South Sudan
Mid-Term Evaluation

**Thematic window:** Conflict Prevention and Peace Building

**Programme Title:** Sustained Peace for Development: Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building in Sudan through targeted interventions in selected communities along the 1-1-1956 border

**Author:** Steve Munroe, Consultant MDG-F
Prologue

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent ‘snapshot’ of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the “Delivering as One” initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.
Sustained Peace for Development: Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building in Sudan through targeted interventions in selected communities along the 1-1-1956 border

Mid Term Evaluation – South Sudan

Prepared for:
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/
MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F)

Prepared by: Steve Munroe
20 January 2012
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List of Acronyms Used

CO      Country Office
COA     Chart of Accounts
CPA     Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC    Community Security and Arms Control
DDR     Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration
FAO     Food and Agriculture Organization
GoSS    Government of South Sudan
IA      Interagency
ILO     International Labour Organization
IMAC    Inter-Ministerial Assessment Committee
IOM     International Organization for Migration
JP      Joint Programme
M&E     Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG     Millennium Development Goals
MDG-F   Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
MTE     Mid Term Evaluation
NSC     National Steering Committee
PCA     Permanent Court of Arbitration
PMC     Programme Management Committee
RC      Resident Coordinator
RCO     Resident Coordinator’s Office
SAF     Sudan Armed Forces
SPD     Sustained Peace for Development
SPLA    Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
SSPC    South Sudan Peace Commission
TOT     Training of Trainers
UNDAF   UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP    United National Development Programme
UNFPA   UN Fund for Population Assistance
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMISS  UN Mission in South Sudan
UNW     UN Women
WHO     World Health Organization
YEP     Youth Employment Programme
Executive Summary

The Sustained Peace for Development programme is a two and a half year, multi-agency project that is funded through the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F). Its primary aim is to promote peace building and effective conflict management in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan, by addressing capacity gaps in national peacebuilding institutions, and increasing security and peace dividends for communities in the target areas.

This mid-term evaluation was conducted in November-December 2011, with an in-country mission in early November 2011. It covers the first 18 months of implementation from January 2010-June 2011. For a variety of reasons, the progress and overall health of the JP is significantly lower than anticipated. Several areas have been identified where improvements can be made and are explained in detail in this report. Focus is put on looking forward, as the JP in South Sudan became its own project following secession in July 2011. Some of the main issues identified during the evaluation can be broadly grouped as follows:

1) Coherence of Project Interventions: Activities are conducted in isolation from each other, with little if any interagency planning and collaboration under the JP.

2) Management Arrangements: Since the JP split in July 2011 for the Northern component, no NSC or PMC has been constituted, nor have JP agencies met in Juba in relation to the project. The focal point from UNDP as lead agency is responsible for 5 projects, and is therefore unable to fulfill the coordination or leadership role required.

3) Ownership Issues: Perhaps due to design issues or the fact that the Coordination Team was based in Khartoum, there has never been a great sense of ownership of the project by UNDP South Sudan. Once the Khartoum-based Coordination Team had no active role following secession, the project has been largely orphaned and running with no guidance, coordination or accountability.

4) Interagency Coordination: There is no active coordination of JP activities at the central level. Due to the reduced geographical coverage area of the JP, this has resulted in 8 agencies engaging in overlapping and duplicative activities.

A summary of conclusions and recommendations are as listed on the next page. A discussion of possible ways forward for the JP in South Sudan can be found in paragraphs 72-76 in the main report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> The lack of a management structure for the JP in South Sudan in the last 6 months has created an ‘orphaned project’, where there is no direction, leadership or accountability.</td>
<td>A NSC should be constituted in South Sudan as soon as possible, and consideration given to forming a PMC in Kuajok if logistically possible given the (lack of) presence of agencies in the state. The NSC should be formulated based on current, relevant partners who are active in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> The JP had several significant structural design issues that have contributed to a lack of coherence and a fragmented approach to delivery.</td>
<td>The NCS/JP Management should identify areas of convergence where the inherent fragmentation can be reduced, such as functionally combining outputs where there is opportunity for genuine collaboration between agencies. This is not to suggest an extensive revision of the results framework, but rather to initiate regular coordination meetings where plans can be discussed and ideas for collaborative action identified.</td>
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<td><strong>3.</strong> There is a lack of clarity regarding expenditures and total agency budgets (in some cases) between North and South. This makes it difficult for the JP as a whole to present itself accurately to the GoSS and to plan a ‘whole JP’ approach.</td>
<td>Agencies should clarify to the NSC on total budget and expenditure information for JP activities in South Sudan. This will be required for reporting to the MDG-F for the second half of 2011.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> There was no credible case made on the value of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact. The disparate mandates, local focus and (lack of) presence in Kuajok make coordination difficult under the best of circumstances.</td>
<td>Collaboration between agencies should be strategic and rational, based on complimentary activities and priorities in the JP target areas. Potential areas of synergy emerged during the evaluation mission, such as UNW and UNICEF both planning community dialogues at the County level. These more specific opportunities for joint action should be identified and pursued, as they are more likely</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The JP did not adequately plan for the possible separation of South Sudan, or the degree to which it would delay project implementation. As it currently stands, there is little likelihood that the JP will achieve the outcomes or outputs envisaged.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Progress to date has been heavy on assessments, light on tangible “dividends of peace” that are considered to be a cornerstone of post-conflict recovery in South Sudan.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>There is no communication or advocacy strategy for the project, despite this being a clear requirement and priority of the Fund. An almost complete absence of identity (use of logo on communication material, visibility materials, etc) reduces the visibility of the project and the opportunity for advocacy for the MDG’s and the UN reform agenda.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Despite its importance throughout the lifecycle of the project cycle, particularly in a volatile operating environment such as South Sudan, risk management is not being done.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>The Government of South Sudan is not engaged at a managerial or oversight level, and has limited awareness of the JP as a unique project.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Leadership of the JP has been lacking in the UNCT/RCO as well as UNDP</td>
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as the lead agency. The deprioritization of the JP is likely influenced by the comparatively small budget and the complexity of coordinating various agencies in a fluid, post-conflict setting.

