

# **Timor Leste**

## **Mid-Term Evaluation**

**Thematic window: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment**

**Programme Title: Supporting Gender Equality and Women's Human Rights in Nation-building of Timor-Leste**

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## Prologue

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent 'snapshot' of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the "Delivering as One" initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.

Adan Ruiz Villalba Evaluation Advisor

MDG-F Secretariat

**Mid-Term Evaluation of the MDG-F Joint Programme entitled  
*Supporting Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Timor-Leste*  
[MDGF-1703-B-TLS]**

**Revised Evaluation Report**

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December 2010

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
I am now ready to submit this revised version of the evaluation report on the MDG-F Joint Programme entitled *Supporting Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Timor-Leste [MDGF-1703-B-TLS]*. This version has been revised based on the comments sent by the MDG-F Secretariat and the UN Agencies on the draft report, as of the date indicated below. It considered the comments which were summarized on the prescribed template.

In my opinion, the findings herein fairly represent the activities and results from the programme since it started in December 2008. These findings were derived from my review of the programme documents, and the interviews and discussions with various informants from the Executing Agencies, the participating government agencies and NGOs in Timor-Leste, the Acting Programme Manager, and beneficiaries.

The facts that are stated in this report are based on the documents and verbal information that were obtained during the course of the evaluation. I have assumed that these facts, likewise indicated in the draft version, have been reviewed by the stakeholder groups. Still, the opinions and conclusions that follow are mine, and these may not necessarily represent the views of the persons and organizations consulted during the evaluation.

The focal persons from the Executing Agencies and the UNRC provided all the necessary information and support to complete this report. Their counterparts from the MSS and SEPI, and the NGOs, also ably assisted in providing and clarifying the information which were used in the evaluation. The UNIFEM staff provided valuable help in convening the interviews and discussions, and provided other support services for the task. In general, the local stakeholder groups were cooperative to the exercise and receptive to the ideas that came out during the evaluation process.

I am happy to have been part of this exercise and the overall effort to achieve the MDGs in Timor-Leste.



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15 December 2010

## List of Acronyms

AA	-	Administrative Agent
AECID	-	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo
AWP	-	Annual Work Plan
CBO	-	Community-Based Organization
CCT	-	Conditional Cash Transfer
CEDAW	-	Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CP	-	Country Programme
DEX	-	Direct Execution
DV	-	Domestic Violence
GBV	-	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GoTL	-	Government of Timor-Leste
GRB	-	Gender-Responsive Budgeting
HDI	-	Human Development Index
HDR	-	Human Development Report
IEC	-	Information, Education and Communication
IOM	-	International Organization for Migration
IPC	-	International Programme Coordinator
JP	-	Joint Programme
JPMF	-	Joint Programme Monitoring Framework
M & E	-	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
MDG-F	-	MDG Achievement Fund
MDTF	-	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoE	-	Ministry of Education
MoH	-	Ministry of Health
MSS	-	Ministry of Social Solidarity
NEX	-	National Execution
NGOs	-	Non-Government Organizations
NPC	-	National Programme Coordinator
NSC	-	National Steering Committee
OECD/DAC	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
PMC	-	Programme Management Committee
PMU	-	Programme Management Unit
PPP	-	Purchasing Power Parity
QCBS	-	Quality and Cost-Based System
RBM	-	Results-Based Management
SEPI	-	Sekretaria Estada Promosaun Igualidade
TOR	-	Terms of Reference
UN	-	United Nations
UNDAF	-	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	-	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	-	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	-	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	-	United Nations Fund for Women
UNMIT	-	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNRC	-	United Nations Resident Coordinator

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## ***Executive Summary***

Timor-Leste is a disadvantaged country whose socio-economic situation is way below the regional norm in Southeast Asia, and comparable only to some low HDI countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The low level of human development in Timor-Leste is believed to be largely due to external and internal conflicts which prevailed until its independence in 2002, with some recurrence until 2008.

Being a post-conflict country, the level of government effectiveness in Timor-Leste is low, and there are national and international initiatives to capacitate local institutions and improve the governance systems. Despite its limitations, the Government of Timor-Leste has also adopted the MDGs, although the latest report shows continuing challenges in the achievement of most of the targets.

In 2007, preliminary efforts were made to formulate a joint programme entitled *Supporting Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Timor-Leste*. This three-year programme commenced on December 2008 after approval by the MDG-F under its overall thematic window on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment. The approved budget for this programme is US\$ 4.955 million, and there are 5 executing agencies which are responsible for the delivery of its results.

By mid-2010, a mid-term evaluation of the programme was arranged and a field mission to Timor-Leste was carried out later in September.

Based on the information gathered during the mission and the review of documents that were submitted to the evaluation, it was concluded that:

- (1) The degree of programme relevance is high. It is clearly contributing to the achievement of Goals 3 and 2 of the MDGs, and to the objectives set in the MDG-F thematic window. It is linked to the plans, priorities, and goals of the government and the UN. Its internal relevance is also established.
- (2) The programme has also been effective in terms of its conformity to the expected norms in joint programming, its ability to provide quality activities and interventions, and in attaining its outreach. It is also complying with the joint programme concept.
- (3) On the whole however, there are constraints in the effectiveness of the programme because of difficulties in achieving its expected results. There has been slow progress in the implementation of activities which is putting the achievement of results at risk. The delay in the programme is due to the following external and internal factors:
  - There is a higher level of difficulty to implement a joint programme in Timor-Leste because of its social, economic and political conditions
  - The programme plan underestimated the effects of the destabilizing events that occurred in 2006
  - The programme design was ambitious; the types of changes that the programme wanted to achieve are complex and most of these are difficult to achieve, especially in Timor-Leste
  - The programme took a considerable risk in assigning most of the inputs and deliverables to a single agency, which was also made responsible for programme management
  - There have been agency weaknesses in making timely decisions and actions, particularly in the staffing function
- (4) While the management system is working, it is only starting to develop into a system for problem-solving and results-achievement. Cost efficiency is being observed; there has however been considerable underspending of the programme budget.

- (5) The synergy in the programme still has to be studied and elaborated. However, there are potential synergistic effects being created by the programme from the integration of interventions and activities.
- (6) While the programme is not the first joint programme to be implemented in Timor-Leste, it has potential to become a case to review the joint programme concept and to share its lessons to the UN System.
- (7) It is still too early for the programme to plan for its sustainability, the premises for such are not yet occurring, and the chances of programme sustainability are low because of the basic situation of the institutions in Timor-Leste.

In view of these conclusions, the evaluation mainly recommended to:

- Re-design the programme by reducing the indicators for the outputs and outcomes, revising the activities and budget, and updating the JPMF
- Set a definite timeline for the establishment of the PMU
- Extend the programme for at least six months, subject to certain conditions
- Review and update the TOR for the PMC and NSC, for these mechanisms to be oriented towards problem-solving and results achievement
- Allow flexibility in the fund transfer system to enable the agencies which are performing well to access their third transfer of funds
- Clarify the protocols in revising the M & E Framework for the joint programmes
- Give special attention to the issue of results attribution in the terminal evaluation of the programme

Notable practices were identified by the evaluation in terms of: the programme's respect and practice of national ownership; the delivery of joint outputs and outcomes, and the joint implementation of activities; and the effectiveness of the programme assistance to the conditional cash transfer scheme in Timor-Leste.

The following lessons were also mentioned in the report:

- In a post-conflict country like Timor-Leste, it is necessary that a conflict assessment be done, and the programme design should be based on the results of this conflict assessment
- In a joint programme, it is better to diversify the risks in programme delivery across the participating agencies than to concentrate the risks in a single agency
- Aside from identifying the external risk factors in the JPMF, there should also be a risk assessment and an identification of the mitigation strategies that would be adopted for each risk
- While the combined commitment rate system encourages the strengthening of joint programming, it does not provide an incentive to agencies that are otherwise performing well
- To the best extent possible, the TOR for programme staff positions and partners should be adapted to local limitations



## I. Introduction

### A. Background and Details on the Evaluation

#### 1. Origins of the Evaluation

In late-2009, the MDG-F Secretariat issued a call for consultants who will be tasked to undertake mid-term evaluations of the programmes funded by the MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F). The process of selection and finalization of agreements began by early 2010. In Timor-Leste, definite arrangements for the evaluation were reached by June 2010, in consideration of the special situation prevailing in the area. Documents about the joint programme on gender were sent by the Secretariat on August, and an Inception Report was submitted by the Consultant thereafter.

#### 2. Evaluation Objectives

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation set the following objectives:

- a. To discover the programme's design quality and internal coherence (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies and the Millennium Development Goals, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action;
- b. To understand how the joint programme operates, and assess the efficiency of its management model in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the One UN framework; and
- c. To identify the programme's degree of effectiveness among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the Gender and Women Empowerment thematic window, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

#### 3. Approach and Methodology Applied

This evaluation was guided by a formative approach. It was an exercise that generally aimed to improve the programme for the second half of its implementation. While viewed from an appreciative outlook, it likewise recognized that there are always challenges in programme implementation, and that there was a need to identify the problems and issues being faced by the programme in order to come up with possible solutions.

The evaluation was also designed to be rapid. It was expected to be completed over a period of eight weeks. This was a consequence of the formative nature of the task, which should allow more time for an adjusted implementation of the programme.

The evaluation was undertaken along the standards set by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG). It aimed to balance the elements of stakeholder participation with independence and integrity. To the best possible extent, the task elicited the participation of various stakeholder groups. This was done through the conduct of standard questionnaires, and interactive interviews and group discussions during a field mission by the Consultant to Timor-Leste [Annex A].

While comments from the stakeholders were considered in finalizing this report, the independence of the undertaking was asserted. The evaluation findings were also based on evidence that were gathered during the course of the study.

In furtherance of the overall formative approach, the evaluation was oriented towards the achievement of results and is framed within the larger concept of Results-Based Management (RBM). The logical relationships of inputs, activities, and results, and also between outputs and outcomes serve as tools for the analyses.

#### 4. Disclosure of Limitations

##### a. Scope of Institutional Participation

The evaluation sought to involve the various institutions that are involved in the programme: members of the National Steering Committee (NSC); member-agencies of the Programme Management Committee (PMC); and participating Government Agencies or Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). However, for reasons that are beyond the control of the evaluation, only 2 out of the 3 target NSC Members and only 2 out of the 4 target Government Agencies were actually able to participate in the evaluation activities [Table 1].<sup>1</sup>

**Table 1. Summary of Target and Actual Institutional Participation**

	Target Number	Actual Number	% of Participation
NSC Members	3	2	67%
PMC Members	6	6	100%
Executing Agencies	5	5	100%
Government Agencies	4	2	50%
NGOs	4	4	100%

##### b. Quality of Financial Data

The financial data that are presented in this report describe the programme situation as of September 2010. The evaluation sought to acquire the latest available financial data, but not all the source agencies were able to provide the information. The financial reports were also unaudited.<sup>2</sup>

##### c. Programme Sites Visited

As aimed for in the work plan, two (i.e. Dili and Suai) out of the five programme sites were visited during the mission. The sample sites followed the overall strata, as one site was a border district (i.e. Suai) and the other was a non-border district (i.e. Dili).

<sup>1</sup> The evaluation sought but failed to have an appointment with the Ministry of Economy and Development of Timor-Leste, a member of the NSC. The Ministry of Finance was also not able to come during the focus group discussion with government agencies.

