for the special function units (i.e. Technical Lead Agency, Coordination Office, Administrative Agent, and Programme Manager) should be revisited and improved, so that these can be clearly understood among the various institutions and positions involved. Based on these TOR, an organizational structure which defines the lines of relationships and accountabilities of the management structures should be clearly defined and agreed upon. The programme may hire an independent organizational development expert for these tasks, or the MDG-

F Secretariat may itself facilitate the process of coming to a common understanding on these during its upcoming mission to the OPT in early 2011.

8. Based on these TOR, it would also be helpful for the programme to develop its communication plan, which will identify the information requirements of the different stakeholders and the manner by which they could obtain such information in a timely and well-understood manner. The communication plan should also include how the different stakeholders could participate in the feedback system for the information being received.
9. The risk factors affecting the programme should be reviewed, and clear measures should be taken on some elements which are within the managerial domain. One of these factors is the inactivity of the PLC, which is affecting Outcome 2. Programme management should now take a decision on whether or not to include the composition of the PLC as among the targets for change. Another factor is the continuing strike in one participating UN Agency. After a careful study, the NSC should set its options, including possibly re-phasing the programme allocation to another agency, if such options would be warranted by the situation.
10. The actual synergies being created by the programme may now start to be defined and elaborated, possibly in terms of greater values or cost savings derived from joint implementation. The report has put forward some potentials that the programme can build on, and validate at a later time.<sup>32</sup>
11. The programme has several interesting experiences in joint programme planning and management that can be useful for future joint programmes. The documentation of these experiences is being recommended, so that these may contribute to the on-going understanding of the joint programme concept.
12. The participation of non-state institutions in the programme can be made more meaningful by inviting this sector in the meetings of the PMC and NSC, albeit as observers, as originally envisioned in the joint programme document. In Gaza, the same approach can be applied in the local management team.
13. After the mid-term evaluation, the programme should now be in a position to write its Sustainability Strategy. The sustainability strategy should, among others, include the activities related to the continuation of the monitoring and evaluation of the intervention until the MDG deadline in 2015.
14. For a future joint programme, a technical review of the budget done prior to approval of the application should include an analysis of the annual allocations. The review should also appraise the accuracy of the costs. The evaluation specifically recommends the use of the Activity-Based Costing (ABC) method in preparing budgets, because this method is consistent with the concepts in RBM.

---

<sup>32</sup> One guide question in determining the synergy from the JP is: Compared to a situation in which the UN Agencies are implementing the same activities bilaterally with the donor, what effects are there in the joint programme modality? In simpler words, what positive effects is the JP creating which could not otherwise be created by the disparate interventions of the UN Agencies? Or, from a donors' interest, why should they support a JP instead of the same projects being done independently by the agencies? The evaluation has already forwarded some possible angles for the programme to look at. One is the multi-sectoral nature of the intervention: here, one question is – is there any new learning from the way that the programme is working with women in the refugee camps and outside the refugee camps? with the youth and the non-youth? between women in the business sector and those in co-operatives and trade unions? For example, the programme can state that by working in both the refugee camps and outside these, the situation and interests of women in the OPT are being articulated more accurately in the proposed strategy to combat VAW. Another possibility is if the Study on Women's Co-operatives will be inputted into a larger policy proposal on the economic empowerment of women in the OPT.

The report also posited that synergy in a JP can also be derived from cost savings. The question here is: From the JP modality, has any cost been eliminated or reduced compared to a bilateral modality? For instance, the matter of having a common PS: could there be any financial gain from having a common Programme Manager and M & E Officer? Is the pooled system for the programme vehicles resulting into lesser administrative costs?

The evaluation is also not recommending the use of the commitment rate method for fund releases in joint programmes that may be supported by the MDG-F in the future.