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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Monitoring at the JP level is currently not being done at all, nor are there structures in place to do so.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The NSC should prioritize establishing an M&amp;E function, possibly within the lead agency or as an additional staff member to support the coordinator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The current focal point within UNDP for the JP handles 4 other projects and is thus unable to fulfill the function of coordinator with any degree of engagement. Without the JP being adequately staffed there is very little likelihood in a meaningful improvement in project performance.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Depending on a decision on a way forward (discussed in paras 76-80), a dedicated staff member(s) should be appointed to the JP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>The joint assessments provided an informed basis for programming, although it is unclear that they had any substantial impact on informing agencies’ decisions about what activities they would engage in.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>JP activities need to be reviewed in a NSC/PMC setting to ensure that they are in line with the assessments and linkages are developed where possible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The combination of narrowing the geographic scope to three counties in Warrap with a lack of coordination has led to a high degree of duplication, likely more than for other, non-IA projects. The JP has not met the base purpose of IA coordination, which is to avoid duplication of efforts.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JP activities need to be reviewed in a PMC setting to ensure that they are in line with the assessments and a coherent plan established to eliminate duplication and develop linkages.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>The JP is not on target to achieve the strategic results envisaged under a multi-agency programme. The lack of ownership of the project by UNDP South Sudan, coupled with the JP Coordination Team being based in Khartoum, has created a coordination vacuum that has deepened since independence.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A meeting/workshop should be held to take an honest review of the spirit of the JP, current context, and ensure that all activities are appropriately aligned. There should be a dedicated JP Coordinator fielded to replicate the work done by the Coordination Team in KRT.</td>
</tr>
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Introduction

Programme Environment and Context

1. After decades of civil war, the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided unprecedented opportunities for peace building and improving the humanitarian and development context of the Sudan.

2. Despite many positive outcomes of the implementation of the CPA, tensions remain prevalent in many areas, particularly along the 1-1-1956 border. A lack of peace dividends for conflict-affected communities in border areas contributes to the fragility of the situation.

3. On July 22, 2009 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) released its ruling on the boundaries of the Abyei Area. Despite the parties’ expressed willingness to implement the PCA ruling, resource-based tensions among neighboring communities have perpetuated continued tensions.

4. Within the Joint Programme (JP) target areas, poverty rates are estimated at up to 90%, along with possessing the lowest development indicators in the country.¹ In general, an absence of social services and livelihood opportunities, and perceptions of isolation and marginalization all contribute to undermining durable peace in the border areas. Continued armed fighting in border areas, pressures on grazing and water resources and struggles over land rights contribute to instability.

5. Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of troops from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) also poses risk as a conflict trigger, especially between those being resettled/returned and host communities.

6. In recent months, fighting between the SAF and SPLA in South Kordofan and Abyei has intensified, leading to increased tensions and significant displacement throughout the JP’s target areas on both sides of the border.

7. **Warrap**, the state targeted by the JP in South Sudan, suffers from an almost complete absence of infrastructure and basic services; inter clan conflicts over grazing lands and water sources are a major source of strife. Cattle raiding is also prevalent and is often very violent.

8. Warrap is the newest state in South Sudan, and the administrative capacity and resources of the local government are extremely low, particularly when outside the capital Kuajok.

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¹ The Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS), 2006.
9. Political events during the JP implementation period have significantly disrupted the ability of development organizations to operate effectively. Notably, these include the CPA referendum on separation in January 2011, local elections in April 2011, and the secession of South Sudan in July. At the time of writing this report (Nov 2011), access to the counties covered by the JP is unpredictable and the security situation is fluid.

Sustained Peace for Development

10. The Sustained Peace for Development (SPD) joint programme seeks to promote peace building and effective conflict management along the 1-1-1956 border area by addressing capacity gaps in national peace building institutions, and increasing security and peace dividends for communities in the target areas.

11. The JP has identified four outputs under two outcomes, contributing to UNDAF outcome 1 which states that “By 2012, the environment for sustainable peace in Sudan is improved through increased respect for rights and human security, with special attention to individuals and communities directly affected by the conflict”.

12. Outcome 1 of the project aims to improve partnerships and the utilization of conflict risk information at the state level to enhance capacity of peace building institutions, promoting solutions that are locally identified, promote social cohesion and are more effectively targeted.

13. Outcome 2 focuses on recovery, reconciliation and reintegration at the community level through basic service delivery and enhancement of economic opportunities. Interventions under Outcome 2 are to be based in large part on information collected under Outcome 1.

14. The SPD was approved on 08 December 2009 by the MDG-F Steering Committee and signed by all partners by 23 November 2009. The project budget approved is $6,000,000 over a period of two and a half years, running from 10 December 2009 to 09 June 2012. The SPD has UNDP as the lead agency partnering with UNICEF, UN Women, ILO, FAO, IOM, WHO and UNFPA, with the South Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) as the main government counterpart in South Sudan.

15. Following the independence of South Sudan, the Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation (previously the South Sudan Peace Commission) was returned to its status as a commission. As of the time of writing, no official decree has been issued establishing the commission or confirming where it will be based in the government structure, so it remains in a state of limbo.

16. The JP received its approval from the Inter-Ministerial Assessment Committee (IMAC), as required by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in March 2010.
17. In the last NSC meeting for the national JP held in Khartoum in June 2011, it was decided that the JP would be split and a new NSC should be formed in South Sudan to assume management over the programme. As of November 2011, this has not yet happened.

18. A financial summary as of June 2011 is below. This is cumulative between JP operations in the Sudan and South Sudan, as no disaggregated budget or expenditures has been provided to date. Individual agencies were asked during the in country mission for expenditure report split between North and South, but few of these have been provided.
Mid Term Evaluation

Objectives

This mid-term evaluation has the following specific objectives:

19. To discover the programme’s design quality and internal coherence (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the Millennium Development Goals, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

20. To understand how the joint programme operates and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework.

21. To identify the programme’s degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

Scope

22. This mid-term evaluation assesses progress of implementation of the JP from its inception until 60% through its approved period. The JP officially started in December 2009 when the first year funds were transferred to the UN agencies. The evaluation will include 6 quarters from the beginning of January 2010 to the end of June 2011.

23. The mid-term evaluation is an important opportunity in the programme cycle to review progress against initial project targets and identify challenges and opportunities moving ahead. The primary value of an MTE is as a forward-looking exercise...reorienting activities and approaches given the experience of the first half of project implementation. It should look at impact of programme activities (positive and negative) and not just report on activity level achievements.

24. Given the unique issue facing this JP, with the division of the programme due to the secession of South Sudan, recommendations will be given in terms of reorienting the JP now that it is a separate programme from that in the North.
Methodology

25. The first step in the MTE was a desk review of relevant documents, in this case including: Project Document, JP meeting minutes, project monitoring reports, PMC and NSC meeting minutes, assessment and Field Visit Reports. Based on this desk review, an Inception Report was prepared and shared with the MGD-F and the country level stakeholders.

26. An in-country mission took place between 2-19 November 2011, where a combination of first hand observation, interviews and discussion groups were used. Interviews were held with project staff and focal points from all partner agencies, government counterparts at the Central level, the RCO, and the UNDP Country Office.

27. Following the initial interviews, a briefing was held with UNDP management where initial findings were shared and discussed, and further clarifications and information required was received. A request was made to have a meeting with more of the partners present but this was not arranged.