<sup>2</sup> See Table H and Footnotes 24-28.

## B. Context of the Programme Area

### 1. Social and Economic Situation

Timor-Leste is considered as one of the poorest countries in the world, where the level of human development is comparable with those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Per Capita GDP in the area is estimated to be even lower than those countries within its immediate HDI sub-group, and way below the regional averages in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa [Table 2]. Unemployment and underemployment are estimated to be as high as 70%, and around half of the population is believed to be living below the poverty line.

**Table 2. Selected Human Development Data (2007)**

	HDI	HDI Rank	GDP Per Capita (PPP US\$)
Benin	0.492	160	1,312
Malawi	0.493	161	761
<i>Timor-Leste</i>	<i>0.489</i>	<i>162</i>	<i>717</i>
Côte d'Ivoire	0.484	163	1,690
Zambia	0.481	164	1,358
East Asia and the Pacific	0.770	n. a.	5,733
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.514	n. a.	2,031

Source: HDR 2009

### 2. Relevant Political Developments

The socio-economic situation in Timor-Leste has been associated with the country's transition to independence and self-rule, albeit in a post-conflict environment. While steps are being taken to stabilize the country since its decision to become independent in 2002, episodes of internal strife occurred in 2006 until 2008. Presidential and parliamentary elections were however successfully completed in 2007, and peace and stability have prevailed until today.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. Status of Public Governance

Public governance in the country is composed by the parliament, the government ministries, and the judicial courts. In general, the institutions of public governance in Timor-Leste have been weakened by the transition and are still in the process of strengthening. The UNDP [2002] reported that around 8,000 core civil servants fled the country during the period of fighting, and that there was a difficulty in


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<sup>3</sup> The path to independence in 2002 had been costly in terms of lives, injuries, internal displacements of persons, and destruction of property. Around 100,000 to 250,000 people were estimated to have died from violence and hunger, and 300,000 persons were displaced during the Indonesian occupation period from 1976 until 1999. By 2000, 37 out of 58 power stations were damaged and non-functional, and 40% of houses were destroyed. In 2006, there was a resurgence of intra-military and mob violence in the country which necessitated the deployment of stabilization forces from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal. Also, in 2008, former military personnel attempted to assassinate the President and Prime Minister of Timor-Leste.

getting qualified local substitutes to fill in the vacated government posts. It was also estimated that around 70% of public buildings were destroyed as of 2000.

A worldwide governance study shows that the level of government effectiveness in Timor-Leste has been low, and may have actually regressed from 2002 until 2009. Countries having similar post-conflict and/or on-going conflict situations like Afghanistan and Palestine also have low levels of government effectiveness, with Timor-Leste only better off than Afghanistan in this aspect [Chart 1].<sup>4</sup>

**Chart 1. Comparative Government Effectiveness Indicators (2002 and 2009)**



Source: World Bank

In view of this overall weakness in governance, the first National Development Plan [2002] which was adopted by the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) after independence emphasized the need for long-term and comprehensive capacity-building in the public sector. A ten-year programme on capacity development for governance and public sector management was included in this plan. An updated 2011-2030 Strategic Development Plan which was recently adopted by the GoTL also indicates a continuous effort to strengthen the public institutions in the country over the next twenty-year period.

#### 4. UN Approach and Strategy

The precarious situation in Timor-Leste necessitated the UN to take on both immediate peacekeeping and peace-building, and long-term development approaches in the area. The overall coordination of these efforts is being done through a UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). This includes the maintenance of an international security force which is gradually turning over its functions to the local police.

Development activities by the UN are guided by a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The initial approach by the UN had been to support the GoTL in its institutional strengthening effort through the strategies of “targeted capacity development in government” and

<sup>4</sup> Based on the study, the government effectiveness indicators for Timor-Leste were -1.13 in 2009 compared to -0.8 in 2002. The range of indicators is from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values implying better government effectiveness. However, the number of sources in the dataset was 6 in 2009, compared to 1 in 2002.


“technical assistance to government”, as indicated in the 2003-2005 UNDAF. The new 2009-2013 UNDAF also made commitments to continue the capacity development of state institutions in Timor-Leste, although now focused on development outcomes, proper management of human resources, and adequate financial resources and tools. Among the on-going interventions of the UN that are related to the strengthening of public governance in the country are the *Support to Civil Service Reform in Timor-Leste Project* and the *Local Governance Support Programme* which are being implemented by the UNDP.

## 5. MDG Targets and Activities

Despite the constraints in being a newly independent country, the GoTL took part in the global effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. A total of 12 targets for the 8 goals were adopted for Timor-Leste. Aside from adopting the goals, the GoTL is also making an effort to monitor the achievement of these goals. For this purpose, two MDG Reports have already been prepared by the GoTL.

The second MDG Report which was prepared by the GoTL in 2009 remained positive on the achievement of the MDGs. However, the available data show that the level of risk in the non-achievement of the goals is high, except in Goal 2 (Achievement of Universal Primary Education) and Goal 3 (Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women) where the indicators show mixed results [Annex C]. The latest Asia-Pacific Report on the MDGs [2010] also show that more than 60% of the indicators in Timor-Leste are off-track, which is the highest in Southeast Asia.

**Chart 2. Comparative Available and Off-Track MDG Indicators in Southeast Asia**



Source: UNESCAP 2010

## II. Description of the Programme Being Evaluated

### A. Background of the Programme

#### 1. Programme Classification

The programme being evaluated, entitled *Supporting Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Timor-Leste*, is being supported by the MDG-F under its thematic window on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment. This window aims to facilitate the achievement of Goal 3 (and all the other MDGs) through interventions that address these dimensions: (a) Capabilities - Basic human abilities as measured by education, health and nutrition; (b) Access to resources and opportunities - Equality in the opportunity to use or apply basic capabilities through access to economic and political assets and resources; and (c) Security - Reduced vulnerability of women to violence and conflict. Based on the TOR for this window, the joint programmes under this theme could cover the aspects of policy and planning, capacity-building of institutions and gender equality advocates, and the piloting or scaling-up of interventions to advance women's rights and reduce gender disparities.

#### 2. Programme Inception

The documents made available for the evaluation indicate that the formulation of the programme started in April 2007. Consultations which involved the key GoTL ministries and offices, and the participating agencies were reported to have been held until October 2007. The first meeting of an incipient NSC together with the stakeholder groups was also held in October 2007, prior to the submission of the programme document to the MDG-F Secretariat.

After the formal approval of the programme on October 2008 and the first transfer of funds on December 2008, an Inception Workshop was held on February 20, 2009. The inception workshop was attended by 31 participants from the Executing UN Agencies, government institutions, NGOs, and the Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID).

#### 3. Implementation Period and Commencement

The implementation period for the programme is three years, and is reckoned to have started on 15 December 2008, when the first transfer of the programme funds was received locally by the country offices in Timor-Leste.

#### 4. Programme Budget and Fund Transfer Arrangement

The total programme budget is US\$ 4.955 million. This whole amount was transferred by the MDG-F to the UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office as the fund's Administrative Agent (AA).

The arrangement for the transfer of funds from the MDTF to the executing agencies is as follows: (a) the first fund advance to the executing agencies is to be passed on by the MDTF upon its receipt of the Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the first year and a signed copy of the Joint Programme Document; and (b) subsequent fund advances will be done by the MDTF upon its receipt of the next AWP and an annual report, and when the executing agencies have complied with a combined commitment rate of at least 70%.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The commitment rate method means that the total value of both disbursed and undisbursed contracts should be at least 70% of the amount advanced by the MDTF to the executing agencies.

## B. Programme Concept and Design

### 1. Joint Programme Concept

The programme being evaluated is recognized as a Joint Programme (JP) in the UN System. Based on the Guidance Note on Joint Programming [2003], a joint programme “is a set of activities contained in a common work plan and related budget, involving two or more UN organizations and (sub-) national partners.” These common work plan and budget are to be included in a joint programme document, which also discusses the roles and responsibilities of the UN Agencies and partners in coordinating and managing the programme. In cases where there are common partners or within the same geographical area, UN organizations are also supposed to strategize and identify common results expected from the programme.<sup>6</sup> In the MDG-F programme, this feature has been applied through the adoption of a common Results Framework.

Based on the interview with the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) in Timor-Leste and subsequent researches done by the evaluation, there are 6 of such joint programmes which are on-going in the country. Two of these are funded by the MDG-F. The programme being evaluated appears to be the third joint programme to be implemented in the current portfolio, although the first 2 joint programmes involve only two UN Agencies [Table 3].

**Table 3. Summary of On-Going Joint Programmes in Timor-Leste**

Title	Implementation Period	No. of Participating Agencies	Budget (US\$)
Local Governance Support Programme	2007 – 2011	2	3.8 million
Inclusive Finance for the Under-Served Economy	2008 – 2012	2	5.0 million <sup>7</sup>
Supporting Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Timor-Leste	December 2008 – November 2011	5	4.9 million
Return, Relocation and Reintegration Support to IDPs and IDP-Affected Communities in Timor-Leste	June 2009 – June 2010	2	0.9 million
Joint Program Promoting Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security In Timor-Leste	January 2010 – December 2012	4	4.0 million
Community mobilization for poverty reduction and social inclusion in service delivery	May 2010 – April 2013	6	4.2 million

Source: Interview with the UNRC and Programme Websites

<sup>6</sup> The 2003 Guidance Note indicates that programme outputs may be “agency-specific” or “shared” across agencies.

<sup>7</sup> The website of the UN Capital Development Fund indicates the total cost of this project to be US\$ 5 million, although US\$ 3.45 million is still “to be mobilized”.

## 2. Other Concepts

The programme is also expected to conform to the aid effectiveness concepts set in the 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. These include the concepts of establishing national ownership on the programme, alignment of programme objectives with national objectives, orientation towards results, and use of country systems to deliver aid. The concept of One UN is also mentioned as part of the overall programme framework, although its dimensions are already present in the concept of a joint programme.

## 3. Results Framework

With reference to the Programme Document, the structure of results expected from the programme is shown in Table 4. The UNDAF Outcome is linked to 3 JP Outcomes: Outcome 1 is about a change in laws and plans; Outcome 2 seeks to improve social services and schemes; and Outcome 3 is focused on changes related to Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB). These outcomes are in turn, composed by a total of 8 outputs. Outcomes 1 and 3 are composed by 3 outputs each, while Outcome 2 is made up of 2 outputs.

There are 3 agencies (i.e. IOM, UNFPA, and UNICEF) which are responsible for the delivery of Outcome 1. Each output under this outcome will be delivered by at least 2 agencies.

For Outcome 2, there are 4 agencies involved (i.e. IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, and UNICEF). However, Output 2.1 will be delivered by only one agency (i.e. UNDP).

The whole of Outcome 3 will be delivered by only one agency (i.e. UNIFEM).

The cost allocations in the Results Framework also indicate that all the outputs and outcomes will be achieved only by the third year of the programme.

## 4. Description of Activities

The programme sought to improve, and lobbied for the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence which was passed by the national parliament of Timor-Leste in mid-2010. Similar efforts are being made on the amendment of the Penal Code which would recognize domestic violence as a public crime.

After the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence, the programme is helping the GoTL to develop and adopt National Action Plans pertaining to the said law. Support to the concerned GoTL agencies is being given by the programme through the posting of experts, and training of personnel. NGOs that provide social services related to domestic violence and trafficking are also supported by the programme through training, linkaging, and funding.