## Annex A. Itinerary of the Field Mission

October 30 (Saturday)		<i>Consultant's Arrival</i>
October 31 (Sunday)	AM	Preliminary Meeting with the Programme Secretariat
	PM	Preliminary Meeting with the Evaluation Reference Group Group Meeting with MOWA
November 1 (Monday)	AM	Group Meeting with MOL and NWECC
	PM	Individual Meeting with MOSA Individual Meeting with PCBS Individual Meeting with MOPAD
November 2 (Tuesday)	AM	Individual Meetings with PMT Members
	PM	Group Meeting with the PMC Group Meeting with Organizations involved in Outcome 1 and 2 Individual Meeting with UNIFEM (in Jerusalem)
November 3 (Wednesday)	AM	Group Meeting with Organizations involved in Outcome 3 Visit to Trainings being done by ILO, UNESCO, and UNFPA
	PM	Group Meeting with Programme Beneficiaries
November 4 (Thursday)	AM	Individual Meeting with Birzeit University
	PM	Group Meeting with the Programme Secretariat
November 5 (Friday)	AM	Group Meeting with AECID (in Jerusalem) Group Meeting with UNSCO (in Jerusalem)
	PM	Individual Meeting with UNDP (in Jerusalem)
November 10 (Wednesday)	PM	Video Conference with Gaza Team
November 11 (Thursday)	AM	Debriefing with the Evaluation Reference Group
November 12 (Friday)		<i>Consultant's Departure</i>

## Annex B. Questionnaires Used for the Evaluation

### NSC Members

1. In your opinion, to what extent were the opinions and interests of the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development been taken into account in the design and implementation of the Gender Programme? Please choose from among the following choices and elaborate briefly:

*To the best possible extent    To a large extent    To some extent    To the least extent    Not at all*

2. In your view, to what extent is the Gender Programme relevant to the Policies and Priorities of the Palestinian National Authority? Please choose from among the following choices and elaborate briefly:

*Highly relevant    Relevant    Somehow relevant    Least relevant    Not at all*

3. Do you think that the governance and management structures for the Gender Programme (i.e. National Steering Committee and Programme Management Committee) are working well?

4. What do you think are the major problems and challenges being faced by the Gender Programme and how could these be possibly solved?

### PMC Members

1. In your opinion, are the governance and management structures for the Gender Programme (i.e. National Steering Committee and Programme Management Committee) working well?
  
2. Is the Gender Programme on track according to schedule?
  
3. In your opinion, what are the factors that contribute to progress or delay in the implementation of the Gender Programme?
  
4. What good practices and lessons being learned from the Gender Programme do you think would be useful for other joint programmes in other countries?
  
5. What do you think are the major problems and challenges being faced by the Gender Programme and how could these be possibly solved?

MOWA

1. In your opinion, to what extent were the opinions and interests of your ministry been taken into account in the design and implementation of the Gender Programme? Please choose from among the following choices and elaborate briefly:

*To the best possible extent    To a large extent    To some extent    To the least extent    Not at all*

2. In your view, to what extent is the Gender Programme relevant to the needs and priorities of your ministry? Please choose from among the following choices and elaborate briefly:

*Highly relevant    Relevant    Somehow relevant    Least relevant    Not at all*

3. Is the Gender Programme on track according to schedule?

4. What are the factors that are contributing to the progress or delay in the implementation of the Gender Programme?

5. What do you think are the major problems and challenges being faced by the Gender Programme and how could these be possibly solved?

## **Annex C. List of Persons Consulted**

### MDG-F Secretariat

1. Ms. Patricia Fernandez-Pacheco - UN Coordination Specialist
2. Ms. Nurit Bodemann-Ostow - Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist

### NSC Members

1. Mr. Maxwell Gaylard - UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator
2. Ms. Ana Urrutia-Enciso - Project Manager, AECID
3. Ms. Eva Suarez Leonardo - Project Manager, AECID
3. Dr. Estephan Salameh - Minister, MOPAD
4. Ms. Randa Janho - General Director, MOWA