Constraints and limitations on the study conducted

28. **Access:** The field trip planned to Warrap did not take place as WFP cancelled the scheduled flight due to it being a national holiday. Last minute attempts to obtain seats on the UNMISS flight to Wau were unsuccessful. This means that all interviews were conducted in Juba and no visits to project sites were possible. However, a field visit would have been limited to the capital Kuajok as the counties where project activities are occurring are currently off limits due to security issues.

29. **Logistics:** In general, the mission was not well organized in-country. Interviews were not set in advance, so a large amount of time was lost waiting. The first two of six planned days saw discussions with UNDP staff and 1 of the 7 other agencies. In addition to this, 1 day was a UN holiday; the CPRU had a two day workshop and UNDP had an all staff retreat (also 2 days) during the mission.

30. **Staff Turnover:** Within several agencies there have been various focal points assigned to the project during its first 18 months. Within UNDP as lead agency, there have been 5 separate focal points in the South Sudan office during this period, making it difficult to obtain definitive information about certain issues.
Main Substantive and Financial Progress of the Joint Programme

Findings

Design level

Relevance

31. The JP document makes a clear case that it seeks to address a critical need in South Sudan, particularly in terms of combining institutional capacity development with community level interventions to promote an environment where peace is made more possible. It also ties in clearly with national priorities, the CPA and the UNDAF, and the strategic objectives of the South Sudan Peace Commission, the main government counterpart.

32. There are several inherent design issues that limit the potential and prospects of the joint programme.

33. One issue is the separation of outputs by agency, which encourages a fragmented approach to addressing the needs of communities in the target area. While it is expected that agencies will work in their respective areas of expertise, pre-project division creates no incentive for collaboration and by default allows for a disparate approach to implementation.

34. Similarly, deciding and dividing the budget along agency lines well before the project began greatly limits the ability of the JP to be flexible to shifting priorities. Over 1.5 years passed between project development and actual mobilization; in a fluid environment like South Sudan, local priorities and the project context can change dramatically. The ability of the JP to be responsive to the current operating environment, particularly after the needs assessments, was extremely limited by the fact that funds were already allocated for particular purposes.

35. In an attempt to harmonize the project as a ‘national project’ for all Sudan, there was limited scope for differentiated programming between North and South, despite the notable differences in contexts and government/agency capacity in each area.

36. The project did not adequately account for the political context or relationship between the government in Khartoum and Juba, nor plan any risk mitigation strategy in the case of a vote for secession midway through the project. The coordination team hired under the project were based in Khartoum and Southern Kordofan, with coordination in South Sudan being spearheaded from the North. This contributed to a lack of ownership of the project in the South, including within UNDP South Sudan as the lead agency.

37. The sheer number of agencies and respective government counterparts (often different in North and South, and even at the Juba/state level) makes this a very challenging and unwieldy project to manage effectively. There was no credible link made on the value
of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact.

**Scope**

38. The originally intended coverage area (Warrap, Unity and Northern Bahr el Ghazel (NBGS)) was very ambitious considering the funding levels, but this was subsequently reduced to three counties in Warrap. The project is organized around 2 outcomes and 4 outputs, but there are multiple ‘sub‐outputs’ being implemented by eight UN agencies. Warrap was selected due to the analysis produced by the CRMA, and the specific counties selected based on the JP assessment mission outcomes.

39. In terms of planning and budgeted versus actual expenditure per output, agencies were largely unable to provide disaggregated expenditure information for the South Sudan component of the JP.

**Time**

40. The inherent challenges of implementing project in South Sudan, coupled with the referendum and secession and resulting reorganization of the project, suggests that the project document may not have allocated sufficient time to adequately position itself north and south of the border. The JP document did not set out a clear plan for project reorientation following the possible secession of South Sudan, and a phased process of ‘handing over’ the project from North to South did not happen in the lead up to the independence of South Sudan.

**Cost**

41. Given the number of UN agencies involved, and the fact that for many agencies two *de facto* country programmes divided the money, funding levels are quite low. This may have impacted agency engagement as well as hopes for sustainable impact in any one area or output. As many agencies have hired staff under the JP, the HR costs of this project are significant for the expected outputs.

42. In terms of planning and budgeted versus actual expenditure per output, agencies were unable to provide disaggregated budgets between North and South.

**Processes level**

**Efficiency**

43. As of the end of the evaluation period (30 June 2011, 60% of the project duration), overall delivery stands at 34%. This represents delivery of both North and South components.
44. A number of activities have been carried out under the SPD, particularly focused around assessments and trainings. There have been at least 5 assessments of varying depth carried out in Warrap in connection with this project; by UNDP, FAO, ILO and the JP itself. As well, three (2 completed and one starting at the time of the evaluation mission) trainings/TOT’s focusing on conflict mitigation skills with partners at the state and/or county level has been conducted.

45. Some other individual activities implemented by agencies include: water yard construction; trainings on clinical management of rape; provision of communication equipment to health facilities to assist with preventing communicable disease outbreaks; training and equipment for surveying land; livelihood training on baking and confectionary; and various workshops on issues related to peace or livelihoods.

46. There is a substantial discrepancy between the degree of progress between agencies, influenced in some cases by the lack of lack presence for many agencies in Warrap. A summary of achievement by output is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Results</th>
<th>Responsible Agency</th>
<th>Achievements to Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Improved partnerships and utilisation of conflict risk information at state level to enhance capacity of relevant peace building institution</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Conducted TOT on Conflict Mitigation to 37 key stakeholders in Warrap. TOT guidelines for Conflict Mitigation under development Communications equipment provided to police Planned roll out trainings to counties not yet done; scheduled trainings delayed due to security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Increased capacity of Land Commission and traditional authorities to resolve disputes of over natural resources</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Institutional Capacity Assessment-Main Partners SS Land Commission; State Ministry of Housing and Physical Infrastructure; Animal Resources and Fisheries; Council of Traditional Authority Leaders (CoTAL); Office of Country Commissioners Intercommunity Peace Conferences in Gogriel East, Twic as well as others (with UNDP) Developed guidelines on Conflict Mitigation for Resource Disputes developed TOT on guidelines done with SS land Commission, IP’s; done in Gogriel East to date Did stock route mapping of migratory patterns; helped IOM to identify locations for water points Support to Ministry of Housing-survey equipment and training for urban land allocation (with UNHABITAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Increased access to basic services for conflict affected communities</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Could not meet with IOM staff; cannot confirm the precise status of its activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Increased livelihood opportunities in target communities</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Recruited international Senior Consultant based in Warrap (shared with YEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quick Assessment (needs and stakeholders) conducted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Economic Recovery (LER) workshop held</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Training on baking and confectionary conducted</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Improved community confidence in local rule of law institutions in South Sudan</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1 Establish a Special Protection Unit (SPU) (former Women and Children’s desks) in Warrap State</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>• UNICEF to fund SPU construction, planned for Dec 2011.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• UNICEF will provide funds and technical assistance to the training.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4.2 Train 10 professionals to work with children in contact with the law (police, social workers, judges, etc.)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Training for police and prison officials is on going at the time of evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3 Women’s capacity to access justice strengthened and justice institutions more responsive to gender issues</td>
<td>UNW</td>
<td>I training on conflict sensitivity conducted in 2010</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Most other activities not started by June 2011 due to the lengthy process of signing an LOA with the State Ministry of Social Development. (now done)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4.4 Ministry of Health and its health care providers able to provide qualitative and efficient health care services for sexual assault survivors</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Training initiated for health workers for CMR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.5 Improve access to GBV prevention and response services in Warrap</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Advocacy work conducted against Form 8, which requires victims of sexual assault/rape to file a police report before the hospital can provide any medical assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.6 Build the capacity of state ministries to provide leadership and coordinate GBV prevention and response activities</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>SOP’s for GBV Referral Pathway contextualized for Warrap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. Gender considerations are not evident in the way in which activities are planned or carried out, save those conducted with a specific focus on women. (particularly by UNFPA and UNW) Training materials seen (conflict mitigation) do not include a gender perspective. Reporting on direct beneficiaries show a huge discrepancy between the
number of men reached (vs planned numbers) and the number of women reached. (less than 10% of target.)