The programme is particularly providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) for the strengthening of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) scheme called Bolsa Mãe. In this scheme, the GoTL provides cash subsidy to qualified mothers on the condition that they send their children to school. The joint programme is helping MSS to improve the concept through technical guidance and support to study similar CCT models in other countries. Technical support is also being given in the field of Information Technology, specifically in establishing the scheme's single registry.

A parallel effort is also being rendered by the programme in GRB. In this component, technical assistance is being provided to GoTL agencies in developing tools that will lead towards the adoption of gender-responsive budgets in the government ministries.



**Table 4. Structure of Results**

Results	Responsible Agencies
<p><b>UNDAF Outcome:</b> Stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion are consolidated and vulnerable populations benefit from quality social welfare and social protection services</p>	
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights</p>	
<p><u>Output 1.1:</u> Legislation passed and national action plans developed to prevent and combat domestic violence and human trafficking</p> <p><u>Output 1.2:</u> Capacity building programme developed to upgrade the knowledge and skills of government officials, NGOs and CBOs involved in implementing action plans related to combating domestic violence and human trafficking at national and local levels</p> <p><u>Output 1.3:</u> Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented on domestic violence and human trafficking at national and local levels</p>	<p>UNFPA, IOM</p> <p>IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF</p> <p>UNFPA, IOM, UNICEF</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through improved outreach mechanisms and services and the establishment of a social protection scheme</p>	
<p><u>Output 2.1:</u> Improved implementation of ongoing cash transfer schemes</p> <p><u>Output 2.2:</u> National and local referral mechanisms and services established and/or strengthened for the protection of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking</p>	<p>UNDP</p> <p>UNFPA, IOM, UNICEF</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting</p>	
<p><u>Output 3.1:</u> Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials, members of local assemblies and local council members</p> <p><u>Output 3.2:</u> Civil society (NGOs, Women’s groups, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for, scrutinize and monitor public expenditures</p> <p><u>Output 3.3:</u> Gender responsive budgets prepared and pilot tested in selected line Ministries and suco councils</p>	<p>UNIFEM</p> <p>UNIFEM</p> <p>UNIFEM</p>

## 5. Programme Sites

National-level activities, such as the activities intended to create changes in laws and plans, are intended to cover and benefit the whole of Timor-Leste. There are also programme activities which are specific to the improvement of the delivery of social services in 5 out of the 13 districts in the country.

## 6. Manner of Implementation

A summary of programme implementation details is shown in Table 5.

There are five Executing Agencies (i.e. 4 UN Agencies plus the IOM) for the programme. UNIFEM and UNDP are in DEX mode, UNFPA and IOM are in a combined NEX/DEX mode, and UNICEF is the only agency in purely NEX mode.

The number of partner government ministries and offices working with each executing agency ranges from 1 to 2 each. However, most of the executing agencies work with the same government ministry or office (i.e. MSS and SEPI).

Four NGOs are also reported to be involved in the programme. At present, these NGOs are working with UNFPA, IOM, and UNIFEM.

In terms of budgets, the UNIFEM allocation is around one-third of the total budget, IOM's portion is roughly one-fourth, and the rest of the agencies hold less than 20% of the budget each.

A Programme Management Unit (PMU) is also supposed to be lodged with UNIFEM.

**Table 5. Programme Implementation Details**

Executing Agency	Mode of Execution	No. of Partner Agencies		Budget Share
		Government Agencies	NGOs	
UNIFEM	DEX	2	1	33%
IOM	NEX/DEX	2	2	26%
UNFPA	NEX/DEX	2	2	19%
UNDP	DEX	1	-	13%
UNICEF	NEX	2	-	9%

*Source:* Focus Group Discussion with UN Agencies and IOM, Focus Group Discussion with NGOs, and data from Acting Programme Manager

### C. Theory of Change

Based on the design, there are five types of changes (at the output level) that the programme intends to create: (1) a change in laws; (2) a change in government plans and budgets; (3) a change in government and NGO abilities; (4) a change in public awareness; and (5) a change in the quality of social services. The combination of these changes is expected to lead towards the achievement of the outcomes, which is a change in the social and economic situation of women and girls.

The way that the programme is being implemented also shows that there are relationships among the output-level changes. A change in the law will bring about a change in government plans. There will also be a need to create some changes in public awareness because a new law (e.g. the Law Against Domestic Violence) has been adopted. This change in awareness will also create greater demand for social services; hence the quality of such services will also have to be upgraded through a change in the abilities of government and NGO providers.

### III. Analysis of Findings

#### A. Relevance of the Programme

##### 1. Quality of the Programme Design

###### a. Quality of Interventions

The gender-based problems that the programme seeks to address are clearly discussed in the Situation Analysis section of the programme document. Based on this analysis, the basic problems of women and girls in Timor-Leste are: (i) their political marginalization and economic deprivation; (ii) gaps in legislation that perpetuate such a condition; (iii) low awareness and service capacity by government to support victims of trafficking and domestic violence; and (iv) inadequate government resources to help victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse and trafficking. These basic problems are believed to be the causes for a higher incidence of gender-based violence and vulnerability by women to domestic and international trafficking. A hypothetical structure of these problems and its long-term effects, as understood by the evaluation, is shown in Annex D. The information gathered by the evaluation also show that these problems were identified through a process of consultations with stakeholders during the formulation of the programme document.

The designed interventions clearly correspond to most of the identified problems:

- The gaps in legislation are being attended to by the programme's support to the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence and the adoption of its corresponding action plans. Similar efforts are also being done to amend the Penal Code, which will recognize domestic violence as a public crime;
- The problem of low awareness and service capacity by the GoTL agencies is also being obviously addressed by the Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activities and overall capacity-building interventions inherent in the programme;
- The whole of Outcome 3 is obviously meant to solve the problem of inadequacy in government resources to help victims of gender-based violence and trafficking, through the promotion of Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB); and
- The economic hardships of women are being addressed through the strengthening of the GoTL's CCT scheme.

However, most of the programme interventions are not new, and were carried over from the previous initiatives which were already being implemented disparately by the participating agencies. The Law Against Domestic Violence has for instance been proposed since 2004. Awareness-raising and capacity-building of government agencies on matters related to gender-based violence and trafficking have been on-going prior to programme start, together with the strengthening of the CCT scheme and the advocacy for GRB. Nonetheless, there are new features that the joint programme has introduced, such as the action plans and IEC activities ensuing from the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence, the common training courses on Gender-Based Violence (GBV), and the normative coordinated approach to joint programming.

The programme was thus also largely adapted to the previous, albeit independent, initiatives by the executing agencies that sought to address these same problems. These prior initiatives have also corresponded to the plans and programs (e.g. the CCT scheme of MSS) of the GoTL; as such, a natural process of adaptation by the programme to local conditions took place.

The executing agencies are also consciously adapting the programme implementation plan to the situation and pace of their partner government agencies and NGOs, and it is evident that there is a high level of local adaptation in this aspect. The risks in adapting to the pace of the GoTL were also

considered in the Joint Programme Monitoring Framework (JPMF). However, as will be pointed out later in this report, there were no courses of action that were identified to mitigate this risk in adaptation, and other externalities arising from the special situation in Timor-Leste.

#### b. Quality of Outputs and Outcomes

The evaluation's appraisal of the structure of programme results as summarized in Table 4 shows that the outputs are logically linked to, and will lead towards the achievement of their respective outcomes. The formulation of some outputs is nonetheless confusing, and these could be due to differences in language and/or understanding of definitions.<sup>8</sup>

There is also a logical relationship between the three programme outcomes and the overall UNDAF Outcome [Table 4 and Annex D]. However, since these four results are all at the level of outcomes, there could only be a horizontal link between the programme outcomes with the UNDAF Outcome. The impact of the programme is therefore missing in the programme design, and this could be a problem if the aspect of impact or impact potential will be included in an end-of-project, ex-ante or a larger meta-evaluation.

There were a total of 36 indicators for the 8 outputs in the original JPMF. In general, the evaluation assessed these indicators to be relevant and approximate to the outputs, subject to the constraint in definitions [Note 7 and Annex E]. At the same time, the evaluation believes that there are too many indicators adopted for Outputs 1.2 and 2.2. There were also no outcome indicators in the original JPMF [Table 6].

In the last quarter of 2009, programme management took an effort to review and improve the Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework of the programme. An International M & E Consultant was tasked to review and propose revisions in the framework. The revised framework included the outcome indicators that were otherwise missing in the original JPMF. However, the evaluation believes that there are too many indicators which were added into the design, and these will only complicate the collection and analysis of data [Table 6]. The evaluation also holds an opinion that the protocols in making changes to the JPMF will have to be clarified between the MDG-F Secretariat and programme management.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The 2007 Proposed Harmonized Terminology of OECD/DAC reaffirmed "outputs" as among the types of results. It can also be inferred from the definitions that "outputs" remain as the basic (first-level) result or change. However, the same OECD/DAC matrix of terminologies later defines "outputs" as "products and services which result from the completion of activities (underscoring supplied)". The Consultant holds an opinion that this definition limits the scope of what can be considered as "outputs" in a development intervention, and also makes vague the distinction between "outputs" and "activities" [see Technical Notes in Annex E].

<sup>9</sup> The revised version broke down the outputs into sub-outputs and assigned indicators for each of these, which resulted into an increase from the original 36 to 100 indicators.

**Table 6. Number of Outcome and Output Indicators, Original and Revised**

Results	No. of Indicators	
	Original	Revised
<p><b>Outcome 1.</b> Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights</p> <p><u>Output 1.1:</u> Legislation passed and national action plans developed to prevent and combat domestic violence and human trafficking</p> <p><u>Output 1.2:</u> Capacity building programme developed to upgrade the knowledge and skills of government officials, NGOs, and CBOs involved in the implementation of domestic violence and human trafficking eradication plans at national and local levels</p> <p><u>Output 1.3:</u> Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented on domestic violence and human trafficking at national and local levels</p>	<p>none</p> <p>3</p> <p>6</p> <p>4</p>	<p>9</p> <p>8</p> <p>24</p> <p>9</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2.</b> Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through improved outreach mechanisms and services and the establishment of a social protection scheme</p> <p><u>Output 2.1:</u> Technical support provided for improving the design and implementation of ongoing conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes of MSS</p> <p><u>Output 2.2:</u> National and local referral mechanisms and services established and/or strengthened for the protection of victims of DV and human trafficking</p>	<p>none</p> <p>4</p> <p>6</p>	<p>8</p> <p>7</p> <p>11</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3.</b> Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resource using gender-responsive budgeting</p> <p><u>Output 3.1:</u> Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials and local council members</p> <p><u>Output 3.2:</u> Civil society (NGOs, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for scrutinize and monitor public expenditure</p> <p><u>Output 3.3:</u> Gender responsive budgets prepared and pilot-tested in MoH, MoE, MSS and suco council in Bobonaro</p>	<p>none</p> <p>4</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p>	<p>8</p> <p>10</p> <p>6</p> <p>none</p>
	36	100

Sources: Original JPMF and Revised M & E Framework

### c. Role of the MDG-F Secretariat

During the phase of the programme formulation in 2007-2008, there were evident efforts by the MDG-F Secretariat to improve the quality of the programme design. Its initial concerns were on the integration of activities and synergy by the participating agencies, elaboration on the impact of the proposed policy changes, and the strengthening of the M & E Framework. At the end of the process, the Secretariat recommended to improve the final version of the programme document by, among others,: (i) including outcome indicators in the JPMF; (ii) changing the formulation of some “activities” from “inputs”; (iii) reducing the number of indicators in the M & E Plan; and (iv) lodging the PMU within the national counterpart agency instead of UNIFEM.