### UN Agencies

1. Ms. Alia El-Yassir - Focal Person, UNIFEM
2. Ms. Covadonga Bertrand - Focal Person, UNDP
3. Mr. Reginald Graham - Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/PAPP
4. Mr. Mounir Kleibo - Head, ILO
5. Ms. Rasha El-Shurafa - Focal Person, ILO
6. Ms. Zahira Kamal - Focal Person, UNESCO
7. Ms. Sima Alami - Programme Associate, UNFPA
8. Ms. Barbara Piazza-Georgi - Representative, UNFPA
9. Ms. Sireen Musleh - Training Coordinator, UNESCO
10. Ms. Carol Ziadeh - Programme Associate, UNDP
11. Ms. Siham Rashid - Project Coordinator, UNIFEM
12. Mr. Cham Fernando - Project Support Officer, UNRWA
13. Mr. Amal Hadweh - Project Coordinator, UNRWA
14. Mr. Tensai Asfaw - Coordination Specialist, UNSCO
15. Mr. Marc Jaquand - Coordination Specialist, UNSCO

### Programme Secretariat

1. Mr. Hanna Nakhleh - Programme Manager
2. Ms. Samar Samara - M & E Officer
3. Ms. Sumood Yassin - MOWA Liaison Officer

### MOWA

1. Ms. Marlen Rabadi - General Director of Advocacy and Media
2. Ms. Fatima Wathaefi - General Director of Planning
3. Ms. Luna Saadeh - GBV Expert

### Others

1. Mr. Ashraf Hamdan - Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
2. Mr. Jamil Salem - Birzeit University Institute of Law
3. Ms. Hanan Jayyousi - Project Staff
4. Ms. Rawand Al-Madmouj - Project Staff
5. Ms. Iman Assaf - ERG
6. Various Informants from NGO, employers, and workers representative organizations
7. Various Beneficiaries of Training Courses

## **Annex D. List of Reference Materials**

### Plans and Reports

Izzat Abdul Hadi, Nadya Engler, Bisan Center for Research and Development. *Women and poverty: the high price of occupation*. In "Social Watch". <<http://www.socwatch.org/node/10964>>.

MDG-F Secretariat. *Report for the MDG Achievement Fund Steering Committee*. 24 September 2010.

Ministry of Planning and Development. *Millennium Development Goals Progress Report*. August 2010.

Palestinian National Authority. *Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010*.

UK Border Agency. *Operational Guidance Note - Israel, Gaza and the West Bank*. February 2009.

UN Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. *United Nations Medium-Term Response Plan (MTRP)*. May 28, 2009.

UNDP/PAPP. *The Millennium Development Goals Progress Report 2002 Occupied Palestinian Territory*. August 2003.

### Minutes of Meetings

*Minutes of PMC Meetings* held from September 7, 2009 until October 20, 2010.

*Minutes of NSC Meetings* held on April 2, 2009 and March 15, 2010.

*Minutes of the Inception Workshop* held on July 23, 2009.

### Others

*Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* - OECD/DAC 2002 and Proposed Harmonized Terminology (2007).

*Guidance Note on Joint Programming* by the UN Development Group dated 19 December 2003.

*Implementation Guidelines for MDG Achievement Fund Joint Programmes* dated June 2009.

*Interoffice Memorandum* from the MDTF to the OPT UNRC dated April 3, 2008.

*MDG-F Secretariat Feedback Message* - Year 2010.

*MDG-F Secretariat Feedback Message* - Year 2009.

*Monitoring Report* for the Period of January - July 2010.

*Terms of Reference for Thematic Window on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment* by the MDG-F.

*The Gender Cross-Sectoral Country Strategy* PowerPoint presentation.

*Work Plan* for the Period of March 2009 - February 2010.