48. Implementation to date has been slower than anticipated for all outputs, reasons for which are discussed in the sections below.

**Communication and Advocacy**

49. No coherent strategy for external communications currently exists, including visibility or other forms of outreach. Project identity and visibility is very limited. As SPD activities are extensions of larger initiatives within the individual agencies, many partners are unaware of the SPD as a unique initiative. Posters distributed bear individual agency logos as they were developed through other projects; support provided to local partners is perceived as single agency support (e.g. “UNFPA provides us with assistance”); the MDG-F logo does not appear on any material seen during the mission.

50. This lack of identity for the project is not entirely surprising, given the degree to which SPD activities are an extension of ongoing (and typically much larger) projects of individual agencies. However, an opportunity to promote the MDGs or present a united UN family (a stated goal of the MDG-F) has not been realized.

**Risk Management**

51. The project document does not contain a risk analysis section or steps/ideas on how to mitigate them, despite the high probability (now a reality) of succession and the reasonable probability (now a reality) of a resurgence of active conflict in the target areas. Risk management is not an ongoing component as the project, in its current form, is not currently being managed.

**M&E Structures**

52. Monitoring and Evaluation was being handled by the Coordination Team (in Khartoum) for the first 18 months, which included (for a period) a dedicated M&E Officer. A set of revised indicators was developed mid-project, and agencies reported a good level of engagement by the M&E Officer.

53. Overall, the M&E framework is not very specific in its indicators, making it difficult for the JP to meaningfully track change over time. Most are activity based (e.g. # of trainings conducted to assess increased institutional capacity, # of PTA’s formed, etc) and baseline information is very limited.

54. In South Sudan, there is currently no oversight since the split of the JP. UNDP as lead agency has not convened a meeting of partners to discuss progress or made any sort of substantive contact. Intra-agency reporting follows the individual protocol of each agency.


Project Management Arrangements

55. The primary coordination body for the JP in South Sudan was the National Steering Committee (NSC), which was held in Khartoum with representation of the South Sudan component participating. Despite efforts by the JP Coordination Team to establish a Programme Management Committee (PMC) in Warrap, this secondary, localized coordination mechanism was never formed.

56. The last NSC was held in Khartoum in June 2011, where it was agreed that a new NSC would be created in Juba following the secession of South Sudan. To date this has not occurred, and the JP has no coordination or management structure in place.

57. There have been five separate focal points within UNDP South Sudan in the first 18 months of the JP, and it has shifted between UNDP units three separate times. It was initially part of the CPRU; it shifted to the Governance Unit for approximately one year; then returned to the CPRU and lined up with the ongoing CSAC project. The JP activities of UNDP directly mirror Outcome 3 of the CSAC project, and it is being implemented through the CSAC mechanism as part of UNDP South Sudan’s effort to move away from a projectized approach to its programming. The second tranche of JP funding to UNDP was delivered to the CSAC chart of accounts (COA).

58. The current focal point appointed by UNDP in February is not actively engaged with the JP; it is one of five projects he reports as being under his responsibility. All of these are significantly larger than the JP in financial and geographical terms.

59. The above indicates that UNDP South Sudan is not, nor has been, particularly committed to its role as lead agency for the JP. The was explained in part by the fact that the funding is so low that it is hard to justify the significant time requirements of such a project, and that ownership of the project was low in South Sudan due to the perception that it was designed and managed by Khartoum and had limited local relevance.

60. At the time of the evaluation mission, the JP can best be described as an orphaned project. While some activities are ongoing, there is no coordination or coherence of the JP as a whole.

Operational Issues

61. Few operational issues were identified as problematic during interviews with agencies.

62. Access to the target counties is, and has been, variable. Certain activities have been delayed due to travel restrictions and this could continue to worsen depending on developments with the current border issues. Access to the state capital Kuajok is relatively stable and several agencies have permanent presence there.
Inter-Agency Coordination

63. While the primary, formal coordination mechanism has been based in Khartoum, the Coordination Team has held periodic coordination meetings in South Sudan and participated in the joint assessment missions to Warrap. No meetings have been held in the past 6 months in South Sudan. During the interviews, it was clear that agency focal points were unaware of the activities of other agencies, even in areas where they overlapped significantly. For example, UNDP trainers were not aware that FAO had conducted similar conflict management TOT’s and distributed similar training materials; UNICEF was unaware that UNW were embarking on a series of trainings that UNICEF was considering starting themselves.

64. The joint assessments (participated in by some agencies) provided an informed basis for programming, although it is unclear that they had any substantial impact on informing agencies’ decisions about what activities they would engage in. These were followed up by individual agency assessments in many cases.

65. Similar interventions are being undertaken by various agencies without any form of joint planning or lateral reporting, at least at the central level. (Due to the field visit being cancelled, it is not possible to make sweeping statements about informal coordination taking place at the state level). For example, FAO and UNDP have both conducted TOT’s on conflict mitigation skills with state and county level stakeholders, and have/are poised to distribute training manuals for rolling out further trainings. These are directly overlapping and have similar target audiences but both were unaware of the others’ work.

66. The varying degrees of agency capacity at the state level have reduced the potential for effective coordination. Several agencies had no presence or ongoing programming in Warrap prior to the JP; others cover the state from offices in Kuajok or Wau.