## 2. Degree of External Coherence

### a. Relevance to Government Plans and Priorities

The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified by the GoTL in April 2003, and the first state report was presented to the 44<sup>th</sup> CEDAW Session held in July 2009. The country’s accession to the CEDAW and its participation in the global accountability system clearly reflect a serious commitment to the achievement of gender equality and the promotion of women’s rights. The programme being evaluated is also undoubtedly a key element of the larger CEDAW framework being pursued by the GoTL.

Gender equality is also explicit among the guiding principles and strategies which the GoTL adopted in its first [2002] National Development Plan. In achieving its goals of poverty reduction and economic growth, the plan is guided by the principle of “Gender equality between women (girls) and men (boys) in access to opportunities, services, goods and privileges”. Recognizing that women form almost half of the population in Timor-Leste, the plan further concluded that “reducing gender inequality and enhancing women’s productivity will be integral elements of the country’s development and poverty reduction strategies.” There were also clear gender equality indicators set in the plan. The joint programme is therefore clearly responding to this overall government development plan.<sup>10</sup>

Informants from the GoTL who were consulted by the evaluation also confirmed the high level of programme relevance to the needs and priorities of their agencies. They believed that the joint programme is directly addressing the gender-based issues that are significant to the tasks being performed by their agencies. At the same time, it was also noted that the level of programme relevance could be higher, should some adjustments be done during the second phase.<sup>11</sup>

One of the concerns especially asked for the evaluation to look into is the degree of prioritization given by the GoTL to the gender programme, in relation to the many other priorities in Timor-Leste. Coming off from a start-up situation after years of conflict, there are many and multi-faceted needs expected in a newly created country such as Timor-Leste. A review of the text of overall National Development Plan [2002] indeed shows that: (i) the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women is only 1 goal among 16 goals; (ii) gender equality is only 1 guiding principle among 12 of such guiding principles; and (iii) gender mainstreaming and empowerment of women is only 1 out of the 9 development strategies identified in the plan.

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<sup>10</sup> The gender equality indicators set in the plan are: (i) existence of legislation to protect women from violence; (ii) accomplishment of targets for the participation of women in the public service, parliament, rural councils, defence [sic] and security forces and diplomatic service; and (iii) creation of mechanisms to help decrease school dropout rates for girls.

<sup>11</sup> From the five-point scale used in the survey questionnaires [Annex F], one respondent rated the level of programme relevance to be “Highly Relevant”, while another respondent estimated the level to be “Relevant” with the condition that the assessment could be “Highly Relevant” if the programme intervention could focus on service delivery than policy advocacy. The programme had apparently been focused on the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence throughout most of the first half of implementation, with increased activities towards the improvement of public services afterwards.

There are nonetheless indications that the GoTL commitments to gender equality, as well as the gender programme itself, are being accorded priority in Timor-Leste through: (i) the creation of the *Sekretaria Estadu Promosaun Igualidade* (SEPI) or the Office of the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Gender Equality; (ii) the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence, which is one of only 9 laws passed so far by the parliament in 2010; and (iii) the effort to amend the Penal Code that will make domestic violence a public crime. The active participation of the GoTL agencies in the gender programme is also an indication of the level of government prioritization being given to the programme and the overall theme.<sup>12</sup>

b. Relevance to UN Plans and Goals

The overall UN effort in Timor-Leste is guided by the 2009-2013 UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) which sets three UNDAF-level outcomes. Out of these, one outcome (i.e. *UNDAF Outcome 1: By 2013, stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion are consolidated*) has been linked to the gender programme in the programme document. This link is further validated by two Country Programme (CP) outcomes that are associated with UNDAF Outcome 1 - *CP Outcome 1.1: State organs and institutions are more efficient, transparent, accountable, equitable and gender-responsive in planning and delivery of services*; and *CP Outcome 1.2: People have greater access to effective, transparent and equitable justice* [Table 7].

**Table 7. Summary of Related UNDAF and Joint Programme Results**

2009-2013 UNDAF Results	Related Joint Programme Outcomes
<p><b>UNDAF Outcome 1:</b> By 2013, stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion are consolidated</p> <p><u>CP Outcome 1.1:</u> State organs and institutions are more efficient, transparent, accountable, equitable and gender-responsive in planning and delivery of services</p> <p><u>CP Outcome 1.2:</u> People have greater access to effective, transparent and equitable justice</p>	<p><b>JP Outcome 1.</b> Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights</p> <p><b>JP Outcome 3.</b> Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resource using gender-responsive budgeting</p>
<p><b>UNDAF Outcome 3:</b> By 2013, children, young people, women and men have improved quality of life through reduced malnutrition, morbidity and mortality, strengthened learning achievement and enhanced social protection</p> <p><u>CP Outcome 3.5:</u> Vulnerable populations, especially children and women, benefit from quality social protection, particularly social welfare services, including in emergencies</p>	<p><b>JP Outcome 2.</b> Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through improved outreach mechanisms and services and the establishment of a social protection scheme</p>

Sources: Interview with UNRC, 2009-2013 UNDAF, Joint Programme Document

<sup>12</sup> SEPI was created through a decree-law in June 2008.



Aside from these, there is also a rational link between the programme being evaluated and the third UNDAF Outcome (i.e. *UNDAF Outcome 3: By 2013, children, young people, women and men have improved quality of life through reduced malnutrition, morbidity and mortality, strengthened learning achievement and enhanced social protection*). There is one CP Outcome here which is particularly relevant to the gender programme - *CP Outcome 3.5: Vulnerable populations, especially children and women, benefit from quality social protection, particularly social welfare services, including in emergencies* [Table 7].

These links between the UNDAF results and the programme interventions clearly indicate that the gender programme is very much in line with the overall UNDAF in Timor-Leste. Sadly, the 2009-2013 UNDAF document itself only recognizes the gender programme as among four special initiatives that “fall outside the common results matrix of the UNDAF.”

It is also clear that the programme will be directly contributing to the achievement of Goal 3 (i.e. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women) and Goal 2 (i.e. Achieve Universal Primary Education) of the MDG Targets specifically adopted for Timor-Leste [Annex C]. These are specifically for the targets that are related to primary education (i.e. net enrollment and gender ratios), and the associated programme intervention here would be the strengthening of the Bolsa Mãe scheme of MSS, which is part of Outcome 2. The evaluation however estimates this intervention to be marginal (i.e.  $\pm 14\%$ ) in relation to the overall programme effort. Hence, it will be more accurate to state that the programme is largely contributing to a general thematic achievement of Goal 3, while partly assisting in achieving the targets for this goal and also for Goal 2.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The estimate of  $\pm 14\%$  is based on the UNDP allocation of the programme budget less the calculated management cost. UNDP is responsible for strengthening the Bolsa Mãe scheme of MSS.

## B. Effectiveness of the Programme

### 1. Achievement of Results<sup>14</sup>

#### a. Delivery of Financial Inputs

After receipt of a signed copy of the final programme document, the MDG-F Secretariat transferred the full programme budget of US\$ 4.955 million to the UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office by December 2008. The MDTF Office has so far passed on to the executing agencies, through their respective headquarters, the amount of US\$ 3.22 million ( $\pm 65\%$  of the budget) in two releases, as shown in Table 8.

**Table 8. Schedule of Fund Releases from MDTF Office to Executing Agency Headquarters**

Date	Amount (US\$)
December 15, 2008	1.73 million
June 15, 2010	1.49 million
	3.22 million

Source: MDTF Website

It was reported by the participating agencies that there was a delay in their receipt of the second fund transfer. This *late transfer of funds* (for the second transfer) was cited by them as one of the causes for the overall delay of the programme. The group discussion and interviews showed that this delay in the second fund transfer was caused by:

- *The Nature of the Commitment Rate System* - The commitment rate to be submitted to the MDTF had to be the combined commitments from all the five executing agencies, and not all the agencies were on the same pace in coming up with the commitment documents;
- *Difficulties in the Hiring of Personnel* - Because of the delay in hiring, Personnel Contracts could not be submitted as part of the commitment documents, and this factored into the first problem since personnel costs formed a large portion of the budget;
- *Delay in Intra-Agency Transfer* - In the case of one agency, there was an unexplained delay in the transfer of funds from the agency headquarters to the country office; and

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<sup>14</sup> The analytical framework used in this section is based on the concept of a “Results Chain”, which relates Inputs to Activities, and Activities to Results: (i.e. Inputs ► Activities ► Outputs ► Outcomes ► Impact). This concept implies the following cause-and-effect relationships: (a) financial and other inputs are needed to conduct the activities; (b) planned activities should be completed in order to achieve the outputs, (c) the attainment of outputs should lead towards the achievement of outcomes; and (c) the achievement of outcomes will lead to the realization of long-term impact. Hence, the framework is premised on the following premises: (a) a delay in the delivery of the inputs will also delay the conduct of activities, and ultimately, the results; (b) because the input requirements should match the planned activities, a lesser amount of inputs would also reduce the level of activities, and this will therefore affect the achievement of results; and (c) because the outputs are supposed to lead towards the outcomes, non-achievement of any output will place the attainment of outcomes (and the impact) at risk.

- *Technical Difficulty* - In the case of another agency, there was a technical problem related to the computer system which prevented the roll over of the first fund transfer to the second fund transfer.


The NGOs which were consulted during the mission further reported that this delay in funding also caused them to move back their respective activities from the original work schedules. There was also an apparent lag time between the delivery of the second tranche (in June 2010) and the NGOs' receipt of the funds, as some NGOs reported that they were able to get their allocations only a week before the mission (i.e. September 2010).

At the same time, it should be pointed out that the first year activities were itself delayed, and this means that the effects of the delay in the second fund transfer only further added to this delay. This delay in the first year activities will be discussed in the next section.

b. Completion of Activities

Based on the financial information provided in the latest [June 2010] monitoring report submitted by programme management, the evaluation estimates a low level of completion of activities, at less than half of the planned activities for the period. Among the programme outcomes, it is likely that the activities under Outcome 3 have been the most underachieved. Aside from the outputs associated with Outcome 3, Output 1.1 (pertaining to the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence and the action plans thereafter) also indicates a low level of completion of activities [Chart 3].<sup>1516</sup>

**Chart 3. Estimated Level of Completion of Activities, until June 2010**



Source: Consultant's estimates based on financial data in June 2010 Monitoring Report

The participating agencies also commonly perceive that the programme implementation is delayed. Aside from the late second fund transfer, the other identified major factors for the delay were:

- *Limited Capacities of Government and NGO Partners* - The programme was designed to work with government agencies which are in a capacity-building stage themselves. The executing agencies have to work with the pace and capacity of these government agencies in order to

<sup>15</sup> Based on the financial data, the completion level of activities could only be 37%. However, the financial data on Output 3.3 are not included in the monitoring report. There is also a discrepancy between the reported total amount disbursed (i.e. US\$ 1.2 million) and the sum of the disbursements broken down in the JPMF Table.