## Annex E. Comments on the Results Framework (Revised Version)

Results, Indicators and Targets	Comments
<p><b>Outcome 1. GBV and all forms of VAW/G reduced</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualitative and quantitative analysis of change in incidence of GBV/VAW over the JP phase</li> <li>- A national survey on GBV is conducted end of 2010, and updated by end of JP phase</li> <li>- The national strategy to combat VAW is finalized by June 2010</li> <li>- The action oriented and policy research is in place by end of 2010</li> </ul>	<p><i>The 5 indicators do not match the result: they do not “indicate” that GBV and VAW have been reduced</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The National strategy to combat VAW is adopted and integrated into strategic plans of MoWA, line ministries and other relevant stakeholder</li> <li>- Final version of strategy to combat VAW is developed by June 2010</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen the rule of law by achieving at least one of the targets</li> <li>- Undertake legislative reform for a common Palestinian Family Law;</li> <li>- Undertake legislative reform for the Palestinian Penal Code to criminalize all forms of VAW/G;</li> <li>- Adopt the Palestinian’s Women Bill of Rights.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of all forms of reported VAW cases are provided with counselling from qualified personnel</li> <li>- Comprehensive baseline data are provided from PCBS end of 2010.</li> <li>- Establish proper documentation “data base” and referral mechanisms within SAWA as a partner service provider in this project by end of 2010;</li> <li>- As above but within the family domestic units at police departments by end of 2011;</li> <li>- As above but within the Gaza shelter staff once functioning</li> </ul>	<p><i>The targets do not match the indicator</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of the targeted population is aware that VAW is wrongful behaviour and a criminal act by 1/2012</li> <li>- Develop an advocacy strategy based on the need assessment with specific target groups and messages by May 2010.</li> <li>- Develop action plan by June 2010 to be implemented till end of JP phase.</li> <li>- Finalize contractual agreement with a media company by August 2010.</li> <li>- Monitor the targeted group perception in regards to VAW pre/post awareness activities</li> </ul>	<p><i>The targets do not match the indicator Activity targets should be distinguished from results targets</i></p>
<p><u>Output 1.1: Knowledge and baseline on VAW established to monitor gender equity goals and inform program development</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevalence measures on Domestic Violence incorporated into routine annual PCBS sample surveys</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	<p><i>There is only 1 indicator, which is the same in the outcome</i></p>
<p><u>Output 1.2: Address VAW by increasing the capacity of gender advocates to influence policy makers and legislators resulting in increased protection for women/G</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualitative and quantitative analysis of policy papers and report forms produced by governmental bodies on VAW and GBV</li> <li>- Find articles in Palestinian law which have misconceptions or hinder progress towards preventing VAW/GBV and protecting women from VAW/GBV by July 2010.</li> <li>- Find missing articles in draft Palestinian law that should be included in order to prevent VAW/GBV and protect women from VAW/GBV by July 2010</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reports on number of draft laws prepared to decrease gender discrimination</li> <li>- Map all reports “number of” on draft laws prepared to decrease gender discrimination, GBV/VAW and protect women from GBV/VAW in Palestine. By July 2010, and 2012</li> <li>- Propose measures and lobbying mechanisms in order to strengthen the rule of law based on results above guarantying at least one of the followings: A. undertaking legislative reform for a common Palestinian Family Law, B. undertaking legislative reform for Palestinian Penal Code to criminalize all forms of VAW/GBV, C. adopting the Palestinian Women’s Bill of Rights, By December 2011.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of PLC members who are aware of gender discrimination in legislation</li> <li>- Define a baseline by Conducting a perception survey among PLC members on awareness of gender discrimination in legislation by June 2010.</li> <li>- From results in indicators 1,2 and 3 above: Provide technical support &amp; training to 400 staff from MoWA, MoSA, MoEHE, MoH, CEC, 450 persons from key women NGOs involved in advocacy, in addition to 50 PLC members on research findings, regulatory frameworks &amp; advocacy as per needed in 2010 and 2011.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of PLC members who have undertaken action in relation to discriminatory legislation</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of strengthened capacity of existing networks between organizations in WB&amp;G</li> <li>- 17 women's orgs in the WB&amp;Gs is supported &amp; networking improved in 2010 and 2011;</li> <li>- Capacity building initiatives are carried out for network members</li> </ul>	
<p><u>Output 1.3: Capacity to provide refuge, security, basic services and access to justice strengthened</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of training packages which include gender-sensitization in training of police forces, judges, health and social workers</li> <li>- Police force: develop 1 training package following the previous 2 targeting the same 80 persons on investigation and data collection methods with the victim and the perpetrator by August 2010;</li> <li>- Develop 3 training packages by end of 2010 one to target Judges, one for lawyers and one for prosecutors;</li> <li>- Develop 2 Training packages targeting social counselors at schools in 2010 and 2011;</li> <li>- Develop 3 training packages targeting social workers within MoSA 1 in 2009, 1 in 2010, and 1 in 2011;</li> <li>- Develop 3 training packages targeting Health providers within MoH 1 in 2009, 1 in 2010 and 1 in 2011;</li> <li>- Develop 1 Manual by WAV in May 2010 on gender concepts, power, reasons, levels forms and types of GBV, identifying sources of information, analyzing collected data and statistics on VAW</li> </ul>	<p><i>The indicator is not relevant to the result (i.e. the number of trainings does not necessarily mean that capacities have changed)</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of professionals (law enforcement DV/ Family Units, judges, lawyers, health, social workers, etc) trained to respond to incidents of VAW/G As detailed in the beneficiaries mapping table above.</li> <li>- Train 80 people from the PA Security Forces, mainly Domestic Violence/Family Units in 2010 and 2011.</li> <li>- Train women and men 60 prosecutors, 90 judges, 360 lawyers in 2010 and 2011.</li> <li>- Train the social counselors at the 8 different schools indentified.</li> <li>- Train 150 social workers/counsellors from MoSA / family counselling units on GBV</li> <li>- Health Providers: train 150 health providers (75f, 75m) on provision of assistance to victims of VAW in 2009, 2010 and 2011;</li> <li>- Train religious leaders (30f, 30m) on provision of assistance to victims of VAW in 2009, 2010 and 2001.</li> <li>- Media professionals: Train 40 media staff and 50 media students in 2009, 2010, and 2011 on GBV and reproductive health in cooperation with Al Quds University</li> <li>- Train leaders from 31 CBOs in refugee camps (875f, 160m) in WB and From 25 CBOs (2500f, 150m) in GS on provision of assistance to victims of VAW</li> </ul>	<p><i>The indicator is not relevant to the result (i.e. the number of trainings does not necessarily mean that capacities have changed)</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cases of GBV reported to the police and other bodies, cases investigated and conviction rates</li> <li>- Track Number of cases/calls received by police and other bodies the type of service received accordingly;</li> <li>2- 1 help line for women victims of violence and related protection services upgraded by December 2010</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• -# of women seeking and accessing refuge in Gaza women's shelter and counselling services.</li> <li>- Track number of received cases at the Gaza shelter and provide all cases with the needed and qualified services</li> </ul>	
<p><u>Output 1.4: Awareness raised, behaviour and attitudes changed amongst men and women on gender relations, women's entitlements and rights (social, political and economic)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Media strategy developed &amp; implemented including advocacy &amp; outreach activities addressing key gender inequalities</li> <li>- Produce and broadcast 10 radio and 5 TV awareness spots on VAW in 2010 and 2011;</li> <li>- An integrated functioning and continuously updated MDG-GEWE web page within MoWA's website;</li> <li>- Celebrate International Women Day 2010 in WB&amp;GS.</li> <li>- Conduct 16 days campaign for combating VAW in Gaza;</li> <li>- Commemorate, with program partners, the tenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip</li> <li>- 140 citizens Celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the MDGs in WB&amp;GS.</li> <li>- Provide support to &amp; raise awareness of teachers, students &amp; parents on gender equality &amp; VAG &amp; boys through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a- 720 teachers and 240 counsellors are trained through 36 gender equality ToTs in WB and Gaza by 2011;</li> <li>b- 12 awareness campaigns are conducted in schools targeting 12,000 students and 12,000 teachers by 2011.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Conduct training/counselling sessions with youth, men &amp; women as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a- UNIFEM: 2,688 perpetrators of GBV/VAW and bullying in schools receive counselling through support groups or individual sessions in 2010 and 2011.</li> <li>b- UNRWA: women and men (perpetrators and victims) receive legal and psychosocial counselling. Train 995f, 455m in WB, GS TBD.</li> <li>c- UNFPA: 240 youth leaders/peer educators (120f, 120m) are trained in GBV to assist in organizing &amp; facilitating group discussions for peers</li> </ul> </li> <li>- 27000 youth (13500f, 13500 m) have increased awareness of gender equality through attending awareness raising workshops on GBV and RH by</li> </ul>	<p><i>The indicator is not relevant to the result (i.e. the media strategy does not necessarily mean that awareness, etc. have changed)</i></p>