Government Engagement

67. The main government counterpart for the JP in South Sudan is the South Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC). At the time of JP development it was a Commission; it was subsequently upgraded to ministry level (Ministry of Peace and CPA Implementation); and following independence it has been tentatively returned to Commission status. At the time of writing this transition is incomplete, as the SSPC has not yet been formally constituted so technically holds no status. This has implications for government engagement as the priority is getting its status clarified.

68. During discussions with the SSPC, feedback was on support from UNDP/other agencies more broadly, with little mention or awareness of the JP specifically. Unprompted feedback focused on achievements in non-JP states.

69. The Government of South Sudan is not engaged at a managerial or oversight level, as no meetings have been held under the auspices of the project since independence.
70. The JP reports 17 government bodies as partners to the JP, which reflects relations that central and state level line ministries have with the various UN agencies. These echo existing partnerships along sectoral lines; there is no meaningful coordination amongst these government entities in the scope of this project.

Results level

Effectiveness

71. Few of the deliverables anticipated have been achieved by the end of the first 6 quarters covered by this evaluation. Given the lack of baseline data or training needs assessments, the late start of many activities and the lack of access to beneficiaries due to the flight cancellation, it is not possible to comment on impact at this time. Sustainability of those activities that have been conducted so far is vulnerable due to the isolated way in which the agencies have implemented them. The NSC, once formed, should take stock of what has been achieved and identify ways to make the results sustainable. (e.g. ensure that people that have received the TOT’s have also received the promised training materials, and have the necessary support and guidance to conduct the ensuing country trainings)

72. The JP is not on target to achieve the strategic results envisaged under a multi-agency programme. The lack of ownership of the project by UNDP South Sudan, coupled with the JP Coordination Team being based in Khartoum, has created a coordination vacuum that has deepened since independence.

73. The decision to reduce the project coverage area from three states (Warrap, Unity and NBGS) to Warrap alone was predicated on the idea of maximizing impact, given the relatively modest amounts of funding for each of the eight agencies under the JP. However, this has inadvertently led to overlapping activities due to the funneling of resources into one area (where many agencies have no presence).

74. Many of the interventions are of very similar nature but are being implemented with little if any integration or intentional coordination. UNDP and FAO have both conducted assessments around conflict triggers and local capacity to mitigate conflict; both have conducted TOT’s around similar skills within a few months of each other. This is not to promote one off trainings; however, the lack of collaboration on trainings under the JP, which have a similar outcome and are conducted with many of the same stakeholders, is unfortunate. UNW is planning a series of trainings around conflict transformation at the country level, again with little connection to the interventions of other agencies.

75. When looking at interagency coordination as a continuum2, the lowest rung of the ladder (i.e. the purpose of IA coordination) would be “avoiding duplication of efforts”—
not doing the same thing in the same place. The combination of a (relatively) small coverage area and a lack of central coordination have meant that this project has in fact encouraged duplication of efforts. Agencies with no presence or programming in Warrap have had to scramble to find a means to operate there; and stretch their mandates to conduct activities where they do not necessarily possess a comparative advantage. The high number of assessments with limited tangible interventions amounts to many UN staff arriving and making commitments, but not necessarily delivering on them. In a fragile state such as Warrap this has significant conflict sensitivity implications.

Avoid Duplication: Not doing the same thing in the same place
Integrated Planning: Coherent plan to deliver complementary services in a well timed manner
Joint Implementation: Leveraging economies of scale, comparative advantages, technical expertise and relationships
Strategic Impact: Producing a sustainable result that is greater than the same of its parts
Looking Forward

76. The JP has not truly taken hold in South Sudan during the first 18 months of implementation, nor in the following five months since the project divided into two. Given the lack of a management body for the project (NSC, PMC) and the current deprioritized nature of the project within UNDP South Sudan, there is little to suggest that this will improve without a substantial shift in perspective.

77. In terms of moving forward, there are several potential options that are presented below. These are in a sliding scale of the degree of interventionism as well as potential to make a substantive change in the project. (least-to-most)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Implication</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing.</td>
<td>The project continues as-is, with reduced expectations on achieving much in terms of sustainable impact. The project is not extended and remaining funds are returned to the MDG-F in June 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancel the Project</td>
<td>There is a total halt on new activities, and ongoing, contracted activities are wrapped up as soon as legally possible. This could have significant negative consequences on the reputation of the newly constituted South Sudan UNCT, as well as damage stakeholder relations in Warrap, which is a fragile state where several commitments have been made under the JP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP assumes ownership</td>
<td>To date, UNDP South Sudan has not fulfilled its obligations as the lead agency for the JP. If UNDP is to attempt to remedy this, it would require at least one dedicated staff person to bring partners together and attempt to refocus efforts in Warrap. Ideally, this would involve a staff member in Juba as well as Kuajok. Given the history of the project in South Sudan, pursuing this option would require a very clear and concrete action plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead agency role shifts to another agency</td>
<td>Given the priority of UNDP to focus its programming on larger interventions, the role of lead agency could be shifted to another agency that has been more engaged to date. As an example, FAO has two staff members under the JP (in Juba/Warrap) and has been quite active and may be willing to assume that role. Given that UNDP plays no administrative role in this JP (i.e. it manages no common funds) there would be little if any administrative difficulty in doing this if all parties agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two JP’s in South Sudan come under the strategic management of the JP Coordinator of the Youth Employment Programme</td>
<td>There is an argument that the two JP’s in South Sudan (YEP and SPD) are so similar in focus (geography and substance) and constitution (agency partners) that they should never have been approved as separate programmes. Currently, many of the agency focal points are the same for both projects. The YEP has demonstrated a much higher degree of coherence than the SPD, and this is due in large part to the role and performance of the current YEP Coordinator. This could promote greater linkages between the JP’s, reduce the transaction costs for all agencies</td>
</tr>
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</table>
involved in both JP’s, and inject some needed leadership into the project from someone that would be able to ‘hit the ground running’ as he is already familiar with the context, actors and administrative set up of the MDG-F.

78. The last three options above would require resourcing in the form of additional staff. The Coordination Team in Khartoum had previously encouraged the team in South Sudan to recruit a coordination officer with funds from the JP staffing budget but this was never pursued. Funding could come from there, and/or from the other sources.

79. It should be said that the political context, competing priorities and fluid security situation has been very challenging during much of the implementation period of the JP. While these factors are often cited as impediments to implementation (sometimes too generously), few environments are as dynamic and unpredictable as Sudan has been over the past 20 months.