<sup>16</sup> This analysis is based on a financial (i.e. fund use) perspective, and not a substantial analysis of the activities.

create national ownership of the programme. There are also limited human resources among the NGO partners, and these NGOs have their own activities;

- *Change in Government Priorities* - Programme activities had to adjust to the plans and planning period of the government partners, and there were changes in the priorities of these government agencies;
- *Difficulties in Personnel Recruitment and Occurrence of Staff Turnover* - There were difficulties in hiring qualified people for the posts, the recruitment process was itself felt to be slow, and there were turnovers in the PMU and also among some focal persons in the executing agencies; and
- *Delay in the Approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence* - The programme assumed that the Law Against Domestic Violence will be approved  $\pm$  12 months after programme start. This did not happen within the expected period; as a consequence, the activities that were supposed to follow were also delayed.

In addition to these, the UNRC also holds an opinion that there was insufficient lead time for the programme to make the necessary preparations. The initial phase of the programme also coincided with a still unstable peace and order situation in Timor-Leste, and this condition prolonged the start-up of the programme. During the visit to Suai, the evaluation also observed that the basic facilities in power and transportation were not supportive to timely operations of the programme.<sup>17</sup>

One difficulty faced by the programme is that while the key persons have a sense that the programme could be delayed, the extent of the delay could not be quantified. The agency focal persons are also only privy to the delay details and issues within their respective agencies, and not yet at the level of the programme as a whole. There is also no remedial plan yet to address the problem of the delay, which indicates a weakness in programme planning. According to the acting programme manager, there was one PMC Meeting in which the problem of the delay was discussed among the agencies. However, this meeting only came up to the point of making the agencies aware of the problem, as no clear steps were agreed upon to solve the problem. At the level of the NSC, which had only one meeting after the start of the programme, it was reported that the problem of the delay was not discussed at all.

### c. Achievement of Outputs and Outcomes

Another difficulty in the programme is that the effect of the delay of activities on the achievement of the results is not yet readily ascertained. On the whole, there is a sense that the management of the programme is not yet results-oriented, because of the current preoccupation on some basic tasks (such as the recruitment of personnel and revision of the M & E Framework) and implementation of key activities (such as the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence). At the time of the mission, the programme implementers were also not yet aware on the possibilities for programme extension and were waiting for the result of this mid-term evaluation to make the necessary adjustments on the outputs and outcomes.

As shown in Chart 3, the pace of activities has been generally slow: except for the activities under Output 1.3, less than half of the planned activities to achieve the programme outputs for the first year of implementation (i.e. programme start + 12 months) have been completed as of the mid-term (i.e. programme start + 18 months). This means that that the progress in the achievement of the outputs is also considerably behind schedule, and it is likely that these outputs cannot be achieved within the original time frame.

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<sup>17</sup> The evaluation was informed that the last group of rebel soldiers surrendered to the GoTL only in 2008.

Output 1.1 had been delayed because the Law Against Domestic Violence took a longer time than expected to be approved by the national parliament of Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, this was finally passed on May 2010 and published as a law on July 7, 2010. With the passage of this law, it is expected that the achievement of Outputs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 would now be accelerated, which would hopefully lead to the overall achievement of Outcome 1 [Table 6].<sup>18</sup>

Outputs 1.2 and 1.3 were also dependent on the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence, and this was the reason cited for the slow progress of these outputs. The agencies responsible for Outputs 1.2 and 1.3 held back on the capacity-building and IEC activities because the passage of the law had to come first in the sequence of activities. However, compared to Output 1.1, there has been better performance on these components.

There was also slow progress in Output 2.1 because the CCT activities had to be aligned with the planning cycle and implementation pace of the MSS. Output 2.2 had also been affected by this constraint because the social protection services had to be coursed through the MSS at the national and district levels. Aside from this factor, there was also a need to work with NGOs in strengthening the referral systems and in providing the actual services to the women-victims.

The delay in the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence, which is part of Outcome 1, was among the reasons being cited for the overall delay of the programme. There is also an impression that this was a key factor for the programme delay. A comparative level of completion of activities as shown in Chart 3, crossed by the budget shares indicated in Table 5 and the structure of results summarized in Table 4, however show otherwise. Based on these data, it is the activities under Outcome 3 which contribute most to the overall delay because these have the lowest estimated level of completion (i.e. 5%) and these carry the greatest weight in terms of resource allocation (i.e. .33). It also follows that among the three programme outcomes, it is Outcome 3 which carries the most risk of not being achieved within the programme period.

Based on the discussion with the key persons from the agency in charge of Outcome 3, the following difficulties were met on the implementation of their activities:

- *Slow Take-Up by the Partner Government Agencies* - It took some time for the GoTL agencies that were supposed to work with the GRB component of the programme to understand its merits and to reconcile this new approach with their own budgeting practices;
- *Difficult and Lengthy Recruitment Process and Staff Turnover* - It was reported that there is an overall difficulty in hiring qualified people from the area, particularly for posts requiring specialized gender skills. The agency recruitment process was also observed to be long and tedious, and the first person who was recruited for the post also resigned afterwards;<sup>19</sup>
- *Lack of NGO Partners with Capacities in GRB* - It is believed that there is no NGO in the area which is focused on GRB, and it will take time to develop the interest and potential of the gender-based NGOs on GRB; and
- *Inability by Agency Headquarters to Adapt to Local Conditions and Lack of Autonomy by the Country Office to Make Decisions* - It is felt that centralized agency procedures (such as personnel hiring and NGO contracting) have not adapted to the special situation in Timor-Leste. It

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<sup>18</sup> This was a key output that was planned to be achieved by the first year of programme implementation (i.e. December 2009).

<sup>19</sup> It was reported that the recruitment of the agency focal person was finalized only in October 2009 because the TOR for the post had to be reviewed at headquarters and there was also a turnover at the selection panel. The hiring was also done by January 2010 because the last quarter of 2009 was not deemed to be a good time to begin the post. However, the person who was hired in January 2010 resigned by March 2010 to continue her studies abroad. The current focal person started her work in June 2010.

also turns out that the country office has limited decision-making capacity, particularly after an audit was completed.

## 2. Quality of Activities and Interventions

Training participants who were consulted during the mission noted the training courses rendered by the programme to be “very good”, “good” and “useful”. These are personnel from the Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU) and the MSS from Dili and Suai, as well as leaders of local organizations, who attended a two-week GBV Investigation course. They particularly noted the effort by the different agencies to put together their respective competencies into the course (e.g. UNFPA is in charge of the topic on women, UNICEF for children, and IOM on trafficking). There is however a weakness in establishing the effectiveness of these training courses because the M & E System is still not in place. Hence, the effectiveness of the training courses, perhaps in terms of how many cases are actually being resolved in time as a result of the beneficiaries’ participation in the courses, could not yet be verified at this time.

MSS also reported the technical assistance being given by the programme to the strengthening of the Bolsa Mãe scheme to be “very helpful”. The effectiveness of the intervention was also cited in terms of the increased number of beneficiaries under the scheme, and the enhanced integrity to be created by a single registry of beneficiaries.

SEPI also positively views the overall programme interventions, noting that the programme has integrated both the policy advocacy and service delivery needs of the GoTL for the promotion of gender equality.

## 3. Extent of Programme Outreach

Except for the interventions under Outcome 3, the reports so far indicate that the programme is covering the target GoTL Agencies and geographical areas that are specified in the programme document, as well as in the revised M & E Framework. The programme design is limited to only 5 out of the 13 districts in Timor-Leste: on this point, the evaluation believes that the 5 districts will continue to be covered by the programme activities (i.e. it is a feasible sample size) and that what is needed is more time to implement the full range of activities intended for these districts.

The limited reach of government agencies and NGOs in Outcome 3 is apparently due to the slow pace of activities under this component, for reasons that have been earlier stated.

## 4. Adherence to Expected Norms

### a. Compliance with the Joint Programme Concept

Another particular area of interest that the evaluation was asked to further look into is the application of the Joint Programme Concept in the programme. This is apparently coming off from the usual perception that the programme could just have been another effort to put together what the participating agencies have actually been doing before, and to simply consider this effort as a “joint programme”. While it turns out to be true that the five participating agencies in this case have actually been doing the same interventions prior to the programme, the evaluation believes that this should not be considered as an issue in joint programming because the agencies are rightfully pursuing their development competencies and mandates. Nevertheless, there is still an issue here, which is the later attribution of the programme results, considering that many of the programme activities have been carried over from the previous individual interventions by the agencies.

With reference to the UNDG Guidance Note [2003], there is no doubt that the programme being evaluated is conforming to the Joint Programme Concept: (i) a Common Work Plan (i.e. the AWP) and Budget is present; (ii) there are more than two UN Organizations and National Partners involved; (iii) the common work plan and budget (at least for the first year) is part of the Programme Document;

and (iv) the Joint Programme Document is signed by all the participating agencies and national partners. In addition to these, the MDG-F also included the agencies' adoption of a common Results Framework, which is part of the programme document.

It is however fairly easy for most programmes to pass as a "joint programme" given the standards set by the UNDG (and even with the additional criterion of a common results framework set in the MDG-F programme). From this perspective, the evaluation believes that there should really be no issue as to which programme is indeed a "joint programme" and which is not, and what could perhaps be more important is the determination of the degree of "jointness" of a so-called "joint programme" (i.e. how joint is the joint programme?). A Conceptual Note discussing this point has been appended by the Consultant as Annex G.

Applying this Conceptual Note, the Structure of Results earlier summarized in Table 4 indicates the overall robustness of the joint programme to be *medium*. While there is a high level of "jointness" in Outcome 1 in which 3 out of the 5 agencies are involved, this is offset by the "disjointedness" of Outcome 3 in which only 1 agency is responsible for delivering the whole outcome. While half of Outcome 2 is a joint effort by 3 agencies, the other half appears to be a sole initiative by only 1 agency [Table 4 and Annex G].

The aspect of joint planning by the participating UN Agencies (together with the GoTL Agencies) is evident from the way the programme is being implemented. It is clear from the discussions and reports that plans are being shared and synchronized. There is also an attempt for joint monitoring of the programme through the review of the Results Framework and the adoption of a new set of indicators. However, the revised Results Framework is still not yet operational: hence, the actual joint monitoring of the programme is yet to be tested. Joint accountability is also being observed through the preparation of common reports and also through the agencies' compliance with the combined commitment rate system.

#### b. Conformity to MDG-F Guidelines and Concepts

The programme is generally conforming to the MDG-F Joint Implementation Guidelines and its underlying concepts, while adapting those guidelines and concepts to the special situation in Timor-Leste. The prescribed governance structures have been set up and are functional: a National Steering Committee (NSC) and a Programme Management Committee (PMC) are in place, and the programme is providing opportunities for the UNRC to exercise strategic leadership over the participating UNCT Members, as part of the One UN Concept. Lead agencies have also been identified for both the executing agencies and the GoTL, and NGO participation in the programme activities is being actively sought.

National ownership of the programme is also being consciously recognized and exercised, although certain adaptations were made by programme management in view of the special situation in Timor-Leste. One of these is the mode of execution adopted for the programme, shown earlier in Table 5, which is mostly DEX than NEX because of the still limited capacities by the national counterparts. A second adaptation is the placement of the PMU within a UN Agency (i.e. UNIFEM) instead of a government ministry, which was apparently done in view of the same constraint in capacity by the counterpart government agencies. It was also explained that there was a change in the assignment of the lead government agency for the programme, from MSS to SEPI. The GoTL is nonetheless present in the governance of the programme, through its representation in both the NSC and the PMC. Some clarifications need to be done by programme management however, on the parameters of "national ownership" within the programme.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> On the five-point Lickert Scale used in the Survey Questionnaire for Government Agencies, both informants noted that the opinions and interests of their agencies were taken into account in the design and implementation of the programme only "To some extent", which indicate an average sense of ownership on the programme. The informants noted that the lack of agency capabilities were not adequately taken into account (in the programme design) and that their role in the programme is only in terms of policy.