youth	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Types of behavioural and attitudinal changes amongst the targeted population above in regards to women's, entitlements and right</li> <li>- Track "as much as possible" the awareness interventions impact on the targeted population</li> </ul>	<i>This is a vague indicator</i>
<b>Outcome 2. Representation of women and women's issues in decision-making bodies increased</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of seats held by women in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)</li> <li>- % change (increase) in 2011 and 2012 statistics on the baseline indicators</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of seats held by women at Local Council Level</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of Women PLC members elected by lists</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of Women PLC members elected by Districts</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of women in decision-making positions</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	
<u>Output 2.1: Knowledge and baseline on women's political representation used to monitor equity goals and inform programme development</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of policy papers, legislation introduced on the basis of knowledge and baseline on political representation</li> <li>- 1 Draft policy paper introduced mid 2011</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Role of women in decision –making enhanced &amp; monitored against MDG3</li> <li>-1 Online database exists on women in different decision-making positions by end of 2010;</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-# of trained national counterparts on research findings on political representation &amp; regulatory frameworks</li> <li>- 50 PLC members increase knowledge &amp; awareness on women in decision-making, gender gaps &amp; effect on regulatory frameworks in relation to MDGs by 2011</li> </ul>	<i>The target is itself the indicator</i>
<u>Output 2.2: Increased capacity of local government, authorities and grassroots organizations to identify, plan and deliver gender-sensitive services and on MDGs</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of ToT training and workshops organized to raise awareness on gender in local authorities &amp; related NGOs;</li> <li>- Provide training for developing women leaders on MDG &amp; Gender sensitive services</li> </ul> <p>As follows:</p> <p>a- Provide 18 local authorities, NGOs, and CBOs constituting around (3400f, 944m) with training to identify, deliver and report on gender sensitive services in local communities in 2010, 2011.</p> <p>b- Same as above with 2700 local council members</p> <p>c- Train 300 male and female refugee youth volunteers who are in leadership positions working for refugee camps CBOs on communications, self awareness and assertiveness, international conventions on human rights (MDG, CEDAW, CRC) to gender mainstream their service in 2010, 2011.</p> <p>d- Conduct ToT for 180 rural women on gender mainstreaming in 2009, 2010, and 2011;</p> <p>e- Provide technical assistance &amp; training to 50 PCBS staff, on engendering MDGs;</p>	<i>The indicator is not relevant to the result (i.e. the trainings do not necessarily mean that capacities have changed)</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-# of local authorities, NGOs and grassroots organizations equipped with needed supplies to deliver services</li> <li>-10 CBOs are equipped</li> </ul>	<i>The indicator is not relevant to the result</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of local councils that include men's and women's perspectives in identifying, planning, delivering and reporting on services that benefit both women and men in the local community;</li> <li>- 18 local councils with action plans that are gender sensitized</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-# of women received knowledge/sensitized as a result of the ToT training above</li> <li>- Transfer knowledge to 45000 women as a result of the ToT above</li> </ul>	<i>The indicator is not relevant to the result</i>
<b>Outcome 3. Enhanced opportunities for women's equal economic participation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % participation rate for women (15 years +) in the labour force in OPT;</li> <li>- TBD by ILO</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of unemployed women who completed 13 years of schooling</li> <li>- TBD by ILO</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of qualitative and quantitative analysis of national action plans development frameworks, policies and</li> </ul>	