80. However, nothing short of an authentic, clearly articulated and supported shift in perspective will create the necessary conditions to change the trajectory of this JP.
**Conclusions and Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The lack of a management structure for the JP in South Sudan in the last 6 months has created an ‘orphaned project’, where there is no direction, leadership or accountability.</td>
<td>A NSC should be constituted in South Sudan as soon as possible, and consideration given to forming a PMC in Kuajok if logistically possible given the (lack of) presence of agencies in the state. The NSC should be formulated based on current, relevant partners who are active in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The JP had several significant structural design issues that have contributed to a lack of coherence and a fragmented approach to delivery.</td>
<td>The NCS/JP Management should identify areas of convergence where the inherent fragmentation can be reduced, such as functionally combining outputs where there is opportunity for genuine collaboration between agencies. This is not to suggest an extensive revision of the results framework, but rather to initiate regular coordination meetings where plans can be discussed and ideas for collaborative action identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. There is a lack of clarity regarding expenditures and total agency budgets (in some cases) between North and South. This makes it difficult for the JP as a whole to present itself accurately to the GoSS and to plan a ‘whole JP’ approach.</td>
<td>Agencies should clarify to the NSC on total budget and expenditure information for JP activities in South Sudan. This will be required for reporting to the MDG-F for the second half of 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There was no credible case made on the value of including so many (8) UN agencies under the project, or how they would fit together to produce coherent, strategic impact. The disparate mandates, local focus and (lack of) presence in Kuajok make coordination difficult</td>
<td>Collaboration between agencies should be strategic and rational, based on complimentary activities and priorities in the JP target areas. Potential areas of synergy emerged during the evaluation mission, such as UNW and UNICEF both planning community dialogues at the County level. These more specific</td>
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opportunities for joint action should be identified and pursued, as they are more likely to a) occur, and b) have an added value in doing so.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<th>The JP did not adequately plan for the possible separation of South Sudan, or the degree to which it would delay project implementation. As it currently stands, there is little likelihood that the JP will achieve the outcomes or outputs envisaged.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Given the many challenges facing the project (internal and external) it is not recommended that the JP request or be given an extension until/unless a credible decision is taken regarding a way forward. (discussed in paras 76-80) Following discussions on the current status of the project activities, as well as present needs and priorities, could lead to a narrowing of programmatic focus.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>6.</th>
<th>Progress to date has been heavy on assessments, light on tangible “dividends of peace” that are considered to be a cornerstone of post-conflict recovery in South Sudan.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Stronger focus should be put on providing some tangible support to affected communities, within a coherent framework.</td>
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<tr>
<th>7.</th>
<th>There is no communication or advocacy strategy for the project, despite this being a clear requirement and priority of the Fund. An almost complete absence of identity (use of logo on communication material, visibility materials, etc) reduces the visibility of the project and the opportunity for advocacy for the MDG’s and the UN reform agenda.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>A clear communication strategy should be adopted based on the MDG-F guidance note, and implemented immediately. The JP’s could serve as a visible example of the UN family working together in support of South Sudan.</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>Despite its importance throughout the lifecycle of the project cycle, particularly in a volatile operating environment such as South Sudan, risk management is not being done.</th>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>A risk management plan should be developed/updated looking forward at the final months of the project. The updated risk matrix should be supplied to the NSC prior to meetings to ensure management is fully informed of current risks and proposed mitigation steps.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>9.</th>
<th>The Government of South Sudan is not engaged at a managerial or oversight level, and has limited awareness of the JP as a unique project.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>An NSC should be constituted urgently under the leadership of the GoSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Leadership of the JP has been lacking in the UNCT/RCO as well as UNDP as the lead agency. The deprioritization of the JP is likely influenced by the comparatively small budget and the complexity of coordinating various agencies in a fluid, post-conflict setting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Monitoring at the JP level is currently not being done at all, nor are there structures in place to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The current focal point within UNDP for the JP handles 4 other projects and is thus unable to fulfill the function of coordinator with any degree of engagement. Without the JP being adequately staffed there is very little likelihood in a meaningful improvement in project performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>The joint assessments provided an informed basis for programming, although it is unclear that they had any substantial impact on informing agencies’ decisions about what activities they would engage in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The combination of narrowing the geographic scope to three counties in Warrap with a lack of coordination has led to a high degree of duplication, likely more than for other, non-IA projects. The JP has not met the base purpose of IA coordination, which is to avoid duplication of efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>The JP is not on target to achieve the strategic results envisaged under a multi-agency programme. The lack of ownership of the project by UNDP South Sudan, coupled with the JP Coordination Team being based in Khartoum, has created a coordination vacuum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that has deepened since independence.</td>
<td>work done by the Coordination Team in KRT.</td>
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# Annex 1: List of People Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Conroy</td>
<td>Head of Office, UNDP South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanuel Gebremedhin</td>
<td>Chief, CPRU, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Schuruma</td>
<td>Programme Analyst, CPRU, UNDP (JP Focal Point)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Cheema</td>
<td>JP Programme Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Muhumure</td>
<td>CSAC, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Okeyne</td>
<td>CSAC Technical Advisor, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wani James Henry</td>
<td>Focal Point, JP Sustainable Development for Peace, FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Oyat</td>
<td>Deputy Emergency Coordinator, FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Wani</td>
<td>National Program Coordinator, ILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucie Andrew Luguga</td>
<td>Program Manager, South Sudan, UN Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Lokoyome</td>
<td>National Programme Officer for Gender, UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatuma Hamidali Ibrahim</td>
<td>Head, Child Protection Programme, UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce Mutiso</td>
<td>Programme Specialist-Child Protection and Education, UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Allen M Mpairwe</td>
<td>Technical Officer, WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent</td>
<td>RCSO South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham Boyd</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor, Joint Programme on Youth Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Kir</td>
<td>YEM Focal Point, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Tobias Atari</td>
<td>Director General for Peace, South Sudan Peace Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayok</td>
<td>Legal Officer, UNHCR (Former UNDP focal point for the JP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Terms of Reference for the Mid Term Evaluation

EVALUATION OF JOINT PROGRAMMES ON CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING

General Context: the MDG-F Conflict Prevention and peace Building Window

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged €90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDGF supports countries in their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other development goals by funding innovative programmes that have an impact on the population and potential for duplication.

The MDGF operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint programmes in 49 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs.

The 11 programmes in this window seek to contribute to the achievement of 3 of main goals through interventions tackling conflict prevention and violence reduction, livelihood improvements against youth violence, and the fostering of dialog. These outcomes represent a variety of direct and indirect approaches to building peace and preventing conflicts. One common premise is ensuring that people know and exert their rights as an important component of a peace building and conflict prevention strategy, and appears as an outcome of many Joint Programs as well. Some joint programmes also pursue specific outcomes that are relevant in their context and situation, such as helping returnees and building public spaces.