## C. Efficiency of the Programme

### 1. Efficiency of the Management System

Aside from reconciling its dual features of being both a goal and a means of reaching this goal, the programme also faces a constraint in balancing the element of national ownership with the management efficiency of the programme. Part of the design had been to assign the lead role in the PMC to the GoTL Agency; however, as was stated earlier, there has been a turnover of such role within the GoTL itself, from the MSS to SEPI. According to MSS, this was appropriate because SEPI is more capable in terms of policy advocacy. Assigning the lead role to any government agency also meant that the PMC will have to adjust to the pace and priorities of the government agency, and also the personal (e.g. language and facilitation) skills of the agency representative to the committee.

Records show that the PMC and the NSC are indeed functional: the minutes of meetings indicate that there have been 4 meetings thus far for the PMC and 3 for the NSC. However, the NSC had only met once after programme start, and the limited time that had been allotted for this meeting (i.e. one hour) also reflect the scope and quality of the discussion. On the other hand, there appears to have been only one PMC meeting in 2009, and the meetings in 2010 were held from 1.5 to 3 hours [Table 9]. Overall, the executing agencies perceive that the PMC Meetings have focused on group planning, information sharing and inter-agency coordination, and is only starting to function as a mechanism for collective problem-solving.<sup>21</sup>

There is also a perception at the NSC level that their meetings have been only “formal”, and that the substantial issues pertaining to the programme are not discussed. One administrative weakness cited in this regard is that there is not really much time to study the programme reports and the other relevant documents, which are given to them only one day before the meeting. Programme management however explained that this is partly due to a difficulty in setting a common date and time for the meetings of the NSC, which are composed by very busy people.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> There was one PMC Meeting in which the problem of the delayed second fund transfer was discussed.

<sup>22</sup> The NSC Members are the UNRC, the Minister of Economy and Development, and the AECID Representative in Timor-Leste.



**Table 9. Details of NSC and PMC Meetings**

	<b>Date Held</b>	<b>Duration of Meeting</b>	<b>Topics Discussed</b>
NSC Meetings	October 11, 2007	45 minutes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduction about the MDG-F</li> <li>• Role of the NSC</li> <li>• Joint Programme Document</li> </ul>
	September 18, 2008	45 minutes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updates on the Joint Programme</li> </ul>
	May 6, 2009	1 hour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2008 Annual Report</li> <li>• Quarter 1 2009 Activities</li> <li>• 2009 Annual Work Plan</li> <li>• Communications and advocacy activities</li> <li>• Endorsement of Nutrition JP</li> </ul>
PMC Meetings	December 17, 2009	3.5 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress Report</li> <li>• Work Plan</li> <li>• Mid-Term Evaluation</li> </ul>
	March 18, 2010	1.5 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2009 Annual Report</li> <li>• 2010 Work Plan</li> <li>• Reporting and M &amp; E System</li> </ul>
	July 16, 2010	3 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme Implementation</li> <li>• Mid-Term Evaluation</li> </ul>
	August 6, 2010	1.15 hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mid-Term Evaluation</li> <li>• Communication and Advocacy Strategy</li> </ul>

Sources: Minutes of NSC and PMC Meetings

Over and above these, however, the evaluation believes that much of the administrative problem in organizing the NSC and PMC meetings, as well as the larger challenges in the management of the programme, is due to the absence of a PMU. Up until the time of the mission, the programme still had to hire an International Programme Coordinator (IPC), while the post of National Programme Coordinator (NPC) was filled up late, been turned over once, and had also not been filled until this time [Table 10]. In the meantime, programme management is being performed by an Acting Programme Manager who is concurrently the Country Programme Manager of UNIFEM. There is general acknowledgement that the Acting Programme Manager is overworked, and that the non-functioning of the PMU has been creating a negative effect on the programme.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Aside from the MDG-F Joint Programme, it turns out that there are 4 other programmes under the portfolio of the UNIFEM Country Programme Manager.

**Table 10. Staff Hiring and Turnover Data (as of September 2010)**

Item	Date Hired	Turnover Rate	Status
International Programme Coordinator	-	-	Not yet filled
National Programme Coordinator	January 2010	1x	Not yet filled

Source: Interview with the Acting Programme Manager

The reasons that were cited for the challenges in staff hiring and management at the PMU were:<sup>24</sup>

- *Budget Adjustment* – According to programme management, there was a need to adjust the personnel cost because of the final budget cut. This resulted in the hiring of a short-term consultant (who helped in revising the M & E Framework) in lieu of a full-time IPC;<sup>25</sup>
- *Lengthy and Tedious Recruitment Process* – Recruitment was done at the regional office, and there were changes in policies and also personnel at the regional office which lengthened the recruitment process. Programme management also felt that the recruitment system was not able to adapt to the special situation in Timor-Leste (i.e. standard international qualifications were set in the TOR which are hard to apply locally).
- *Limited Availability of Qualified Local Applications* – A related reason raised is that in general, there is a limited supply of local applications who would meet the qualifications of an NPC.

The NPC who was hired in January 2010 resigned after only three months at the post. Programme management reported that this was due to the pressure demanded by the work. The former staff who was also consulted by the mission confirmed this information, and also cited related inter-personal reasons for leaving the programme.

Thus far, the main accomplishment of the PMU was the review and revision of the M & E Framework, which is a separate undertaking from the coordinative, reporting and other management tasks being performed by the Acting Programme Manager. The results-oriented M & E System is still to be tested and applied nonetheless, which is limiting the present ability of the programme management system to be informed on the progress of achievement of results and to make corresponding actions.

Aside from these gaps in problem-solving, administration, and results monitoring, the programme is also obviously weak in risk management. A review of the JPMF shows that the delay in the approval of the Law on Domestic Violence has been identified as a risk factor (i.e. “Slow progress on the promulgation of draft laws e.g. Law against Domestic Violence and the Penal Code, and associated regulations”), together with the risks associated in working with the government (i.e. “GoTL identified for capacity development is not able or willing to invest the necessary time and effort”) and lack of qualified local staff (i.e. “Difficulty in locating suitably qualified personnel”). However, risk assessments on these were not done and the corresponding mitigation strategies were not adopted.

<sup>24</sup> There was also a turnover in the coordinator position at the UNRC Office but informants felt that this had not affected the programme.

<sup>25</sup> The original budget submitted to the MDG-F Steering Committee/Secretariat was US\$ 5.96 million, and the final approved budget was US\$ 4.96 million.

It is also unclear if the programme has benefitted from the previous lessons in joint programming. The previous lessons in joint programming that were indicated in the programme document and cited during the mission are apparently generic learnings from the agency collaborations with the GoTL. There has been no information pertaining to the lessons learned from the first two joint programmes in Timor-Leste [Table 3].

Programme synergy has also been explained generally, and not yet in a way particular to the programme. While the matter of synergy is also still to be elaborated well by the programme, it is plausible that synergistic effects are being created or will be created through: (a) the integration of the interventions on domestic violence with the trafficking of women and their social protection; (b) the combination of legal advocacy with follow-up planning processes and public awareness campaigns; and (c) the common training courses that are being implemented jointly by the participating agencies.

## 2. Financial Efficiency of the Programme

The participating agencies are observing standard Quality and Cost-Based Systems (QCBS) in the procurement of goods and services. It is clear that financial efficiency is being achieved in this aspect. However, as implied from the previous discussions, there are obvious trade-offs in applying the system to the procurement of personnel (i.e. the recruitment of staff) to the overall management efficiency of the programme and its achievement of results. Programme management will hence need to explore if there are net benefits being contributed by the current procurement system, or the mode of its application, to the programme.<sup>26</sup>

Counterpart resources from the government agencies and NGOs have also been mobilized by the programme. However, these are not yet accounted for under the present financial reporting system; hence, the proportionate value of the local counterpart to the total programme cost cannot yet be ascertained.

There has been considerable underspending of the programme budget: out of the US\$ 1.7 million which was transferred in December 2008, only US\$ 1.3 million (74%) had been disbursed as of mid-term. The financial pattern has differed among the agencies: three out of the five executing agencies posted positive variances from the first transfer amount by mid-term, while two agencies managed to overspend beyond their initial budgets [Table 11]. On the whole, this situation became a problem for the agencies which had already run out of funds, but could not otherwise bilaterally apply for the second transfer because they had to wait for the rest of the agencies to collectively comply with the minimum 70% commitment rate.

Nevertheless, after receipt of the documents which showed that the agencies had complied with the 70% commitment rate and the other related requirements, a second transfer was made by the MDTF Office near the mid-term period (i.e. around US\$ 1.49 million on June 15, 2010). Based on the latest data provided for the evaluation, the total disbursement rate had slightly moved up to 45%, from 39% in the mid-period. The trend also indicates that there will be a continuity of the first financial pattern: two agencies are likely to overspend, while there will be significant underspending on the whole [Table 11].

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<sup>26</sup> In theory, it is also plausible to adapt the same system to the level of local qualities (and also costs), although the expected difficulty here would be the setting of a benchmark.

**Table 11. Selected Financial Data**

	Amount Transferred (US\$)		Amount Disbursed (US\$)		Disbursement Rate	
	As of 2008	As of 2010	Mid-Term	Latest	Mid-Term	Latest
IOM	487,791	983,259	641,152	735,848 <sup>27</sup>	65%	75%
UNIFEM	539,673	889,629	140,994	140,994 <sup>28</sup>	16%	16%
UNFPA	321,128	619,786	241,299	241,299 <sup>29</sup>	39%	39%
UNICEF	155,150	310,300	167,519	202,372 <sup>30</sup>	54%	65%
UNDP	209,998	419,996	77,559	138,289 <sup>31</sup>	18%	33%
Total	1,713,740	3,222,970	1,268,523	1,458,802	39%	45%

Sources: MDTF Website, January to June 2010 Monitoring Report, Agency Reports

#### D. Prospects for Sustainability

The level of discussion at the PMC and NSC has not yet proceeded to the extent of preparing for the exit of the programme and the sustainability of its interventions. Still, it is obvious from the programme design and expressed in the programme document that the sustainability strategy is directed towards: (i) the internal capacity-building of government agencies and NGOs; and (ii) the adoption of favorable policies and plans (e.g. laws and gender-responsive budgets) that will institutionalize the programme results.

There is no doubt that the legal change/s and effects brought about by the intervention will most likely be sustained for an indefinite period of time. However, policies that are below the level of a law (e.g. GRB policies) always carry the risk of being altered or disregarded, especially in the context of Timor-Leste where there are many government priorities. It is not also easy to apply the strategy of capacity-building in a country where there are many capacities to build, and where one basic problem is the shortage of qualified people. Finally, the financial capacity of the local counterparts is also presently low, which makes it highly unlikely for them to sustain the programme activities without donor support.

<sup>27</sup> Amount reported to the evaluation as of September 23, 2010. Also, the amount is recognized as an “expenditure” in the worksheet.

<sup>28</sup> Amount indicated in the Monitoring Report as of June 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Amount indicated in the Monitoring Report as of June 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Amount reported to the evaluation as of September 16, 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Amount reported to the evaluation as of the third quarter of 2010. Also, the amount is recognized as the sum of “expenditures” in the worksheet.