<p>programmes that mainstream gender equality and women's economic empowerment concerns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-a: Conduct 3 analysis through participatory gender audit PGA an ILO tool for MoL by February 2010, PGFTU by July 2010 and for COC in 2011;</li> <li>-b: According to the PGA results, 3 action plans to mainstream gender with monitoring and follow up systems are developed. In 2010 and 2011;</li> <li>-c-Identify the articles in Palestinian Labour law that impede women's labour force participation, changes drafted and action for response designed by gender advocates (MoL, MoWA, TUs, employers' orgs, NGOs, researchers). In 2010 and 2011</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of women who improved their income due to the JP empowerment initiatives</li> <li>- Provide empowerment to 80 women cooperatives, Women CBOs and BDS entrepreneurs, followed by grants and accordingly follow up results on income in 2010, 2001.</li> </ul>	
<p><u>Output 3.1: Influence of gender advocates, workers and employers org in decision-making and planning is increased particularly in relation to reforming discriminatory labour laws and planning for gender-sensitive employment opportunities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• -# of sex-disaggregated data and gender relevant indicators on women's economic participation utilized in PCBS, MoL and other relevant institutions</li> <li>- Develop &amp; provide training on tools &amp; methodologies for gender advocates, research institutes on quantitative, qualitative &amp; process oriented indicators to monitor GBV/VAW in the work place in order to strengthen labour dispute mechanisms through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a-Conduct assessment study and train 40 people to Promote user producer dialogue on gender statistic by June 2010; Accordingly:</li> <li>b-Revise and identify gender gaps and needs in labour statistics produced and their presentation to be more responsive to users and more informative for improved analysis, advocacy and development of press releases, policy papers etc...by users by June 2010;</li> <li>c- Incorporate where needed a set of gender relevant indicators on women's' economic participation into PCSB labour force survey by December 2010</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<i>The targets do not match the indicator</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of labour market institutions with integrated ILO standards. Existence of policies in MoL and its institutions undertaken mainstreaming efforts promoting women's employment and protecting them in the workplace</li> <li>- Laws that impede women's labour force participation are identified, changes drafted by December 2010 ;</li> <li>- Organize ad hoc workshops for gender advocates to develop &amp; launching an advocacy campaign for the endorsement of draft laws starting end of 2010 till end of JP phase.</li> </ul>	<i>These are 2 indicators put together in 1</i>
<p><u>Output 3.2: Capacity of the MoL (including its institutions), workers' and employers' org developed to implement specific measures that promote women's employment and protect them in the workplace</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• -# of capacity assessments for mainstreaming gender within labour market institutions</li> <li>- Provide training to 100 members of the Tripartite Committee (MoL, workers' &amp; employers' org on coordination mechanisms for mainstreaming gender equality, &amp; decent work towards reducing GBV/VAW in the workplace through 2009, 2010 and 2011.</li> <li>- Conduct 3 Participatory Gender Audits for MoL in 2010, PGTFY in 2010 and CoC in 2011.</li> <li>- Establish a multi stakeholder, consultative body (NVEC) by June 2010, and train its members (10-15 people) in 2010 and 2011</li> </ul>	<i>The indicator is not relevant to the result The targets are not relevant to the indicator</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• -# of cases of GBV/VAW reported in the workplace. Method of reporting, to whom, etc...</li> <li>- Conduct a survey on GBV in the workplace and its' economic impact by end of 2010;</li> </ul>	<i>The target does not match the indicator</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• -# of cases dealt with and type of solution envisaged</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of labour disputes involving women</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	<i>Maybe "% of resolved labour disputes"?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of women in targeted institutions / by position/responsibility</li> <li>- As above</li> </ul>	
<p><u>Output 3.3: Employment opportunities for low-income women and female graduates including in refugee camps are increased</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of girls/women accessing/enrolling in vocational training/by type of training and relevance to skills required by labour market</li> <li>- Conduct a rapid labour market NA in key areas of growth &amp; demand with 30 TVET centres by April 2010;</li> <li>- Develop a training module through building on the NA above, and reviewing available governmental and non-governmental TVET curricula by September 2010;</li> <li>- 25 trainers are trained in 10 TVET centres by 2010;</li> <li>-180 TVET students from different locations are trained in TEVT centers by 2010-2012;</li> <li>- 50 extension workers (field trainers) are graduated by August 2010,</li> </ul>	<i>How is this indicator different from the 2<sup>nd</sup> one?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of girls/women graduates from TVET centres that find employment within one year of graduation</li> <li>- Launch an awareness campaign led by MoWA and MoL among families, employers &amp; TVET institutions to change perceptions of TVET in OPT by</li> </ul>	<i>Could this be a better indicator than the 1<sup>st</sup>?</i>