Virtually all stakeholders in the joint programme within this window involve supporting the government, at the national and/or local levels. Many programs also engage civil society, community, and/or indigenous organizations and leaders.

The following points should be provided by the joint programme team

- Describe the joint programme, programme name and goals; include when it started, what outputs and outcomes are sought, its contribution to the MDGs at the local and national levels, its duration and current stage of implementation.
• Summarize the joint programme’s scale of complexity, including its components, targeted participants (direct and indirect), geographical scope (regions) and the socio-economic context in which it operates.

• It is also useful to describe the human and financial resources that the joint programme has at its disposal, the number of programme implementation partners (UN, national and local governments and other stakeholders in programme implementation).

• Changes noted in the programme since implementation began, and how the programme fits in with the priorities of the UNDAF and the National Development Strategies.

2. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDGF. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes lasting longer than two years will be subject to a mid-term evaluation.

Mid-term evaluations are highly formative in nature and seek to improve implementation of the joint programmes during their second phase of implementation. They also seek and generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be transferred to other programmes. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee and the Secretariat of the Fund.

3. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS

The mid-term evaluation will use an expedited process to carry out a systematic, fast-paced analysis of the design, process and results or results trends of the joint programme, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period of approximately three months.

The unit of analysis or object of study for this interim evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This mid-term evaluation has the following specific objectives:

81. To discover the programme’s design quality and internal coherence (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the Millennium Development Goals, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

82. To understand how the joint programme operates and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms.
This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework.

83. To identify the programme’s degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Economic Governance thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS AND CRITERIA

The main users of the evaluation represented in the evaluation reference group (Section 8 of the TOR), and specifically the coordination and implementation unit of the joint programme, are responsible for contributing to this section. Evaluation questions and criteria may be added or modified up to a reasonable limit, bearing in mind the viability and the limitations (resources, time, etc.) of a quick mid-term evaluation exercise.

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

Design level:

- **Relevance**: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors.

  a) Is the identification of the problems, with their respective causes, clear in the joint programme?

  b) Does the Joint Programme take into account the particularities and specific interests of women and men in the areas of intervention?

  c) To what extent has the intervention strategy been adapted to the areas of intervention in which it is being implemented? What actions does the programme envisage, to respond to obstacles that may arise from the political and socio-cultural background?

  d) Are the follow-up indicators relevant and do they meet the quality needed to measure the outputs and outcomes of the joint programme?

  e) To what extent has the MDG-F Secretariat contributed to raising the quality of the design of the joint programmes?

- **Ownership in the design**: Effective exercise of leadership by the country’s social agents in development interventions
a) To what extent do the intervention objectives and strategies of the Joint Programme respond to national and regional plans and programmes, to identified needs, and to the operational context of national politics?

b) To what extent have the country’s national and local authorities and social agents been taken into consideration, participated, or have become involved, at the design stage of the development intervention?

Process level

- Efficiency: Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, etc.) have been turned into results

a) To what extent does the joint programme’s management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) contribute to obtaining the predicted products and results?

b) To what extent are the participating agencies coordinating with each other, with the government and with civil society? Is there a methodology underpinning the work and internal communications that contributes to the joint implementation?

c) Are there efficient coordination mechanisms to avoid overloading the counterparts, participating population/actors?

d) Is the pace of implementing the products of the programme ensuring the completeness of the results of the joint programme? How do the different components of the joint programme interrelate?

e) Are work methodologies, financial instruments, etc. shared among agencies, institutions and Joint Programmes?

f) Have more efficient (sensitive) and appropriate measures been adopted to respond to the political and socio-cultural problems identified?

- Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country’s social agents in development interventions

g) To what extent have the target population and participants made the programme their own, taking an active role in it? What modes of participation have taken place?

h) To what extent have public/private national resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme’s objective and produce results and impacts?
Results level

- Effectiveness: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved or are expected to be achieved, bearing in mind their relative importance.

a) Is the programme making progress towards achieving the stipulated results?
   a. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?
   b. To what extent is the programme contributing to the goals set by the thematic window, and in what ways?

b) Is the stipulated timeline of outputs being met? What factors are contributing to progress or delay in the achievement of the outputs and outcomes?

c) Do the outputs produced meet the required high quality?

d) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?

e) Does the programme have follow-up mechanisms (to verify the quality of the products, punctuality of delivery, etc.) to measure progress in the achievement of the envisaged results?

f) Is the programme providing coverage to beneficiaries as planned?

g) In what way has the programme come up with innovative measures for problem-solving?

h) Have any good practices, success stories, or transferable examples been identified?

i) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of fair youth employment?

j) In what ways has the joint programme contributed to the issue of internal and/or external migration?

k) What types of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.

a) Are the necessary premises occurring to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the joint programme?

At local and national level:

i. Is the programme supported by national and/or local institutions?

ii. Are these institutions showing technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme and to repeat it?

iii. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?

iv. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?

v. Is the duration of the programme sufficient to ensure a cycle that will project the sustainability of the interventions?
b) To what extent are the visions and actions of the partners consistent or divergent with regard to the joint programme?

c) In what ways can the governance of the joint programme be improved so that it has greater likelihood of achieving future sustainability?

5. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The mid-term evaluations will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TOR, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, consultants are expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. Consultants are also expected to use interviews as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the desk study report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.

6. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the Secretariat of the MDGF:

- **Inception Report** (to be submitted within fifteen days of the submission of all programme documentation to the consultant)

This report will be 10 to 15 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The desk study report will propose initial lines of inquiry about the joint programme this report will be used as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation managers. The report will follow this outline:

0. Introduction

1. Background to the evaluation: objectives and overall approach

2. Identification of main units and dimensions for analysis and possible areas for research

3. Main substantive and financial achievements of the joint programme

4. Methodology for the compilation and analysis of the information

5. Criteria to define the mission agenda, including “field visits”
**Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 15 days of completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the evaluation reference group. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be shared with evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions. This report will contain the same sections as the final report, described below.

**Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within ten days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation reference group. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

1. Cover Page
2. Introduction
   - Background, goal and methodological approach
   - Purpose of the evaluation
   - Methodology used in the evaluation
   - Constraints and limitations on the study conducted
3. Description of interventions carried out
   - Initial concept
   - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.
4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions
5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)
6. Recommendations
7. Annexes

**7. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION**

The mid-term evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).
• **Anonymity and confidentiality.** The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.

• **Responsibility.** The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the consultant and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The team must corroborate all assertions, or disagreement with them noted.

• **Integrity.** The evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.

• **Independence.** The consultant should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.

• **Incidents.** If problems arise during the field work, or at any other stage of the evaluation, they must be reported immediately to the Secretariat of the MDGF. If this is not done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by the Secretariat of the MDGF in these terms of reference.