## IV. Conclusions and Other Remarks

### A. Conclusions

1. There remain serious challenges on the achievement of the MDGs in Timor-Leste by 2015. As such, the role of the joint programme in helping to achieve these goals is important, and it is clear that the programme is contributing to the achievement of Goals 3 and 2.
2. The joint programme is also visibly contributing to the achievement of the objectives set in the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Window of the MDG-F. Programme effort is devoted to the reduction of women's vulnerability to violence and conflict in Timor-Leste. The programme is also intervening in the aspect of promoting women's access to public resources and achieving equal capabilities in education.
3. The programme is clearly relevant to the plans and priorities of the GoTL, as well as to the plans and goals set by the UN System in Timor-Leste. Its internal relevance has also been established; the designed interventions correspond to most of the identified problems, a high level of adaptation to local conditions is being respected and followed, and there is a logical link between the outputs and outcomes.
4. The programme has been effective so far in terms of conforming to the expected norms in joint programming, a perceived high quality of its activities and interventions, and in attaining its outreach. It is complying with the joint programme concept, although the evaluation assesses it to be a "medium" joint programme. It is operating within the MDG-F standards, its activities and interventions are positively appreciated, and it is meeting the set outreach targets.
5. However, the overall effectiveness of the programme is being pulled down by difficulties in achieving its expected results. There has been slow progress in the implementation of activities which is putting the achievement of results at risk. Both external and internal factors have affected the delay:
  - 5.1 The local social, economic and political conditions make the level of difficulty in joint programme implementation in Timor-Leste higher than in most countries. The programme was designed to work with and through local institutions that were basically weak, and qualified local human resources were limited.
  - 5.2 The process of programme formulation started after the occurrence of destabilizing events that shook Timor-Leste in 2006. The programme plan underestimated the effects of these events, and programme commencement coincided with lingering security concerns and political uncertainties which contributed to the lengthy start-up period.
  - 5.3 The programme design was ambitious. The types of changes selected by the programme are mostly difficult to achieve, especially in the context of Timor-Leste. The sequential relationships of these changes further add to the complexity of the change effects.<sup>32</sup>
  - 5.4 The risks in programme delivery were not spread evenly among the participating agencies; considerable risk was taken in assigning most of the financial inputs and programme deliverables to a single agency, which was also assigned the task of programme management. This arrangement has not worked well for the programme.
  - 5.5 Agency weaknesses in making timely decisions and actions, and particularly in the staffing function, contributed to the delay.

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<sup>32</sup> Among the five types of changes which are stated on page 11, the change in public awareness is perhaps the only type which is fairly easy to achieve.

6. The management system is working and is performing the basic planning, information sharing and coordination tasks. However, it is only starting to develop into a system for problem-solving and results achievement. While cost efficiency is being observed, there has been considerable underspending by the programme as a whole.
7. While programme synergy still has to be studied and elaborated, there are potential synergistic effects being created by the programme from the integration of interventions and activities.
8. While the programme is not the first joint programme to be implemented in Timor-Leste, it could serve as the first real attempt to review the joint programme concept and learn from its lessons.
9. It is still too early for the programme to plan for its sustainability, and the premises for such are not yet occurring in the present period. Except for the continuity of the change in law which is being attributed to the programme, the chances of sustaining the programme activities and interventions beyond the programme period are low. Much of this low prospect for sustainability is due to the weak state of institutions in Timor-Leste, and an apparently longer time needed to capacitate these institutions.

#### B. Notable Practices

The following programme practices have been observed and positively noted by the evaluation:

1. National ownership over the programme is consistently being respected and practiced. With this in view, the participating agencies have made extra efforts to adapt the programme to local practices and limitations.
2. The delivery of joint outputs and outcomes, as well as the joint implementation of activities, by several agencies are distinct features of this programme that could be interesting areas of further study. The programme has potential to contribute to a greater understanding of the Joint Programme Concept.
3. The sharing of knowledge from the experiences of CCT schemes in other countries was reported to be an effective means of improving the local Bolsa Mãe scheme. MSS has positively confirmed the practical and strategic contributions of the programme to the scheme.

#### C. Lessons Learned So Far

The lessons that can be derived from the experience would be the following:

1. In a post-conflict country like Timor-Leste, it is necessary that a conflict assessment be done and a section on this should form part of the Joint Programme Document. The programme design should be based on the results of this conflict assessment, aside from the thematic (i.e. gender, environment, and culture) assessment.
2. In a joint programme, it is better to diversify the risks in programme delivery across the participating agencies through a balanced distribution of the results and resources, than to concentrate the risks in a single agency.
3. Aside from identifying the external risk factors in the JPMF, there should also be a risk assessment and an identification of the mitigation strategies that would be adopted for each risk. The risk assessment and mitigation strategies could be part of the Joint Programme Document, or the Programme Inception Document.

Risk monitoring should also be done as part of the overall M & E of the programme. For this purpose, the format of the Monitoring Report prepared by the MDG-F Secretariat has included a section on the monitoring of the risk factors, and this section should be taken seriously by the programme implementers.

4. While the combined commitment rate system encourages the strengthening of joint programming, it does not provide an incentive to agencies that are otherwise performing well. The system also increases the risk of overall poor delivery in an already risky programme design.
5. To the best extent possible, the TOR for programme staff positions and partners should be adapted to local limitations.

## V. Recommendations

### A. Recommendations on the Programme Design

1. First and foremost, it will be necessary for the participating agencies to review and revise the programme results. A key task in the review is to determine how much of the outputs and outcomes, as measured by their indicators, can still be achieved within the remaining period. From the point of view of the evaluation, the remaining period can be extended to at least 6 months after the original programme end (i.e. May 2012).
2. It follows that the indicators in the revised M & E Framework will have to be reduced to realistic levels, as the evaluation has found that there are too many indicators in the revised version of the said framework. The evaluation suggests a maximum of five indicators for each result, and a minimum of two, or based on the number of participating agencies responsible for the delivery of each output and outcome, whichever is higher.
3. The programme budget for Year 3 or the third fund transfer will most likely also have to be revised (i.e. reduced) based on the new Results Framework. The activities for each output which are doable within the remaining period (i.e. the original programme end plus 6 months) will have to be identified, and a consolidated Gantt Chart prepared afterwards. The costs of these activities will then also have to be re-estimated.
4. The MDG-F Guidelines allow the UNRC, in consultation with the participating agencies and with agreement by the NSC, an option to transfer up to around US\$ 1 million between the participating agencies. This option should now be considered, particularly in transferring some amounts from Outcome 3 to Outcomes 1 and 2.<sup>33</sup>
5. The JPMF should be updated with the final set of indicators. The risk factors in the JPMF should also be updated, a risk assessment should be conducted, and mitigation strategies should be adopted for each risk factor.

### B. Recommendations on the Management of the Programme

1. First, the Improvement Plan to be adopted by the PMC/NSC should include a definite timeline for the establishment of the PMU. The MDG-F Secretariat will however need to agree with the timeline indicated in the improvement plan.
2. It should be considered that transferring the administration of the PMU to another agency at this time will also entail some turnover costs, especially considering that there appears to be on-going efforts to fill in the PMU positions at the soonest possible time. However, if the PMU is still not yet filled in within the time indicated in the improvement plan and agreed upon by the MDG-F Secretariat, the option to relocate the PMU to another agency should be considered.
3. Based on the revised Results Framework and budget, a minimum six-month extension of the programme should be requested by the NSC. This additional six-month period is a fair approximation of the lag time created by the delay in the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence.
4. The TOR for the PMC and NSC should be reviewed and if necessary, updated for these mechanisms to be oriented towards problem-solving and results management. A related step would be to identify which problems could be solved internally by the participating agencies, which problems need to be processed and solved at the level of the PMC, and which cannot be solved at this level and need to be raised at the level of the NSC.

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<sup>33</sup> Prior information should also be given to the MDTF and the MDG-F Secretariat.



5. The programme should start the documentation of its lessons on joint programming and contribute those lessons to the knowledge management system of the UN. Discussions on the programme exit should also begin, with a viewpoint of clarifying the expectations for the sustainability of the programme.

C. Recommendations to the MDG-F Secretariat

1. In consideration of the special circumstances in Timor-Leste, it would be reasonable for the Secretariat to consider a minimum six-month extension of the joint programme. This six-month extension being recommended by the evaluation is based on the estimated lag time created by the delay in the approval of the Law Against Domestic Violence. However, the granting of the extension should subject to the following minimum requirements:
  - 1.1 A revised Results Framework, Work Plan and Budget covering the extended period (i.e. programme end plus at least six months) is submitted by the PMC/NSC. The revised documents should reflect a transfer of financial inputs and results from Outcome 3 to Outcomes 1 and 2, as suggested earlier; and
  - 1.2 The Improvement Plan to be adopted by the PMC/NSC should indicate a definite timeline for the establishment of the PMU, and a clear and agreed upon option for the transfer of its administration should this condition not be met.
2. If possible, some flexibility in the fund transfer system should be allowed to enable the agencies which are performing well to access their third transfer of funds. Per agency commitments should be considered, in lieu of the combined commitment rate system. At the same time, there should be continued assurance on the joint accountability of the programme. This can be done by requiring collective PMC endorsement on the special request for fund transfers to agencies which are in urgent need of the funds.
3. The MDG-F Secretariat should clarify the protocols in revising the M & E Framework for the joint programmes, in terms of how much changes can be made at the country level and which changes need to be cleared first at Secretariat level.
4. Regarding the issue of results attribution, the evaluation recommends that the terminal evaluation of the programme give special attention to this concern. By far, this mid-term evaluation holds a view that this MDG-F Programme may claim high or full attribution only in Output 1.2 (i.e. capacity-building after the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence) and Output 1.3 (i.e. awareness-raising after the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence). This hypothesis will however need to be tested later during the terminal evaluation phase.

## Annex A. Itinerary of the Field Mission

September 11 (Saturday)		Consultant's Arrival in Dili
September 13 (Monday)	AM PM	Preliminary Meeting with the Evaluation Reference Group Preliminary Meeting with the Acting Programme Manager
September 14 (Tuesday)	AM PM	Interview with the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Interview with the AECID Director Reflection and Write-Up
September 15 (Wednesday)	AM PM	Reflection and Write-Up Interview with the Acting Programme Manager
September 16 (Thursday)	AM PM	Interview with UNIFEM Focus Group Discussion with UN Agencies
September 17 (Friday)	AM PM	Focus Group Discussion with Government Agencies Focus Group Discussion with NGOs
September 18 (Saturday)		Site Visit to Dili
September 19 (Sunday)		Reflection and Write-Up
September 20 (Monday)		Site Visit to Suai
September 21 (Tuesday)		Return to Dili
September 22 (Wednesday)	AM PM	Interview with MSS Director Reflection and Write-Up
September 23 (Thursday)	AM PM	Reflection and Write-Up Final Meeting with the Acting Programme Manager
September 24 (Friday)	AM PM	Preparation for Debriefing Debriefing with the Evaluation Reference Group
September 25 (Saturday)		Consultant's Departure from Dili

## **Annex B. List of References**


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## Annex C. MDG Targets and Accomplishments in Timor-Leste

Goals and Indicators	Target (2015)	Actual (2007)
<u>Goal 1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty headcount ratio</li> <li>• Poverty gap ratio</li> <li>• Share of poorest quintile in national consumption</li> <li>• Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age</li> <li>• Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption</li> </ul>	18% 8% n. a. 31% n. a.	49% 15% 8% 49% n. a.
<u>Goal 2. Achieve Universal Primary Education</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Net enrolment ratio in primary education</li> <li>• Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5</li> <li>• Literacy rate of 15–24 year-olds</li> <li>• Literacy rate of 15 year-olds and over</li> </ul>	86% 100% 100% 100%	63% 73% 85% 58%
<u>Goal 3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education</li> <li>• Ratio of literate women to men aged 15–24</li> <li>• Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector</li> <li>• Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament</li> </ul>	100% 100% n. a. n. a.	n. a. 93% 36% 28%
<u>Goal 4. Reduce Child Mortality</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under-five mortality rate</li> <li>• Infant mortality rate</li> <li>• Proportion of one year-old children immunized against measles</li> </ul>	96/1000 53/1000 100%	n. a. n. a. 59%
<u>Goal 5. Improve Maternal Health</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maternal mortality ratio</li> <li>• Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel</li> <li>• Contraceptive Prevalence Rate for all methods</li> <li>• The adolescent (15-19 years of age) birth rate</li> <li>• Antenatal care coverage</li> <li>• The unmet need for family planning</li> </ul>	252/100000 60% n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.	n. a. 41% 20% n. a. n. a. n. a.