<p>2011.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of women entrepreneurs who acquire skills (business management, negotiations, etc) and who use these skills.</li> <li>-Assess needs for BDS providers by 2010.</li> <li>- Develop/build on existing 2 ToT Training modules for BDS providers by March 2010;</li> <li>-ToT: Train 20 BDS providers/trainers in WB and 20in GS on skills to work as BDS providers to MSMEs targeting women entrepreneurs &amp; business start-ups by June 2010, using tools, techniques &amp; strategies for better mainstreaming &amp; up streaming gender equality considerations for women entrepreneurs.</li> <li>- Provide 9 grants to the best BDS providers by June 2010;</li> <li>-80 women entrepreneurs are trained by BDS providers on enhanced life skills by 2011;</li> <li>- UNFEIM: 450 rural young women are trained on equal participation in employment &amp; the labour market by 2011;</li> <li>-1800 rural women and young female graduate have received academic and job counselling by 2011.</li> </ul>	<p><i>Targets 1 to 5 are not relevant to the indicator</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of women in cooperative who acquire skills in cooperative management and leadership and who use these skills</li> <li>-Conduct Needs assessment for women cooperatives by April 2010;</li> <li>-2 ToT for 25-30 women cooperative leaders Get Ahead workshops in marketing, Cooperative management, leadership &amp; organizing skills is conducted by 2010;</li> <li>- Transfer the ToT knowledge to 100 women in cooperatives on business and cooperatives management skills in 2010and 2011.</li> </ul>	<p><i>The targets do not match the indicator</i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % change in Income levels of women in cooperatives, and women CBOs in refugee camps</li> <li>-UNRWA: Develop and implement 30 income-generating schemes through women &amp; rehabilitation CBOs in refugee camps (20 in WB and 10 in GS). Starting 2009 till 2011. (Building on Using ILO needs assessments and training packages);</li> <li>-Provide 20 Start-up grants 9 for women entrepreneurs GETAHEAD and 9 for potential women cooperatives who have exceptionally completed the training by December 2010</li> <li>To implement learning activities in their own institutional settings.</li> </ul>	<p><i>The targets do not match the indicator</i></p>