• **Validation of information.** The consultant will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.

• **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the consultant shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.

• **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

8. **ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION**

The main actors in the mid-term evaluation process are the MDGF Secretariat, the management team of the joint programme and the Programme Management Committee that could be expanded to accommodate additional relevant stakeholders. This group of institutions and individuals will serve as the evaluation reference group. The role of the evaluation reference group will extend to all phases of the evaluation, including:

- Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design.
- Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation.
- Providing input on the evaluation planning documents,( Work Plan and Communication, Dissemination and Improvement Plan).
- Providing input and participating in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.
- Facilitating the evaluation team’s access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.
- Monitoring the quality of the process and the documents and reports that are generated, so as to enrich these with their input and ensure that they address their interests and needs for information about the intervention.
- Disseminating the results of the evaluation, especially among the organizations and entities within their interest group.

The MDGF Secretariat shall promote and manage Joint Programme mid-term evaluation in its role as commissioner of the evaluation, fulfilling the mandate to conduct and finance the joint programme evaluation. As manager of the evaluation, the Secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted as stipulated, promoting and leading the evaluation design; coordinating and monitoring progress and development in the evaluation study and the quality of the process.

9. TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS

84. Preparation of the evaluation (approximately 45-60 days before the date the programme reaches a year and a half of implementation). These preparatory activities are not part of the evaluation as they precede the evaluation exercise.

1. An official e-mail from the Secretariat is sent to the RC, coordination officers in the country and joint programme coordinator. This mail will include the official starting date of the evaluation, instructive on mid-term evaluation and generic TOR for the evaluation.
2. During this period the evaluation reference group is established, the TOR are adapted to the context and interest of stakeholders in the country and all relevant documents on the joint programme are sent to the evaluator.

This activity requires a dialogue between the Secretariat and the reference group of the evaluation (the body that comments on and reviews but does not interfere with the independent evaluation process). This dialogue should be aimed at rounding out and modifying some of the questions and dimensions of the study that the generic TOR do not cover, or which are inadequate or irrelevant to the joint programme.

3. The Secretariat’s portfolios manager will discuss with the country an initial date for having the field visit.

4. From this point on, the evaluation specialists and the portfolio manager are responsible for managing the execution of the evaluation, with three main functions: to facilitate the work
of the consultant, to serve as interlocutor between the parties (consultant, joint programme team in the country, etc.), and to review the deliverables that are produced.

85. Execution phase of the evaluation study (87-92 days total)

**Desk study (23 days total)**

1. **Briefing with the consultant (1 day).** A checklist of activities and documents to review will be submitted, and the evaluation process will be explained. Discussion will take place over what the evaluation should entail.
2. **Review of documents according to the standard list (see TOR annexes; programme document, financial, monitoring reports etc.).**
3. **Submission of the inception report including the findings from the document review specifying how the evaluation will be conducted.** The inception report is sent and shared with the evaluation reference group for comments and suggestions (within **fifteen days of delivery of all programme documentation to the consultant**).
4. **The focal person for the evaluation (joint programme coordinator, resident coordinator office, etc) and the consultant prepare and agenda to conduct the field visit of the evaluation.** (Interview with programme participants, stakeholders, focus groups, etc) (Within **seven days of delivery of the desk study report**).

**Field visit (10-15 days)**

1. The consultant will travel to the country to observe and contrast the preliminary conclusions reached through the study of the document revision. The planned agenda will be carried out. To accomplish this, the Secretariat’s programme officer may need to facilitate the consultant’s visit by means of phone calls and emails, making sure there is a focal person in the country who is his/her natural interlocutor by default.
2. The consultant will be responsible for conducting a debriefing with the key actors he or she has interacted with.

**Final Report (54 days total)**

1. The consultant will deliver a draft final report, which the Secretariat’s programme officer shall be responsible for sharing with the evaluation reference group (within **fifteen days of the completion of the field visit**).
2. The Secretariat will assess the quality of the evaluation reports presented using the criteria stipulated by UNEG and DAC Evaluation Network (within seven days of delivery of the draft final report).

3. The evaluation reference group may ask that data or facts that it believes are incorrect be changed, as long as it provides data or evidence that supports its request. The evaluator will have the final say over whether to accept or reject such changes. For the sake of evaluation quality, the Secretariat can and should intervene so that erroneous data, and opinions based on erroneous data or not based on evidence, are changed (within fifteen days of delivery of the draft final report).

The evaluation reference group may also comment on the value judgements contained in the evaluation, but these may not affect the evaluator’s freedom to express the conclusions and recommendations he or she deems appropriate, based on the evidence and criteria established.

All comments will be compiled in a matrix that the Secretariat will provide to the evaluation focal points.

4. On the completion of input from the reference group, the evaluator shall decide which input to incorporate and which to omit (ten days) and submit to the MDG-F Secretariat a final evaluation report.

5. The Secretariat will review the final copy of the report, and this phase will conclude with the delivery of this report to the evaluation reference group in the country (within seven days of delivery of the draft final report with comments).

86. Phase of incorporating recommendations and improvement plan (within fifteen days of delivery of the final report):

1. The Secretariat’s programme officer, as representative of the Secretariat, shall engage in a dialogue with the joint programme managers to establish an improvement plan that includes recommendations from the evaluation.

2. The Secretariat will publish the evaluation in its website.

10. ANNEXES
a) Document Review

This section must be completed and specified by the other users of the evaluation but mainly by the management team of the joint programme and by the Programme Management Committee. A minimum of documents that must be reviewed before the field trip shall be established; in general terms the Secretariat estimates that these shall include, as a minimum:

MDG-F Context
- MDG Framework Document
- Summary of the M&E frameworks and common indicators
- General thematic indicators
- M&E strategy
- Communication and Advocacy Strategy
- MDG-F Joint Implementation Guidelines

Specific Joint Programme Documents
- Joint Programme Document: results framework and monitoring and evaluation framework
- Mission reports from the Secretariat
- Quarterly reports
- Mini-monitoring reports
- Biannual monitoring reports
- Annual reports
- Annual work plan
- Financial information (MDTF)

Other in-country documents or information
- Evaluations, assessments or internal reports conducted by the joint programme
- Relevant documents or reports on the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels
- Relevant documents or reports on the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the country
- Relevant documents or reports on One UN, Delivering as One

c) File for the Joint Programme Improvement Plan

After the interim evaluation is complete, the phase of incorporating its recommendations shall begin. This file is to be used as the basis for establishing an improvement plan for the joint programme, which will bring together all the recommendations, actions to be carried out by programme management.

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Evaluation Recommendation No. 2

Response from the Joint Programme Management

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Evaluation Recommendation No. 3

Response from the Joint Programme Management

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