Goals and Indicators	Target (2015)	Actual (2007)
<p><u>Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HIV/AIDS prevalence among pregnant women aged 15–24 year</li> <li>• Condom use rate within the contraceptive prevalence rate and among high risk groups</li> <li>• Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS</li> <li>• Incidence and death rates associated with malaria</li> <li>• Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures</li> <li>• Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis</li> <li>• Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under Direct Observable Treatment Short-Course</li> </ul>	<p>n. a. n. a. n. a. 45/1000 60% n. a. n. a.</p>	<p>n. a. n. a. 66% 206/1000 52% 447/100000 80% and 40%</p>
<p><u>Goal 7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source</li> <li>• Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation</li> <li>• Proportion of households with access to secure tenure</li> </ul>	<p>78% 60% n. a.</p>	<p>60% 47% 88%</p>
<p><u>Goal 8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Net ODA, total and percentage of OECD/DAC donors GNI to the Least Developed Countries</li> <li>• The unemployment rate of young people aged 15–24 years, by sex and total</li> <li>• Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population</li> <li>• Internet users per 100 population</li> </ul>	<p>n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.</p>	<p>\$210 m 10% 0.5% 1%</p>

## Annex D. Hypothetical Problems Tree



## Annex E. Technical Note on Some OECD/DAC Definition of Terms and Its Implications on Programme/Project Designs<sup>34</sup>

In 2007, the OECD/DAC came up with a set of proposed definitions for some key development terms (i.e. the Proposed Harmonized Terminology). This was a revised version of the 2002 set of definitions. Hereunder is a summary of the relevant definitions and the Consultant comments on these definitions:

2002 Definition	2007 Proposed Terminology	Consultant's Comments
<p><b>Results</b> - The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention.</p>	<p><b>Results</b> - Results are changes in a state or condition which derive from a cause-and- effect relationship. There are three types of such changes (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) which can be set in motion by a development intervention – its output, outcome and impact.</p>	<p><i>In both definitions, “output” is recognized as a “result”. Based on the 2007 proposed definition, a “result” is a change in a state or condition.</i></p>
<p><b>Outputs</b> - The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.</p>	<p><b>Outputs</b> - The products and services which result from the completion of activities within a development intervention.</p>	<p><i>Based on the latest 2007 proposed definition, an “output” is still a “result”, although in the form of a “product” or “service”.</i></p>

The table on the next page now shows some examples of the outputs formulated in the programme document and the Consultant's comments on these formulations based on the above definitions:

<sup>34</sup> This note was prepared by the Consultant for the purpose of elaborating the findings and opinions raised in this evaluation report. It does not necessarily represent the views of the MDG-F and any of the organizations mentioned in this report.

Output	Consultant's Comments
<p>Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented on domestic violence and human trafficking at national and local levels</p> <p>Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials, members of local assemblies and local council members</p> <p>Civil society (NGOs, Women's groups, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for, scrutinize and monitor public expenditures</p>	<p><i>Based on the 2007 definition, this can pass as an "output", but these can also be the same as the "activities".</i></p> <p><i>Which is the "result"? Is it the development of the tools or the increase in knowledge and skills? Based on the 2007 definition, it should be the tools. Therefore, the indicator should only be related to the tools.</i></p> <p><i>Based on the 2007 definition, this should be acceptable as an "output". However, this formulation can also be the same as the "activity" leading towards the output!</i></p>



## **Annex F. Questionnaires Used for the Evaluation**

### NSC Members

1. To what extent is the GE Joint Programme relevant to UN Policies and Priorities in Timor-Leste?
  
2. To what extent and in what ways is the GE Joint Programme contributing to the One UN Concept and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?
  
3. In your opinion, are the governance and management structures for the GE Joint Programme (i.e. National Steering Committee and Programme Management Committee) working well?
  
4. Would you think that there were past lessons and experiences in joint programming which were taken into account in the planning and implementation of the GE Joint Programme?
  
5. In your view, how will synergy among the UN Agencies be created or is already being created through the GE Joint Programme?
  
6. What good practices and lessons being learned from the GE Joint Programme in Timor-Leste do you think would be useful for other joint programmes in other countries?
  
7. What do you think are the major problems and challenges being faced by the GE Joint Programme in Timor-Leste and how could these be possibly solved?

### Executing Agencies

1. Based on your own assessment, to what extent is the GE Joint Programme progressing towards the attainment of results?
  
2. Is the GE Joint Programme on track according to schedule?
  
3. In your opinion, what are the factors that contribute to progress or delay in the implementation process and the attainment of programme results?
  
4. What good practices and lessons being learned from the GE Joint Programme in Timor-Leste do you think would be useful for other joint programmes in other countries?
  
5. What do you think are the major problems and challenges being faced by the GE Joint Programme in Timor-Leste and how could these be possibly solved?

Government Agencies and NGOs

1. In your opinion, to what extent were the opinions and interests of your agency been taken into account in the design and implementation of the GE Joint Programme? Please choose from among the following choices and elaborate briefly:

*To the best possible extent    To a large extent    To some extent    To the least extent    Not at all*

2. In your view, to what extent is the GE Joint Programme relevant to the needs and priorities of your agency? Please choose from among the following choices and elaborate briefly:

*Highly relevant    Relevant    Somehow relevant    Least relevant    Not at all*

3. Is the GE Joint Programme on track according to schedule?

4. What are the factors that are contributing to the progress or delay in the implementation of the GE Joint Programme?

5. What do you think are the major problems and challenges being faced by the GE Joint Programme in Timor-Leste and how could these be possibly solved?

## Annex G. Conceptual Note in Determining the Robustness of a Joint Programme<sup>35</sup>

1. A Joint Programme involves two or more UN Agencies working together to achieve a common result. This common result could however be an outcome and/or an output (and even an impact!).
2. There are participating agencies which are responsible for the implementation of activities specific to each output. Following the Results Chain concept, these are also the agencies that are therefore responsible for the delivery of each output. It follows that the agencies responsible for the delivery of outputs under each outcome is also (partly or solely) responsible for the achievement of that particular outcome. In the MDG-F Joint Programmes, these relationships can be seen from the Results Framework.
3. The simplest form of a Joint Programme could therefore be seen from a Results Framework in which each of at least two participating agencies is responsible for its own outcome [see Form 1 below]. These outcomes would then be linked to a common UNDAF Outcome.
4. Another form of a Joint Programme could be seen from a Results Framework in which at least two participating agencies are responsible for a common output. This means that while the agencies are each implementing their own activities in accordance with their respective expertise and mandates, they are working towards the achievement of a basic result – the output. It follows that the output cannot be achieved if the participating agencies do not complete their activities [see Form 3 below].
5. An intermediary form of a Joint Programme could be seen from a Results Framework in which at least two participating agencies are each responsible for the delivery of their respective outputs, although leading towards a common outcome [see Form 2 below].
6. While the three forms can be considered as joint programmes, it is obvious that the first form is a weaker version compared to the second and the third (i.e. the first form is what can be called in plain language as “just an effort by the agencies to put it all together”). The robustness of a joint programme can be determined from the way that its results are structured, as shown in this example:

### Example: 2 Agencies, 2 Outcomes, 3 Forms

Result	Participating Agencies		
	Form 1	Form 2	Form 3
<b>Outcome 1</b> Output 1.1 Output 1.2	Agency 1 Agency 1 Agency 1	Agency 1 and 2 Agency 1 Agency 2	Agency 1 and 2 Agency 1 and 2 Agency 1 and 2
<b>Outcome 2</b> Output 2.1 Output 2.2	Agency 2 Agency 2 Agency 2	Agency 1 and 2 Agency 1 Agency 2	Agency 1 and 2 Agency 1 and 2 Agency 1 and 2

7. In this example, the level of robustness of the Form 1 JP can be considered as a “low”, “medium” in Form 2, and “high” in Form 3.

<sup>35</sup> This note was prepared by the Consultant for the purpose of elaborating the findings and opinions raised in this evaluation report. It does not necessarily represent the views of the MDG-F and any of the organizations mentioned in this report.

## **Annex H. List of Persons Consulted**

### MDG-F Secretariat

1. Ms. Paula Pelaez - Programme Advisor
2. Mr. Adan Ruiz - Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor

### NSC Members

1. Mr. Finn Reske-Nielsen - UN Resident Coordinator
2. Mr. Francisco de Asis López Sanz - AECID Director

### Executing Agencies

1. Ms. Elaine Tan - Country Programme Manager, UNIFEM
2. Ms. Santana Soares - Focal Person, UNIFEM
3. Ms. Heather Komenda - Focal Person, IOM
4. Ms. Katherine Lester - Focal Person, UNDP
5. Mr. Ricardo Dutra - Technical Person, UNDP/MSS
6. Ms. Min Yuan - Alternate Focal Person, UNICEF
7. Ms. Dulce Soares - Focal Person, UNICEF
8. Ms. Auxiliadora dos Santos - Alternate Focal Person, UNICEF
9. Ms. Caroline Meenagh - Focal Person, UNFPA
10. Ms. Claudia Flores - Technical Person, UNIFEM/SEPI

### GoTL Agencies

1. Ms. Carmen d' Cruz - Director of Social Services, MSS
2. Mr. Armando da Costa - Director of Gender and Policy Development, SEPI
3. Mr. Aleixo da Costa - Chief, Dili Vulnerable Persons Unit
4. Ms. Shahzadi Crulfam - Team Leader, Dili Vulnerable Persons Unit
5. Mr. Quintino - Suai Child Protection Officer, MSS
6. Ms. Irene - Officer, Suai Vulnerable Persons Unit

### NGOs

1. Ms. Mira da Silva - Focal Person, PRADET
2. Ms. Maria Barreto - Focal Person, FOKUPERS
3. Ms. Natalia Fausto - Alternate Focal Person, FOKUPERS
4. Ms. Teresita Verdial - Alternate Focal Person, Alola Foundation
5. Ms. Joana Villanovo - Focal Person, Alola Foundation
6. Ms. Melita Herrera - Alternate Focal Person, JSMP
7. Mr. Luis Olivera - Focal Person, JSMP