## Annex F. Assessment Criteria and Guide Questions

### 1. Programme Design

- a. What factors affected the design of the programme?
- b. What is the quality of the programme design?
- c. To what extent has the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programme?
- d. Are the follow-up indicators relevant and do they meet the quality needed to measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?
- e. What improvements can be made on the programme design?

### 2. Relevance of the Programme

- a. Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women and men in the areas of intervention?
- b. To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions does the programme envisage, to respond to obstacles that may arise from the political and socio-cultural background?
- c. To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans and programmes (with particular regard to plans for gender equality or equivalent frameworks), to identified needs, and to the operational context of national politics? (CEDAW or equivalent frameworks)
- d. How is the programme relevant to the achievement of the MDGs and the objectives of the thematic window on gender equality and women's empowerment?

### 3. Effectiveness of the Programme

- a. Is the programme making progress in helping to achieve the set results?
- b. Is the schedule for the set products being met? What factors are contributing to progress or delay in the achievement of the products and results?
- c. Do the products created live up to the necessary quality?
- d. Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?
- e. Is the programme providing coverage of the participating population as planned in the joint programme document?
- f. What factors are contributing to progress or delay in the achievement of products and results?
- g. In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?
- h. What good practices or successful experiences or transferable examples have been identified?
- i. To what extent have the country's national and local authorities and social agents been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention? Is national ownership of the programme being developed?
- j. How is the programme conforming to the standards in joint programming?
- k. How is synergy being created by the programme?
- l. What other positive effects are being created by the programme?

### 4. Programme Efficiency

- a. To what extent does the joint programme's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) contribute to obtaining the predicted products and results?
- b. What factors are affecting the management efficiency of the programme?
- c. How is the M & E System contributing to management efficiency?
- d. How financially efficient is the programme?
- e. What factors are affecting the financial efficiency of the programme?

5. Prospects for Sustainability

- a. Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the joint programme?
- b. Is the programme working with local sustainable institutions?
- c. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?
- d. Is a sustainability strategy in place?
- e. Are the activities for the development of programme sustainability clearly indicated in the exit phase?